LAND AND WA T E R 
March 23, 191:6' 
A PROBLEM IN STRATEGY 
By Colonel Feyler 
Colonel Feyler, the -writer of this arresting article, is the 
it'en-knoit'H military correspondent of the " Journal 
Jc Geneve," and is Swiss by vationalitv. He is the 
most jamniis and the most impartial of all Neutral 
critics of the war, and his opinions carry great weight 
in every belligerent country. 
AT the moment of writihg the violence of the battle 
/% of Verdun is at its height. The bahince seems 
I — J^ to be incHning in favour of the French. But 
^ JL. there is no need to anticipate the event in order 
tn draw attention to one interesting problem in strategy 
whicli will, beyond all question, be one of those that will 
be studied most closely after the war, and in the solution 
of which the battle of Wrdun, whatever its issue may be, 
"will certainly be a factor. 
The problem may be stated thus : Was the German 
plan of attack in August, 1914, which decided upon a 
march through Belgium, a wise one, or would it have 
been better to have attacked France directly upon her 
eastern fortified frontier ? 
1 suppose no one will deny that from both political 
and moral points of view the violation of Belgian 
neutrality by the German Empire, which was pledged to 
defend it, was a very grave blunder. The political result 
was that Germany not only ])rovoked the opposition of 
the small State she thus attacked, but also compelled 
Great Britain to declare war upon her in the interests of 
moral Tightness and international loyalty. And so, 
instead of having only France to reckon with in the west, 
the German Empire arrayed against itself France and 
Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
The Moral View 
From the purely moral point of view the fault was 
equally grave. A Government cannot be forgiven for 
a deliberate breach of its plighted word more easily than 
an individual can. It is even entitled to less easy forgive- 
ness, because the men who constitute it are supposed 
by those whom they govern to have higher responsibility. 
Germany has suffered from the position of inferiority in 
which she thus placed herself ever since the day when her 
troops tirst set foot in Luxemburg and Belgium. The 
war immediately became a struggle between the might 
employed to make good the broken word, and the right 
that is the protection of treaties concluded in good faith. 
Lofty as these considerations may be, they are, 
however, merely accessory to the problem stated here. 
That is essentially technical, and must be considered 
simply and solely from' the point of view of strategy and 
of the tactics employed. 
From the strategical point of view the disadvantages 
of the passage through Belgium were the greater length 
of march than by a direct attack, and the addition to the 
effective forces at the disposal of the enemy. This, it is 
true, might be compensated to a certain extent by better 
technical preparation and by superior skill in the handling 
of troops. The Germans had left absolutely nothing 
undone to that end. The army they had organised was 
not one designed for political purposes and intended only 
for the defence of the Empire, but an army forged for 
the specific purpose of an offensive war against a coalition 
of France, Russia and England. Fully realising that a 
prolonged war would allow the armies of those three 
allied Powers to establish a numerical superiority, they 
determined to anticipate this by hurling a more rapidly 
concentrated and more mobile force upon France. And 
thanks to the fact that she had a higher birth-rate than 
that of France, Germany was able to compose this force 
entirely of young and evenly trained elements that had 
practically filled the cadres of the active army on its peace 
footing. 
With this powerful organisation at their disposal 
the Imperial Head-Quarter Staff thought it would be an 
easy matter to pass through Belgium. The Belgian 
army was certainlj* much less ready and less highly 
qualified than the German army. And they feft no 
apprehension on the score of the effective force which 
England might throw into the line, because for sevf'ral 
weeks that force would necessarily be a limited one. 
From all these considerations they concluded that the 
numerical inequality was not of a really serious character : 
that it could only become manifest at a remote date 
and in the event, which they did not anticipate, of their 
plan not resulting in a speedily victorious campaign. 
Disadvantages of the Detour 
The disadvantages of the detour through Belgium 
could thus be most fully obviated and free scope given 
to its advantages. Among these were the extension of 
front, which facilitated bringing into action a larger 
number of guns and cannon, the obligation imposed upon 
the enemy of adapting himself to this extension of front, 
contrary to his original plans and with inadequate means, 
and finally, the advantage of avoiding the strongly 
fortified country along the line Belfort-Epinal-Toul- 
Verdun. 
In point of fact this last advantage has not proved 
to be quite what the German Head-Quarter Staff supposed. 
They discovered that, although it appeared less capable 
of resistance, the Belgian fortified barrier of the Meuse 
was strong enough to compel the assailant to mark time 
for days which were worth weeks. The British Army 
had time to arrive to cover the French left flank, and the 
second Belgian stand round Antwerp and afterwards 
on the Yser, having in the course of operations completed 
the work of the first, the advantages of the passage through 
Belgium were eclipsed by the disadvantages. 
How would it have been if the offensive had been 
conducted by the direct route in the east ? That question 
raises discussion of the check which the first heavy Ger- 
man attack met with before Verdun the other day. If 
they did not succeed in February, IQ16, in spite of the 
colossal combination of methods employed and the 
ferocity of fighting, why should they have had any 
better success in August, 1914 ? 
I do not think the two cases are parallel. In 1914 
the Germans would have benefited by the surprise caused 
by their 420 mm. howitzers. Instead of giving the first 
exhibition of their effectiveness upon the forts of Liege, 
they would have demonstrated it upon the French forts. 
And even if their success had been less quickly achieved, 
the chances were that the attack would have succeeded. 
Question of Fortifications 
As it is now, the forts on French territory have been 
adapted to meet the requirements which experience at 
Li^ge, Namur and Maubeuge has proved to be necessary. 
Instead of their defences being constricted within a narrow 
limit of space, which consequently is liable to destruction 
by a very small number of heavy shells accurately direc- 
ted, they are distributed over a larger area, which gives 
them greater chances of escape from the enemy's attack. 
The entrenchments have been developed in accordance 
with the formulas of field fortifications, with the result 
that the defensive area is very much vaster. And 
finally, the heavy artillery which the French lacked at 
the beginning of the war, has been constructed, and is 
now opposed to the German heavy guns at Verdun. 
Another difference between 1914 and iqi6 lies in the 
quality of the troops engaged, and especially in that of 
the officers and non-commissioned officers. No doubt the 
battle of Verdun has sent into action troops that had been 
well prepared for the violent fighting required of thern. 
They had been rested after their previous exhausting fati- 
gues and carefully trained. But none the less they had less 
homogeneity than those that would have been employed 
in 1914, and also less quickness and skill in operation. 
In August, 1914, the men would have been the very best 
that Germany could produce, and led by the most capable 
and energetic representatives of the commissioned and 
non-commissioned grades. In February and March, 
lA 
