10 
T. A N D \ W" A T !•: R 
Maivli ''o, totG 
pilots suggests that these raids are necessarily highly 
dangerous to those who carry thcni out unless they can 
operate at a much greater height than seaplanes can reach. 
Since writing last week a new light has been thrown 
on the encounter between the British and German des- 
troyers oft Zeebnigge last Monday week. When the 
news of this little action was first published, it sounded as 
if it were entirelj' unconnected with the great air raid on 
that port. It subsequently appeared tliat the (ierman 
d«*stroyers had been dri\en out of Zeebrugg(> by the air- 
craft rmlv to fall under the lire of "the British boats. Some 
three months ago 1 asked the question in these columns 
whether it was inconceivable that aircraft could be made 
in modern conditions to do what Cochrane's lire ships 
achieved in the affair of the Aix Roads. It was an 
effect like that actually achieved at Zeebnigge that I had 
in mind. And undoubtedly it is one of the j)ossibilities 
of the future. 1 say " of the future," because it seems to 
be pretty clear that no country has at present an air 
service capable of attacking an anchored fleet with 
sufficient jirecision and effect to drive them in confusion 
out to sea. A.gainst a fleet under way and free to 
man(euvre, it looks as if aircraft neither had now, nor 
was ever likely to have, any such su|)eriority as to make 
them a formidable menace. But if the fleet is at anchor 
the case is very different. Aktihk Poi.i.kx. 
The Need for a Balkan Policy 
By Alfred Stead 
Ei 
X Oriente lux " ? The history of the war Ikis 
so far revealed nothing more striking than tlic 
ack of comprehension in this <ountry of the 
] * -^ factors in the Near East. Turkey was need- 
essly lost, Bulgaria given the chance of following her 
inclinations r;ither than ours. Serbia and Montenegro 
were destroyed, Albania overrun, and the decisions of 
Koumania and (ireece made much more difficult. So 
much for the past. 
To-day, with a great Allied Conference sitting in Paris, 
no question is of more moment than that of a Balkan 
Policy. In it lies at once the corner-stone of the future 
action of the Allies, and from it depends the more com- 
plete action of Italy and the entry,of Roumania. It is not 
too much to say that Serbia was sacrificed because of a 
lack of a definite policy in the Balkans. Let us therefore 
take heed lest Worse befall. 
A Tempting Objective 
Kven those w ho do not admit that the great stroke of 
the war will come in the Balkans and the Hungarian jilains, 
must acknowledge that the long-drawn line from Germany 
to Constantinople offers a tempting objective. In 
Germany so much has been made of Bulgarian accession 
that a Bulgarian defeat is equivalent, in moral effect, 
to a German one. And it is undoubtedly easier to crush 
Bulgaria than to pierce the German front in the West. 
The way to the East and to the Indies is always 
bound to play a great part in the decision of the war. 
As long as Hungary, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria and 
Turkey remain in German hands there can be no real 
settlement. It is idle to sa^' that a beaten Germany will 
automatically evacuate all these territories — history 
shows us that treaties of peace by conference prove often 
that possession is nine-tenths of the law. And it is 
obvious that we can never accept the principle that 
Germany, even a weakened Germany, shall have access 
to Turkey and the East. But this is only to be prevented 
by building a well foundationed dam across the road, 
not by throwing a loose brick into the flood. 
Even if the war be not determined in the Balkans, 
at any rate it is this part of Europe which might easily 
result in discord amongst the Allies in the final settlement. 
There is no need that it should, but there is every danger 
that it may, unless steps are taken to set our policy on 
a firm basis, clearly understood by those immediately 
concerned and by our Allies. 
There are few fundamental factors which would 
have to be reconciled. The principle of nationalities is a 
difficult one to carry out in its entirety, since it would 
mean leaving the Turks at Constantinople and indeed the 
adding of a considerable portion of Thrace and Eastern 
Roumelia to Turkey. It is also a jirinciple rather 
weakened by the concessions made on the Adriatic coast 
to Italy at the expense of the Serbs and Serbo Croats. 
But we may take it that in outward form at least, an 
attempt will be made to stick to this idea. How essential 
it is to these peoples, filled as they are with national 
sentiment, may be judged by the resolution hrouglit 
forward by Croatian deputies in the Croatian Diet. It ran : 
" riu'sontlicm Sla\' question can be settled either upon the 
ruhis of tiie idea of a (ireater Serbia and in favour of the 
Croatian State Idea, or on the ruins of the idea of a 
(ireairr Croatia, if so he that KiiSrsia and her allies s'.iould 
win the war. But under no cirrumstances could the 
South SIa\- question be settled on the basis of a Greater 
Hungary." 
Then we have the very definite declaration that 
Serbia shall be recreated, greater than before. As the 
greater includes the less, this must be taken to mean 
that the status quo ante the present war is to be part of 
the peace demands of this country There can scarcely 
be any idea of (luibbling about tlie Serbia of before the 
Balkan wars ; it would .be as reasonable to talk of the 
Serbia of the Tzar Dushan. Thus we may assume that 
as far as Serbia is concerned our policy is clear. That is 
unless we are to regard the words of our responsible 
statesman as so much mockery of the misery of sacrificed 
nations and the adding of one more geographical expres- 
sion to the list of those to be recreated, as a mere dithy- 
rambic exercise to tickle the earsof members of Parliament. 
If we can bank on Serbia's restoration, a very con- 
siderable portion of the Balkan puzzle falls into place. 
It is obviously impossible for us to attempt to beguile 
Bulgaria back into the fold by offers of Serbian Macedonia. 
Nor can Albania be regarded as anything else but a separ- 
ate item to be arranged for as may best be considerecl bv 
those interested, 'i his is perhaps just as well, because 
the Bulgarians have made it quite clear that it is not 
for Macedonia that they are fighting and will fight, but, 
in order to destroy Serbia anci have a common frontit-r 
with Hungary, with direct access to the Middle European 
markets for her agricultural products. 
To Recreate Serbia 
" The war will cease," sayr a prominent Bulgarian 
military authority, " only when we convince the frii'nds 
of Serbia that their cause has been definitely lost, and 
that Serbia, who is responsible for the war is really dead." 
We have bound ourselves to recreate Serbia so that it 
would seem difficult to treat with Bulgaria, since to carry 
out our promise must mean finally denying to Bulgaria 
Macedonia and a frontier with Central fuirope. 
Nor is the promise to Serbia the only factor bearing 
upon the situation. Nobody who has troubled to study 
the question can deny that iVec access to the Black Sea is 
essential to Russia, "with all her wealth carried down 
south to the Black Sea by her magnificently navigable 
rivers. The time has gone to discuss whether or not it 
shall be done, but we cannot disregard the results of sucii 
a decision. Russia at Constantinople is declared in 
Bulgaria to be an untenable situation, but Russia must be 
adequately assured of free egress from the Black Sea in 
one form or another. Thus we ha\-e another portion of 
the puzzle elucidated. 
Nor must we overlook that the Russians at Con- 
stantinople means that we must ensure also the right to 
breathe to Roumania, whose only coast is within the 
Dardanelles. An open outlet for "Roumania must mean 
the cutting up of Bulgaria, a resoh-ing of the nomad 
tribes now known as Bulgarians into their natural con- 
dition of subordination. Such a fate does not need to 
affect any of the Slav races because there are none more 
insistent on their Tartar (not Slav) origin than the 
Bulgarians to-dav. 
We are therefore faced by some very definite factors. 
