10 
L A N D c^ W A 1 h R 
April 6, i'ji6 
GERMANY AND THE NEUTRALS 
By Arthur Pollen 
THE week has rovcakHl no inavkcd changi- of any 
kind in tlu- naval situation, though that an air 
raid has reached Scotland for the rirst time may 
not be without sifjniticance to the (irand Fleet. 
The submarine campaign continues without any new fea- 
ture beyond maintaining the destnictivcness with which 
it started. The. tension between (iermaiiy and Holland 
which the 'fulmntiii and Palambaiig outrages have created 
is demonstrated by the fact that extraordinary military 
measures arc being taken on the Dutch frontier. We 
need not be surprised that these measures are repre- 
sented by the Berlin Wireless press as being due to 
an ultimatum from the Allies to the Dutch Government. 
.\merica has made no overt move, but thert; are many 
indications that the decision of the American Ciovern- 
ment is taken. And | not least interesting of these is 
the development of ttie political situation in Germany. 
Armament of Merchant Ships 
It will be remembered that a ruthless, reckless, sub- 
marine cani)>aign against all ship])ing plying with Eng- 
land or with any of the allied countries — a campaign 
that was to be final and decisi\e— was proclaimed to 
begin on the first day of last month. This proclamation 
was issued when it was supposed that America had 
yielded on the point that an arnied ship was in a' different 
jwsition from an unarmed ship, so that not omy would 
the ordinary canons of civilised war not apply in such a 
case, but Germany would be released from the specific 
promise not to sink any liner or indeed merchant ship, 
without visit, search, and provision for the safety of the 
people on board. But between the proclamation of the 
new campaign and the date of its promised beginning, 
it became ot)vious that the American Government was 
not going to accept the German contention as to the 
defensive arming of ships. 
If the new campaign were persisted in, it must 
force President Wilson's hand. There ensued a 
struggle between civilians and extremists in the 
Emperor's council. The civilians, led by Von HoUweg, 
saw clearly enough that no submarine successes that 
could reasonably be expected could compensate Germany 
for the loss of American friendship. The extremists led 
by von Tirpitz insisted first that only by submarine war 
could any success against England be obtained at all 
and, next, that only by utter ruthlessness in the treat- 
ment of all ships neutrals liners, and the rest, could any 
success worth having be obtained. 
While this controversy was at its highest the attack 
on Verdun failed, and Gennan capacity to keep war going 
became gravely limited ; this in turn made it doubtful 
whether a large portion of the world's shipping 
could be destroyed, and England thus brought to her 
knees, before Germany's power of resistance must come 
to an end. The diplomatists and statesmen could not 
fail to see that should the submarine campaign fail of its 
ultimate goal, its reaction on the German position, when 
surrender became inevitable, must be utterly disastrous. 
For the United States was not only the sole great neutral 
power that could help Germany in peace negotiations, that 
was the sole commimity with the wealth and good will 
capable of putting Germany on her feet again when the 
war was over. The failure at Verdun then was the 
decisive factor in the dismissal of \o\\ Tirpitz and the 
abandonment of his jjolicy. 
It was here that tlie (ierman Govermuent paid the 
penalty of the peculiar methods it had adopted to en- 
slave the public opinion of its pecjplc. For a year or 
more the shipowner paying demunage on his idle shij) 
in American ports, the ruined merchants of Hamburg, 
the crippled manufacturers, and the half-starved jnolc- 
tarians had been told that all their losses and sufferings 
had been causc-d by F^ngland. and that the War Lord's 
vengeance was falling upon that country by his destruction 
of her ships. The first of March was to have seen this 
campaign quadrupled in violence, A'on Tiri^itz, a greater 
master of political agitation and intrigue than (jf naval 
>cience — it was his famous League that besotted the 
Germans into thinking that they would become a naval 
j)cople, and perhaps the final and determining factor in 
persuading them that Great Britain could be ignored in 
the world conquest upon which Germany entered 20 
months ago — \'on Tirpitz had so organised things that, 
if he could not save himself, he could at any rate save his 
policy. The protest against submission to the neutrals 
was instantaneous and universal. Within five days of 
the Grand Admiral's disiuissal, the Ivmperor had to order 
the initiation of his programme, in spite of its author being 
no longer in j)owcr. The first and obvious moral of the 
situation then was that the Clovernment of Germany no 
longer had Germany in hand and consequently was no 
longer master of its own actions. 
During the past week a great effort has been made to 
re-establish the authority of the Chancellor. A com- 
mittee of all the Reichstag parties has been formed, and 
they have heard trom the Chancellor, from Dr. Hellferich 
and from the secretary of the Marine Amt a full exposition 
of the military and diplomatic position. The object of the 
Government was to obtain a resolution which should 
pass the Reichstag unanimously and give the Chancellor 
and his august master a free hand to deal with the 
situation. 
Two parties apparently stood out against the course 
which was finally adopted. The new SociaUsts took up 
a line, the details of which are not given to us. But 
they are not difficult to guess, and Herr Ledebourg, who 
represented it on the Committee, was a final dissentient 
from the resolution which all the other parties accepted. 
But the Radicals seem to have accepted it only after a 
struggle for a very material alteration. The resolution, 
as agreed upon, recites that the submarine is an effective 
weapon against England, that such use must be made of 
it as will guarantee the winning of a peace that secures 
the future of Germany, and that any negotiation with 
neutral states must provide that " while their just interests 
are to be respected, the German Government is to 
reser\-e such freedom in the use of the submarine as is 
necessary for the full assertion, of Germany's sea power." 
The radicals tried hard to limit the resolution to saying 
that the submarine must be used against Germany's 
enemies only. But having failed they accepted the 
decision of the majority. It is claimed in the semi- 
official press that the resolution re-estabhshes the 
authority of the Chancellor. It seems on the contrary 
as if it were the agitators that have prevailed. For there 
is no conciliation to neutrals in a doctrine which says 
that Germany's necessity is to be a measure of Germany's 
freedom to use force at sea, and is to be the criterion of 
(iermany's judgment as to the limits of right and justice 
that neutral powers can claim. 
A German View 
The significance of the situation is perhaps best con- 
veyed by its effect on the cooler German minds. We 
saw last week how Maximilian Harden welcomed the dis- 
missal of von Tirpitz as a triumph of reasoned statesma;i- 
ship over insane militarism. The failure of the Reichstag 
to back up this triumph, and its determination to commit 
the German nation to a crazy campaign of outrage, has 
evidently, made hhn despair of his countrymen. " In 
spite of uncountable \ictories," he says " the war is a 
cruel misfortune. In spite of Bethmann Hollweg's lamen- 
table 'scrap of paper ' statement, Germany wants 
treaties to be res]x>cted. Let us all agree that .the war 
was a mistake, made not by one but by all, though not 
e(pially by all, and you will find Germany ready to 
organise the pea<'e of Europe. The hour has come foi 
the Kaiser and the Chancellor to state their war ends. 
Our enemies are afraid that after the war Germany 
will continue to arm herself and prepare other wars. 
This would mean an attempt to world rule and would 
bring all those who would sign peace with us in deadly 
