March 23, 1916. 
LAND AND WATER 
iqi6, the men belonged to any number of annual classes, 
young and old, and the veteran officers of the active 
army had almost ceased to exist. Thus the chances 
had altered, and were not nearly so many, and not 
nearly so real, as in August, 1914. 
Is this as much as to say that, consequently, the 
French would not have retrieved the situation, as they 
were able to do at the Marne, with the assistance of the 
British Army ? It is quite possible. But such an 
enquiry is outside the scope of any examination supported 
by proofs ; imagination takes too large a part in it. All 
one can say definitely is that the Belgian army would 
not have had to intervene, that England would not have 
had to support Belgium in virtue of her guarantee of 
neutrality, and that with regard to the moral support 
wliich a belligerent may be desirous of finding among 
neutrals, Germany would not have tarnished her reputa- 
tion as she has done. In short and in conclusion, she 
would probably have had greater chances of victory. 
Why, then, did slic run tUc risk of reducing her 
chances ? I do not think it is a hazardous proposition tliat 
she did so because she wanted to get to the sea, and that 
when preparing her plan of war her ambitions already 
embraced England as well as France. Germany has 
always looked far ahead ; it is seldom that she has sought 
out one enemy without thinking about the enemy of 
to-morrow. When Prussia laid hands upon Denmark, 
Austria-Hungary was already a matter of interest to her. 
When she crushed Austria-Hungary at Sadowa, slie was 
not forgetful of France. Would there be anything 
extraoiclinary if, in I914, the German Empire perceived 
England behind Belgium and France ? 
Investigation of the strategical problem offered by 
her plan of campaign in the west would thus serve to 
throw a light upon the probable political aims and objects 
of the Imperial government. The investigations will 
be all the more interesting when the official records of the 
various Staffs begin to disclose their secrets. 
AIRCRAFT POLICY 
And the Zeppelin Menace from the National Standpoint 
By F. W. Lanchester 
[In this and the jolloiving article an endeavour is made 
to put before the public a dispassionate account of the 
reasons, facts and circumstances which have led to the 
present day non-military employment of aircraft in 
warfare as typically exemplified by the Zeppelin raids. 
The writer has endeavoured to bring the question of 
aircraft raids into their true perspective, both as to 
their relative material importance as acts of war, and 
to their moral importance, as founded on the theories 
of German military writers, as a means of causing 
embarrassment to an enemv Government. Later articles 
will deal with the capabilities and development of the 
large airship and the importance of its future rdle in 
legitimate warfare.] 
THERE have been many complaints \oiced in the 
press and at meetings of different kinds that 
Britain has neglected to provide herself with 
large airships comparable to, and capable of 
combating, the Zeppelin raider. Parenthetically it may 
be remarked that the idea that airship can counter airship 
has no proved foundation, and it is certain that if the 
enemy were to adhere to its present policy of attacking 
only by night, any attempt at defence by means of airships 
of equal size and speed would be foredoomed to failure. 
Thus if airship is to counter airship in such a matter 
as giving protection against raids, it will be b}' indirect 
means, namely by reprisal or by intercepting the enemy 
on his return from a raiding expedition. Apart from the 
question of whether or no airship can counter airship it 
does appear on the face of it to require some explanation 
why (ireat Britain has not kept a closer watch on the 
work done in Ciermany, in this the most showy though 
certainly not the most useful development of service 
aeronautics. 
System of Government 
It is only within roughly the past twelve months, 
during which the German raider has managed to make 
himself particularly obnoxious, that public interest has 
become focussed on this question of aircraft, and now the 
public attention is so focussed the cry is that somebody 
is to blame. The present Coalition (ioxernment clearly 
cannot be blamed, so the blame has to be thrown on the 
late Government prior to the war, and according to 
\arious writers not only is the late Government to blame, 
but the pigheaded and stupid experts come in also for 
their share ! Let us see to what extent these allegations 
will hold gas. 
During the last few decades, one may sav during 
the last fifty years, it has become more and more the 
settled system in this country that the Government elected 
by popular vote, ostensibly for the purpose of governing, 
is controlled, driven or held back bv the continuous 
application of the pressure of public opinion. We do not 
appoint a Government for a period limited by a maximum 
term of office, and leave it to govern. Our system appears 
to be that we appoint a (iovernment as we harness a horse, 
and we never leave off pulling the strings from the day it 
goes into office to the day on which it finishes its term or 
drops dead. The result of this is, that if public opinion, 
even in matters of detail, goes astray, it almost certainly 
follows that the Government also goes astray, just as, in 
the analogy of the horse, if the driver gets flurried or is 
the worse for drink the horse and coach will get into 
difficulties or go off the road. 
There is a strong tendency on the part of the public 
and electorate to rush from one extreme to the other ; 
thus a few years ago the Zeppelin airship was looked 
upon by the public as a mere academic development of 
no particular interest to us islanders, and if the Govern- 
ment had started spending a few millions on a parallel 
development in this country, and had experienced half 
the failures through which Count Zeppelin has fought his 
way, there would have been so many questions asked in 
Parliament and so much trouble created that there can 
be but little doubt the whole aeronautical movement, 
not only in the airship but also in the aeroplane, would 
have received a substantial, possibly fatal, set-back. 
Experimental Expenditure 
Again and again during recent years public opinion 
has decHned to tolerate any expenditure in armament 
which could not be proved up to the hilt as absolutely 
necessary to the country's safety. It is indeed probable 
that the verdict of the future historian will record that 
this standard of absolute necessity has been so low as 
at times actually to have placed Great Britain and the 
British Empire in grave peril. To suggest that the British 
Government would have been allowed to carry out an 
expensive experimental campaign in airships (and nothing 
but an expensive campaign would have been of any 
service) is futile, and to blame a Government so controllcc 
by public opinion for not having done so is a course whict 
can only lead serious thinkers to question the whoh 
fabric and purpose of our modern democratic system. 
To-day we hear right and left the senseless cry thai 
the Government ought to have done this, or the Govern- 
ment ought to hax'e done that ; that the Government 
ought to have built large airships to protect us from 
Zeppelin attacks. What is the meaning of this outcry — 
is it that the people and the press are any wiser than 
before ? Is it that the people and the press have Icarncc 
something which the Government have not learned ? 
Is it that the people and the press have known something 
in the past which the Government did not know ? My 
answer is emphatically " No." 
Individuals amongst the people and individuals 
amongst the press have known and have foreseen. 
Members of the Government have known and have 
