T. AN I) cS: W AT IC II 
March ]o. 
iqiC) 
Kailway, wliicli it nits south of Lako Drisviaty. From 
t liat point to Vilna the railway is in (ierman hands. 
Now the reader will here particularly note the 
junction which lies immediately west of the town of 
Sventsiany. The importance of that place and the effect 
of its reoccnpation after the thaw by our Ally is clear 
from the map alone. From tiu' junction west of Sventsiany 
a railway line leads to the Haltic at Libau and nourishes 
all the action undertaken by the Germans between the 
Vilna-Dvinsk main line and the Vilna-Minsk main line. 
Tiiat iwass of munitionmont without whicii an artillery 
attack a.tjainst '.nodern defences cannot be undertaken 
depends upon the possession of Sventsiany. ^lunition- 
ment can also come round from the Baltic to \'ilna and 
\'ilna is the great depot from the whole district. But if 
the junction near Sventsiany was lost to the enemy, even 
thoufjh at the moment, the Russian advance should 
there form a sharp salient, the whole German line would 
have to fall back. It would be impossibh- to supply the 
districts east of the Vilna-])\insk railway and north of 
the \'iina-Minsk railway. Tliis is particularly true from 
the lack of roads in the Lake region. From Vilna within 
a radius of about forty miles there radiate out a con- 
siderable number of country roads, but on striking the 
lake region these come to an end for the most part. 
Tiic junction near Sventsiany, therefore, will cer- 
tainly be the objective of our Ally when the line weather 
comi's. Tiie present movements are only designed to 
make possible such an advance, or the threat of it, many 
weeks hence. They are strokes delivered by either side 
(the first infantry attacks a whole fortnight ago were 
German not Russian in origin) to improve their positions, 
to get hold of the drier ground, etc., before the thaw. 
But what each party ultimatelj' has in mind is the junction 
near Sventsiany. 
Next, let it be appreciated that the Russian object 
here, no matter what the vigour of their offensive in the 
future in the region round Widzy, up northward to 
lake Drisviaty, and down southward to Lake Narotch 
(about 70 miles astraddle of the railway, and all pointing 
at Sventsiany) is strategically a defensive object. Tiiey are 
warding against and will be trying to forestall a German 
offensive in the Northern sector. They are not — they 
cannot be — planning a main offensive of their own in 
that region. 
Indeed, the strategical elements in the larger sense of 
that phrase upon the Eastern fiont are simple and clear. 
The field for a Russian offensive is the southern field. 
Tiie field for an enemy offensive is the northern field. 
Why is this ? Because the enemy has better com- 
munications behind him for early work, while the Russians 
must take advantage of the fact that their imperfect 
roads will be useable in the south before they are useable in 
the north. Because politically a real Russian advance 
in the south will be of immediate effect upon the Rou- 
manian situation while a similar advance in the north 
would not be. Because in the south the forces opposed to 
Russia are mainly Austro-Hungarian and, as we know, 
even more exhausted than the (ierman, and bocanse as 
the now crying depletion of their effectives makes it more 
and more necessary for the Austro-Germans to attempt 
an early decision, the northern field lends itself to their 
]K>wer of moving troops and of accumulating munitions 
more than does the southern. 
What we are watching, then, for the moment, is no 
more than slight movements for better positions in the 
north which, as they are obtained, will be intended upon 
the Russian side for defence, upon the German for offence ; 
while it is probable that this offensive will be delivered 
before the corresponding and counterh;) lancing Russian 
offensive in the south develops. 
The Other Fields 
In the other fields of the- ;rcat war there is \ery little 
to chronicle or to analyse between last week and this. 
On Monday last the German salient at St. Eloi just in the 
corner south of the big British salient round Ypres was 
fiattened out and carried. The operation was per- 
formed by the mining of certain points upon a length of 
()oo yards of (ierman trench, the mines being exploded 
early upon the Monday morning, whereupon an infantry 
attack was delivered by the Northumberland l-"usiliers 
and the Royal Fusiliers, capturing the first and the second 
line trenches and taking prisoners two officers and 168 men. 
