LAND A N n ^\' A T E R 
March 23. 
1916, 
***inmoninf^ classes older or yountjor than those alrcudy 
summoned in the two other countries which are fully 
conscript and feelinj,' the exhaustion of m^n, Germany 
and France. She is i)roved to be calling upon those 
resources earlier than her Allies or opponents. She has 
even made it legal, in case of necessity, to call men up 
to the age of 55. 
It is this last group of facts, the demonstrable ex- 
haustion of men as proved by the nature of the drafts 
now required, which is by far the most signilicant of all 
three. It is the conclusion of those from whom I draw 
these statistics, and the legitimate conclusion — since 
she has clearly gone further in abnormal methods of 
recruitment than any other Power — that the Austro- 
Hungarian permanent losses, added to the floating 
margin of temporary losses is more severe in projiortion 
to the ultimate numbers available than is the case even in 
(iermany, and, u forliori. more severe than is the case in 
France. And that evidence inclines us much more 
nearly to the figure of three million than to the lower 
hgure of 2,400,000. 
It is true that the Au^tro-Hungarian losses, if they 
approach or reach tluee million, are much larger in pro- 
portion to the armies in the field tlian the corresponding 
losses of the French or the German or the British. F-vcn 
if the Germans have lost four millions, an Austrian total 
of three millions would be disjiorportionatelv high. But 
one's belief that they have approximated to that loss is 
founded up()n the extreme measures they are already 
taking to till the gaps in their ranks. 
Befont leaving the matter there is a way of con- 
sidering it which should not be neglected and which 
confirms this conclusion. 
We must not lofe sight of the fact that though 
a lo.ss of three millions is higher even than the German loss 
in i)roportion to the effectives in the field, it is not hi'^lier 
in proportion to total population. The total population 
of the Dual Monarchy is to that of the German limpire 
(by the last statistics) as rather more than 50 is to 64, 
and in that proportion an Austrian loss of three millions 
would only mean a (ierman loss of about three millions 
and seven-eighths. 
To sum up : — There is no very precise conclusion 
obtainable upon Austro-Hungariaii losses from our present 
evidence. We can only arrive at a margin of error as 
wide as that between 2{ millions and 3 millions, i.e., 
a margin of over 13 per cent. Our most reliable 
form of evidence gives us no more than the general 
statements, that the supeiior exhaustion of the 
Austro-Hungarian recruitment points to a loss certainly 
superior (in proportion) to that of the other belligerents, 
and that this would mean a loss superior to the lowest 
of 2 j millions or 2,400,000, and probably nearer three 
millions. 
THE FALL OF VON TIRPITZ 
By Arthur Pollen 
IF the fall of von Tirpitz has mystified us in this 
country, it seems to have puzzled his country- 
men no less. That the excuse of ill health is a 
mere excuse, and that in fact he has been dis- 
missed, and dismissed because of differences with the 
Chancellor seem to be admitted by the German papers. 
The cry of the Keichstag Conservatives for a more 
ruthless submarine war, shows that his fall is taken to 
herald the abandonment of the sinking-at-sight policy. 
Inconsistent Policies 
But there are two difficulties in the way of our accept- 
ing this interpretation of so dramatic a change. First, 
there have been official announcements that the policy 
of sinking armed merchantmen will be pursued without 
modification, and that between March ist and March 
18th, nineteen enemy vesssls have been sunk, of 
an aggregate displacement of over 40,000 tons. It 
hardly seems consistent with any softening of the cam- 
paign that boasts such as these should be made. But 
su:h statements must be made, if only to keep up the 
country's spirits — for we know how frightfulness cheers 
the hungry German. Secondly, still less consistent are 
the two outrages perpetrated on the Dutch liners. For 
that matter the attacks on the Tubantia and Valemhxng 
are without precedent — and inconsistent with any pro- 
fessed German policy. The sailing of the Tubxntia had 
neen widely advertised in the German papers. No 
belligerent liner of 13,000 tons displacement has been seen 
in the neighbourhood of the Noord Hinder Lightship for 
a great many months. It is true she was sunk at night, 
but then her name was displayed upon her side in letters 
20 feet high, each letter illuminated with electric lights 
like a facade of a picture palace before the days of 
Zeppelin raids. That she was torjX^docd cannot be 
cpiestioned. But it was not apparently seen whether 
the torpedo was discharged from a submarine or from 
a destroyer. If from a destroyer, she might ha\(> fallen 
10 a long range shot. In any event, illuminated as she 
was, it must have been obvious that there could hv no 
ground for supposing that it was a belligerent ship dis- 
guised as a neutral. It was a million to one against her 
having any cargo for Fngland ; there were heavy odds 
against there Ix'ing any English passengers on board- 
for these would travel by the ordinary Channel mail 
boats — there was a high probability of the ship carrying 
a considerable quota of Americans. The only taint of 
belligerency in the case of the 'fufxintia w.is that she did 
intend to call at Falmouth, l-'ven this was lacking in the 
case of the Palembang. Here a ship bound straight 
The more 
incidents were 
either from the 
T here is 
I' boats 
for the Dutch overseas possessions, was deliberatelv 
attacked, not by one but by three torpedoes, the first of 
wliich ajjparently did not explode— at midday and in 
broad daylight. The Tnbantia, as a German communique 
points out, was not even in the war zone, and neither was 
armed. How then can their sinking be explained ? It 
is possible that both were sunk by submarines whose 
commanders had received von Tirpitz's instructions, and 
not those of his successcf. It is also possible that the \'on 
Tirpitz instructions went far beyond any public pro- 
fessions. 
probable explanation is that both 
outside any instructions received 
Grand Admiral or from von 'Capelle. 
nothing new in the action of the (ierman 
being inconsistent with Germany's public 
professions. \Ve saw that in the case of the Arabic, 
the Hesperian, and in numerous other instances. If, in 
August and September, their conduct showed that 
the submarine commanders were too nervous and excited 
to make their acts square with the orders of their superiors, 
it is not likely that their successors of to-tlay will be any 
calmer, l-or the circumstances of their trade are not 
favourable to balanced judgment. We have no precise 
information as to Germany's submarine losses. But if 
they were formidable in September, they ha\e certainly 
not become less formidable in the months that have 
passed since then. There can, in fact, be little doubt 
that of their original strength both in boats, officers 
and trained crews, practically nothin.j; now remains. 
New Submarines 
The new submarines are likely en(?agh of a displace- 
ment 50 or 100 per cent, greater than the largest of the old 
ones. They must carry much larger crews. If, for example, 
they are armed with 5-inch guns, each gun would mean an 
addition of at least 25 men to the personnel. Each increase 
of power needs mon; men also. A submarine displacing 
1,500 or 2,000 tons armed with, say, two 5.5 guns, might 
have to carry a crew of at lea.st 100 if not 150. And 
the value of such boats would increase out of proportion 
with the increase in tonnage. If then this is the type 
of vessel on which the Germans are now relying, 
responsibilities far heavier and more exacting than ever 
arc now laid on men who not only are inexperienced, but 
starting on their business knowing only too well the 
tragic fate of all their predecessors. It is said — I do not 
know with what truth -that for some time the German 
Admiralty has ab.indoned the system of recruiting the 
submarine service by volunteers from the fleet. It 
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