March 30, 1916 
LAND & W A T E R 
paralyse the sea service of the Allies by destroying all 
shipping. 
It is a case of Germany contra muiuium, and if 
British, Allied, and neutral shipping is to be saved, its 
protection can come from one (juarter only, namely, the 
eliorts that the British Admiralty is able to put fortli. 
Should the United States be forced into war, the question 
of shipping, viewed not as a national but as a world 
problem, will be to some extent solved, by putting into 
service the German ships now interned in the United 
States harbours. Between 490,000 and 500,000 tons of 
shipping would ease the position materially. But it 
would not save it, if losses were to continue for any length 
(jf time at the I'ate of the past eight days. 
There is, howe\'er, no reason for supposing that 
this rate can or will be maintained. What apparently 
has happened is that a large number of submarines were 
dispatched from the German ports on the iqth of the 
month. These boats have been upon their stations now 
for periods varying from eight to fom- days. To run 
them down and destroy them takes time. The situation 
is not imlike that of the last weeks of August last year ; 
and I shall be disappointed if history does not repeat 
itself so that, before April is far advanced, we do not get a 
state of affairs comparable to that of last September. 
Once more the enemy's submarines are at their maximum 
in numbers ; once more these numbers should be effec- 
tively reduced. Once more it will take time to replace 
them. 
So far there is no evidence that the new and larger 
submarines of which we heard so much, have taken part 
in the campaign. Telegrams from Denmark and Sweden 
indicate that such new submarines have been seen. One 
is said to have taken the crew of a captured ship on board 
and to have kept them there for four days. Whether 
these exist in quantities, and if so, whether they can alter 
the character of the attack on commerce, so as to make 
its protection more difficult, are matters that only ex- 
perience can decide. But the Admiralty has had the 
necessity for preparing against these new conditions for a 
long time under consideration, and it is not doubtful 
that c\Tr3' preparation which forethought can suggest 
has been made. 
The " Alcantara- Greif" Affair 
The Admiralty has at last announced the fact that 
the raider Greil was stopped bj' the patrol boat 
Alcantara, Captain Wardle, on February 20th, and that 
in the ensuing engagement the former was sunk by gun- 
lire and the latter by torpedo. It is unfortunate that 
we are not given a full and authentic account of so in- 
teresting an incident. Three or four unofficial stories of 
the fight have been published and cacji is inconsistent 
with the others. As an instance of the kind of confusion 
that arises, take the case of the Grcif colours. When 
seen, she was disguised as a Norwegian. Now-a-days 
this means something more than flying the Norwegian 
ensign. For, as a protection against German U boats 
all neutrals carry their colours permanently displayed 
upon their sides and they illuminate them by night. 
the Moewe, we know, from time to time used to jjaint 
out the Swedish colours and substitute Danish, and 
generally to ring the changes of apparent nationality. 
And as the artists altered the ship's disguise, so no doubt a 
new ensign went to the mast head. The use of false 
colours has always been regarded as a legitimate ruse 
de guerre. But it has been an invariable rule not to light 
except under your own flag. "Now if no ship to-day can 
pose as a neutral unless the flag is painted on the side, 
it is clearly impossible to paint this out .when action com- 
pels an acknowledgment of nationality. Tlie Admiralty 
account makes a point of the fact tliat the Grcif ioit^ht 
with these permanent Norwegian colours upon her sides. 
But these would not have deceived Captain Wardle. 
Since the Mocwe's escape, the innocence of no neutral 
ship attempting to pass the patrols could be assumed. 
He would have formed his judgment on the general ap- 
ncarance and fittings of the ship and on her conduct. 
The real point is, did she as the (ierman Admiralty 
says, run up the Germnn flag before she opened lire ? It 
is a matter on which the Admiralty account is silent, and 
on which the unofticial accounts give us no information. 
The incident is a curious comment on the utter insinceritv 
of the German protest of a little more than a 3-ear ago 
about English shijis flying the American flag. 