The situation upon the Tigris is stationary. The 
elements of any judgment upon this situation are either 
well known or necessarily withheld. There is no margin 
for conjecture. What is left of a division is, and has been 
for these months jiast, contained by the equivalent 
of at least four Turkish divisions. The relieving force 
advancing up the river to disengage its colleagues has 
not been of sufficient strength cither to force or to turn 
the Turkish line down the river below Kut-el-Amara 
which lies astraddle of the river and, on account of the 
presence of marsh upon the north, is vulnerable chietiv 
upon the south. The capital element in the situation, of 
course, is the remaining supjily of the British force con- 
tained by the enemy, and that is a matter whi( h, ecpially 
obviously, is not for public discussion. What must be 
clearly appreciated, however, by opinion in this country is 
that the small Russian force operating upon and descend- 
ing the only road from the Persian plateau to the Mesopo- 
tamian Plain is neither in size nor in proximity an appre- 
ciable factor in the problem. Still less will it be affected 
by the much larger Russian movements in the Armenian 
mountains — at any rate within any useful time. It is j^ro- 
bable that the Russians will ultimately descend upon the 
Plains, or at least that their extreme left will threaten 
and interrupt the railway at Ras-l^i-.Ain. But such 
action, whicli would have had a very great effect during 
the concentration of the little Turkish army in Mesopo- 
tamia and the accumulation of its munitions, would not 
have that effect to-day. It would threaten and perhap;; 
ultin a'cly cause the destruction of any force bevf)nd 
Mosul, but only at long date. 
Meanwhile the Russian advance continues not 
pressed, but e\idently clearing the country melhodicallv 
as it goes and ijuite possibly compelled to improxc the 
tracks, especially in the south for the passage of wheeled 
vehicles and guns. It has not yet reached what ma\' be 
called the second stage for the main advance of whicli 
Erzeroum formed the first stage. Its second stage will be 
marked by the line Trebizond luzinguain Kliarput or 
Diarbekjr, and until at least that stage is reached no 
appreciable effect upon the situation in Mesopotamia 
has even begun to develop from the north. It is cleaiiv 
meeting with strong resistance in front of Trebizond 
and has its main concentration near the Black Sea and 
not in the south. 
The Situation at Verdun 
Before Verdun the week has shown no movement 
at all. We only know that the enemy has been able to 
keep on right uj) to this, the 37th day of the main attack, 
or the 39th, counting from the first opening of the bombard- 
ment, a well-maintained bombardment upon the last of 
the -sections which he has chosen to threaten, that on the 
extreme west. He is directing his fire against all the 
eastern slopes of Hill 304 and behind it against the 
western end of the Charny Ridge, which is covered by 
the wood of Bourrus. It is to be presumed that he in- 
tends later a strong infantry attack against the same 
western sector ; if not, he has thrown away the effect of 
his bombardment. This week he has only made one 
infantry movi^ment, an attempt on Tuesday to debouch 
from tiie woods. It was easilj' thrust back and cannot 
have been in great force. But a main infantry attack 
must come unless he is prepared to waste entirely all this 
artillery preparation. When he will stop and confess 
failure, only the future can show. He cannot have had 
less than a quarter of a million men so far hit and caught, 
excluding all other casualties incidental to such an effort, 
to such weather and to such ground. It may be that he 
desires to add to this list. We cannot tell. It is with 
him at this moment quite as much a political as a military 
problem. There will be one clear indication of the 
moment in which he admits defeat before Verdun, and 
that will be the publication from Berlin of an inmiense 
list of booty, prisoners and guns. When that is issued 
we shall know that the battle of Verdun is over and that 
the French have won it. 
The Rumours of a Raid 
There have been for now several days rumours 
gathering in volume and somewhat supported by official 
warnings that the enemy was preparing or jiretending to 
prepare, a raid upon the Eastern coast. Wliat trutii 
there may be in such rumours, a private student of the 
