LAND & W A T E R 
like half this assault, therefore, was delivered from the 
mass of woodland called bv the name of " Malancourt and 
Avocourt woods." and the whole of it aimed alonj,' the 
easier slopes which led up to the hark of Hill 304. It is a 
mile to a mile and a half of hard open ground,' rising only 
60 feet above the last trees of the wood and 140 feet above 
the valleys. This attack along the arrows AAA appears, 
so far as we know at the moment of writing, to have 
been delivered somewhere about eight to nine in the 
morning of Sunday. It came on by colunms of com- 
panies- that is. in very dense and deep formation -and 
its first and most vigorous effort very nearly reached to 
the Frencli trenches, coming in some points to within a 
hundred yards of them. This first effort, however, was 
broken and the large force employed retired to reform. 
Just after this first episode in the battle, apparently 
about ten o'clock in the morning (these hours are con- 
jectural only until further information shall be afforded), 
the second attack was launched along the line of 
the arrows B B B, this second attack being somewhat 
stronger in number and amounting to at least two full 
divisions. In all, therefore, the equivalent of four divi- 
sions, two corps, or thereabouts, were already engaged. 
This first attack upon the east also failed before it had 
reached the first French trenches ; unlike its western 
fellow it went to pieces, and the troops used fled for 
cover suffering the particularly severe losses consequent 
on such local breakdowns. 
It was already clear before noon that the enemy was 
not only attacking in such a direction and fashion as 
menaced the Mort Homme directly upon the one side 
and indirectly, by Hill 304, upon the other ; but also 
that his form of attack was such that if either of these two 
wings achieved its object it would take the remaindey 
ot the French line in reverse. Although the salient 
attacked was not pronounced, success upon either side 
would mean not only the retirement of the French in 
front of that success, but also a threat to the rear of the 
remainder of the French force suffering attack from the 
other section of the Germans. 
It is significant in this connection that apparently after 
the repulse of the first attack from B there was launched 
—as from C— a very large fresh force— on the exact 
strength of which accounts differ— across the now dry 
fiat belt of meadowland between the hills and the banks 
of the Meuse itself. This grass is water-meadow often 
(and recently) flooded between that stream and the 
(lOose Crest, stretching up to the steep bank by which 
the crest overlooks the stream. This very heavy blow 
was struck right at the ruins of Cumieres village and the 
French trenches covering those ruins and stretching to the 
nver but the field of fire was open, and the German 
check here led to very heavy loss. 
Such up to somewhere about noon or a little later was 
the first phase of the battle. 
The ne.xt phase, which covered all the afternoon up to 
sunset, consisted in no more than the repetition of these 
first assaults. How these were directed upon the eastern 
wings from B and C we have as yet no details. But we 
know ihey were repeated, probably with better troops 
hitherto held in reserve, and that, late in the evening 
a space of about 500 yards round about the thicker 
line D D, the German masses reached and occupied 
the first advanced French trench at the base of the Mort 
Homme, and ultimately remained in possession of it 
throughout the following night and day— up to the last 
information received On Tuesday evening, when these 
lines are written. 
It was little or nothing to get for such an awful price 
but the western attack from the direction A A was even 
Jess fortunate. The renewed assaults were delivered here 
three separate times in the course of the afternoon and 
all three of these renewed attempts were thrown back 
as had been the first in the morning. 
Upon this front, towards the end of the day, somewhere 
between five and six o'clock, an entirely fresh body of the 
strength of a brigade (I think it may turn out to be 
Bavarian) appeared still further to the German right along 
the arrow E and struck at Avocourt from the extreme 
north-west. Coming in thus at the close of the affair and 
triking the French trenches when these had supported 
he whole weight of the da\-. this brigade— or its head 
lements—not onlv reached but entered the trenches at 
April 13, 191(3 
about the point F, and were only dislodged just before 
dusk by a counter-attack. 
This Sunday fighting was the main affair. Upon 
Monday all was quiet in front of Avocourt. A strong 
enemy effort against the centre behind Bethincourt 
was thrown back ; a flank attack on the right touched 
a point or two of the adxanced trenches, and no more. 
^ buch was the situation at the close of the battle so 
.ar as the description to hand in London on Tuesday 
evening informs us. It is clear that the news leaves us iii 
the middle of an action not yet completed and one upon 
a scale comparable to the great original attack of seven 
weeks ago upon the other side of the river I say " com- 
parabe,'' but not equal. For the numbers engaged, 
though formidable, have hitherto counted only half 
those which struck the line between Ornes and Brabant 
on February 21st. 
While thfs main attack for the carrying and seizing of 
the Mort Homme and Hill 304 was proceeding, another 
attack, similar m volume and probably intended to 
prevent reinforcement by the pontoons across the Meuse 
was being launched against the Cote du Poivre. 
There had been great artillery activity along this main 
position east of the Meuse the"day before, just as there 
had been artillery activity west of the Meuse seven 
weeks ago before the main attack was launched upon the 
eastern side, and it was thought at one moment that the 
enemy was attempting to assault all along the line but 
little came of it. And if would seem that the bombard- 
ment to which the one side had been subjected was (as 
the converse bombardment of the western side had been 
se\'en weeks before) designed only to leave the French 
command in doubt upon the point of main effort. 
The Evening Losses 
We have as yet no estimate of the proportion of enemy 
losses in this affair up to the ^Monday evening where our 
present information ceases. We know that forces esti- 
mated at the lowest at seven and at the highest at nine 
divisions were engaged in the attack from Avocourt to 
the Cote du Poivre. We can only obtain the vaguest 
conception of their sacrifice bv noting that the attacks 
were renewed again and again throughout the day and by 
a very general statement (the basis for no reasoned con- 
clusion) upon the specially heavy loss of the enemy 
in front of Cumieres and its wood— points where the enemy 
broke, whereas upon the rest of the front he retired after 
each attack in some order and reformed regularly for its 
renewal. What is simple and satisfactory in the relation 
IS that the enemy continued to bring up "fresh men. We 
are particularly told that the body which struck between 
the Goose Crest and the river was new and so was the 
brigade which came down on Sunday evening from the 
extreme north-east upon Avocourt. What other new 
elements were present we have not been told. 
But the enemy, who would be enormously advantaged 
if he could compel us to take up a foolish attitude towards 
the mere area of Verdun (which attitude he; believes we 
are already taking), would be almost equally advantaged 
if the moment, let alone the place, of the main counter- 
offensive were to be determined by political and not by 
military judgment. 
When or how the counter-stroke is to "be delivered is 
a matter for the allied command alone. No one, whatever 
his personal vanity or power may be, would openly dispute 
so obvious a truth. But there "is a danger that the mass 
of uninformed opinion may bring pressure to bear in 
favour of premature action. This danger is particularly 
great in a society the ultimate direction of which is com"- 
mercial and civilian. Every day of delay is an- added 
expense and an added strain. That it has the same effect 
upon the enemy we tend to forget. That the endurance 
of such expense or such strain is like the sowing of a 
harvest only to be reaped when it is ripe, those un- 
acquainted with the military conditions of concentration 
and supply equally tend to forget. 
When we have made the enemy pay the very fullest 
price in exhaustion for a foolish purchase upon which he is 
now embarked, not with a true military, but with a 
political object, it will be our next duty, as negative and 
therefore as difficult as the first, to wait patiently through 
whatc\-er space of time will best prepare the decisive 
character of the counter-stroke, and not to hasten or to 