As to the facts of the action itself the details cannot 
be disentangled, but the main incidents seem to have 
been as follows. After challenge by the Alcantara, the 
Greif hove to, and the Alcantara stopped to lower a boat. 
The range was apparently something well under a thous- 
and \'ards. The Grcij is described as a ship of between 
4,000 and 5.000 tons, standing excejitionally high out of 
the water. The Alcantara, we know, was a new lin^r 
built for the South American trade, displacing oyer 
15,000 tons. The gunners on each side then were faced 
with the proverbial task of hitting a haystack at 20 yards. 
As soon as the boat was clear, the Alcantara apparently 
got under way. upon which the Grcif droppecl her gun 
masks, dispatched a torpedo or two and opened fire. 
Tiie Alcantara is represented as mamxnivring to avoid the 
torpedoes and hitting the Grcif repeatedly until one of 
the enemy shots .put her steering gear out of action. 
Until then she was apparently hardly hit at all. This 
no doubt brought her to, and at a short range, made her 
an easy \ictim to the torpedo. At this stage the Andes, 
a second auxiliary patrol cruiser came and virtually 
completed the work which Alcantara had begun. Before, 
however the Greif actually sank, the light cruiser Comits 
atti^acted by the firing a])]>eared upon the scene and, at long 
range, opened an extremely effective iire on the raider, and 
finally blew her up. In the meantime, one or more 
destroyers had arrived, and the survivors from the two 
foundered ships were picked up. The whole action can 
only have lasted a matter of minutes. 
The conduct of the Grcif is all of a piece with the 
submarine camjmign. I have heard naval ofticers discuss 
what they would do in such a situation. Obviously, if 
a disguised ship is reckless of consequences, it must have 
the patrol ship at its mercy, for the patrol is bound by 
custom to stop and send a boat aboard the stranger, 
and when she stops, .she is a sitting mark for the enemy's 
torpedo. In the earlier ,';tages of the war, such ships were 
lost to the enemy's submarines, who followed a genuine 
neutral — or one enemy ship disguised as a neutral — and 
caught the patrol ship when she hove to. This danger 
was got over by removing the patrol line further out. 
It is not easy to see how in conditions like those of the 
2Qth February, a patrol can make herself any safer than is 
a policeman who is sent to arrest an armed desperado. If 
all blockading ships were attended by a destroyer, and 
could stand off.- leaving the destroyer to go into close 
quarters, the latter, which draws too little water to be in 
danger from a torpedo, and presents a small mark for 
the enemy's guns, and is obviously armed with torpedoes 
herself, would run little risk. But then it is quite certain 
that there cannot be destroyers enough for work like this. 
The Admiralty has no doubt made a thorough 
investigation into the circumstances. Indeed, it is to be 
hoped that the regular practice of holding a court martial 
on the surviving officers and men has been revived, not 
of course with the idea that the Captain is necessainlv 
or even probably to blame, but so as to arrive at the fullest 
and most complete statement of the facts, and to ensure 
a competent and impartial professional judgment on 
them. The findings of such a court are the best and 
indeed the only safe guide to other officers in similar 
circumstances. 
It v.. interesting to note that the Alcantara is onlv the 
second ship to be sunk by a torpedo fired from anything 
but a submarine. The first ^^•as the BUlcher, which is 
said to have rccei\ed the coup de grace from the Arcthusa. 
In both cases the victim was crippled, stationary and at 
short range, when the shot was fired. Undoubtedly it 
is one of the minor surprises of the war that the torpedo, 
except when used by the submarine, has been completely 
ineffective. Perhaps if the bombarding ships had been 
able to get higher up in the Dardanelles, a different story 
would have been told, and a new record for work froiii 
shore stations made. But even this would not have 
vitiated the general truth that the difiiculty of hitting a 
manceuvring ship, except at the shortest possible range, 
seems to be almost insuperable. 
Air Raids and Naval War 
Of the Air Raid on the Island of Sylt we have very 
few details. But the loss of three seaplanes and their 
