April 6, 1916 
.LAND & WATER 
17 
Shackleton's Expedition 
By Herbert G. Ponting 
In this most ''ntcrcsttng article Mr. Herbert Ponting. 
member of Captain Scott's Expedition and therefore 
ilwroiighly familiar icith the conditions that are lil^ely 
to prevail during the latter part of Sir Ernest Shaekleton's 
expedition, explains as nearly as can be done from the 
scanty information that has so far reached us the probable 
position of Sir Ernest's party at the present time. 
The photograph of the South Pole appearing on page 2 
was printed from a n^ga'ive taken by Lieutenant II. 
Bowers. The film was brought lack by Captain Scott 
to his last camp, and icas there found by the Search 
Party eight months after his death. It was subsequently 
developed at Cape Evans. 
THE real incentive for Sir Ernest Shaekleton's 
trans-Antarctic journey is to explore the unknown 
region v^'ch lies between the \\'eddcll Sea and 
the South Pole. That in itself is a tremendous 
xuuk I taking, but merely to regard the Pole as a " half- 
way house," so to speak, and to essay to continue on 
the journey to the opposite side of the Polar continent, 
is a colossal task. To accomplish this unprecedented 
feat of exploration has been Sir Ernest's fondest hope 
ever since he penetrated within one hundred miles of 
the South Pole eight years ago. 
The risks of all previous South Polar expeditions arc 
practically doubled, as Sir Ernest is not only relying on 
his own party getting safely through, but also on another 
party safely reaching the opposite side of the continent 
independently, and providing him with supplies for a 
large part of the latter part of his great journey as well 
as for emergencies when he reaches his journey's end. 
Had he essayed to rest content with reaching the South 
.Yole from a point from which it had not hitherto been 
approached, and to turn back on his tracks, and return to 
the VVeddell Sea, he would have had the absolute certainty 
that provisions would be cached along the latter part of 
his return route, and he would have known exactly what 
arrangements had been made to meet any emergencies 
which might arise. There could be no such certainty in 
the tremendous task which he set himself, and, perhaps, 
anxiety about the expected food licpots and supplies 
at the journey's end have been among his hardships. 
From the Pole 
At the time of writing these lines, March 28th, we 
know little more than was contained in the tirst wireless 
messages from the Aurora. These messages indicate 
that Sir Ernest intended to travel from the Pole, via the 
Beardmore Glacier, to Hut Point on McMurdo Sound, 
which is an arm of the Ross Sea. In the absence of any 
information from the Endurance, the ship by which he 
and his main party'sailed to the Weddell Sea, we can only 
assume that he adhered to his proposed time schedule, 
and started on his trans-Antarctic journey from some 
point on the shore of the Weddell Sea between Graham's 
Land, which is due south of South America, and Coat's 
Land, as near the date of October ist, iqi.S, as the weather 
permitted, and not later than Novembef ist. 
Providing that he met with no misfortune, and no 
impassable mountains or chasms impossible to cross — 
and nothing but such physical barriers would daunt Sir 
Ernest Shackleton — he hoped to reach the South Pole 
about Christmas Day. Assuming that he did so, and 
that his dog-teams were well and going strong, and that 
neither his party nor the dogs were distressed for lack of 
food, we can best estimate the approximate date of his 
journey's end by referring to Amundsen's time-table. 
Amundsen left the South Pole on December 17th, iqii. 
rtith 16 dogs, and he reached his base at the Bay of Whales 
on the Great Ice Barrier on January a^th, iqi2, with 
eleven dogs, all well. He therefore covered the 700 miles 
in 40 days, but he was extremely fortunate as regards 
weather, encountering little of the sevc'rc' wind' which 
distressed Scott's party so much. (The Bay of Whales is 
400 miles from Cape Evans on the Ross Sea main part 
of the Barrier not shewn in the plan.) 
Shaekleton's route, via the Beardmore Glacier, is 
about 50 miles longer than Amundsen's. Allowing say 
ten days for the extra distance and the worse conditions 
of weather which would seem to prevail on this route, 
and assuming that Shackleton left the Pole on December 
26th, and that the Aurora party laid out depots of food 
for him for the greater part of the way to the Beardmore 
(ilacier, we may hope that he safely reached Hut Point, 
some time about the middle of Ecbruary la,st. On a 
journey of such magnitude however many delays might 
be experienced, and, even if he got through safely, it is 
conceivable that he might have been several weeks longer. 
Had everything worked out as Sir Ernest hoped and 
planned, and had the Aurora not met with the mis- 
fortune recently reported, he would have left McMurc'o 
Sound early in March, and we should have had news of 
him from some New Zealand port early in April. 
So much for man-made plans. But in that storm- 
beaten end of the world one never knows what a single 
hour may bring forth as regards weather. The blizzards 
of the Antarctic are of such severity that even small 
stones are blown about in the wind. 
The " Aurora " 
On May 6th the Aurora was blown from her mooring 
• off Cape Evans, Lat. 77.25 S., and became fast in the ice- 
pack, in which she appears to have drifted for oyer nine 
months to as far North as Lat. 64.30 S., 161 E. With 
this misfortune to his .ship. ended all possible hope of Sir 
Ernest's relief this year from the Ross Sea end of the 
journey. It is unlikely that any relief ship can reach him 
before January next, as until then, it being now the 
beginning of the Antarctic winter, the sea will be frozen 
or blocked with ice-pack. 
But the fact of the Aurora- being blown out to sea, and 
relief for the pfesent impossible, does not necessarily 
infer disaster to anyone. It means a year's longer exile 
in the Antarctic, and a certain amount of hardship, 
but if the base has been reached safely by Sir Ernest 
and his party, and proper supplies were found theF«, 
not of necessity anything worse. 
The drawing o\'er leaf prepared from my photographs 
of the south part (of McMurdo Sound will illustrate the 
points which I wish to make clear, so far as. I am able to. 
I do not pretend that it is geographically correct, but 
it gives a fairly accurate idea of the topography of the 
district, from an imaginary point above the edge of the 
Barne Glacier at Cape Evans. The line of approach 
to Hut Point across the Barrier, at the end of the journey, 
would vary according to the ice conditions. If the sc'a 
were frozen it might extend well out to the south-west, 
or it might lie towards the eminence called Castle Rock, 
if the sea were open, and the surface of the Barrier badly 
crevassed near the land on the line marked. I ha,ve 
made it a summer view, when the sea would be " open," 
but it must be borne in mind that from the end of April 
to January the sea would probably, but not by any 
means certainly, be frozen. The freezing of the sea 
depends on the roughness of the weather. If continual 
storms are experienced during the winter the sea may not 
even freeze at all over a large part of the Sound. 
Cape Evans 
On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Sound 
might be frozen not only during the winter, but, to a 
less extent during the summer as well. In short, though 
it is more than probable that the winter ice between 
Hut Point and Cape Evans would break up during the 
summer, it is yet possible that it might not. 
The fact that the Aurora had taken up moorings ofl 
Cape Evans indicates that Captain Scott's winter-quarters 
were being used as the base for operations. If Sir Ernest 
succeeded in reaching this place he would be able to live 
with some pretence to comfort, providing enough clothing 
had been landed from the Aurora. Unfortunately a 
message has stated that " the party is short of fuel and 
clothing" Clothing would certainly present greater 
difliculties than food, as nothing warm can be made from 
