April 13, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
confuse by public clamour the plans which will then be 
laid To do so would be only second in folly, if second, to 
the folly of attaching to the area of Verdun the super- 
stitious importance which you already find attached 
to it in too many quarters . . 
I have written at this length upon the significance of 
the moment because, lacking an appreciation of it. 
the actual operations will be without meaning. Let 
us now turn to an examination first of the position m 
Mesopotamia and next of what the last enemy effort in 
this region of Verdun has been. 
Position in Mesopotamia 
With regard to the position in Mesopotamia there is 
little or nothing to add to the official summary which has 
been circulated through the Press with a map, also 
officially provided, which gi\'es all the mam points of 
the situation. We do not know the chances of success, 
for the very simple reason that the numerical factor, both 
in pieces and in men (which is the essential of the whole 
matter) is necessarily concealed from us. We know 
from the experience of Europe that with reasonably 
good troops a line of six miles long entrenched is held 
at full strength if, say, more than twenty and less than 
thirty thousand men are present. We know that such 
a line cannot be touched, no matter what superiority of 
infantry attacks it, until it has been pounded by very 
numerous heavy pieces for anything from 36 to 48 hours. 
But what numbers are present of guns or men— the whole 
basis of judgment— is not to be published. 
With the ground every one is by this time famihar. 
'M^i^ 
•^'uwau'/dt "dial's !i 
S€ I 
I 
Oiyoiloh 
The Turks have consolidated an extremely strong main 
position running upon Sketch III from A to B, some 6 
miles in length, continuous save for a couple of miles 
where it is broken by the Suwada Marsh, and reposing 
upon its right or southern extremity upon the Shatt-cl-Hai. 
These lines contain General Townshcnd's besieged British 
force lying in the bend of the river at Kut, and are known 
as the EsSinn position. Beyond the dry, or mainly dry 
watercourse called the Dujailah, the flank of these 
positions is covered by a series of six redoubts. The corner 
where this flank joins the main front is strengthened by a 
strong work, the Dujailah redoubt lying immediately 
behind the fosse formed by the old watercourse. Some 
miles in front of the main Es Sinn position, the ultimate 
breaking of which is essential to the relief of the small 
force besieged at Kut, the Turks have put forward 
advanced positions of less strength destined to delay the 
British relieving force. The first of these at C, 15 or 16 
miles in a direct line down the stream upon the Es Sinn 
position, was carried by the relieving force some days ago. 
The second and more formidable one, known as the 
Sann-i-Yat position, is unfortunately still intact. 
This advanced line of the enemy reposes securely upon 
two marshes north and south of the Tigris, the interval 
between (nearly bisected by the river) being little over 
four miles. There was apparently no possibility whatso- 
ever of turning this comparatively short line, the marshes 
having been recently flooded, though the river has not 
risen. 
These floods have also restricted the front the enemy has 
to defend upon this advaitced position by encroaching 
somewhat upon the two extremes of it. All our public 
news with regard to the effort to carry this advanced 
position is contained in a despatch of exactly seventeen 
words in length : " An attack was made at dawn on the 
qih, but failed to get through Ihe enemy's line," and that 
is all we know. 
It is impossible upon such information to discuss the 
matter further. We can only wait for the result. 
Main Offensive against the Mort Homme 
Upon last Fridav and Saturday, April 7th and 8th, the 
French command was advised of a great concentration of 
fresh forces (probably not less than four divisions ia 
strength and perhaps more), upon the front behind the 
heights which run from Forges to the woods of Malan- 
court. The front line of German trenches at that moment 
ran as do the crosses upon the accompanying sketch Map 
I, and the main concentration was taking place roughly 
w'here the two groups of thick black lines, A and B, stand 
upon that sketch. 
It was therefore clear, especially in connection with the 
very violent bombardment which had developed against 
the French positions along the whole of this nine miles 
sector, that the enemy was going to make a strong bid for 
the Mort Homme. 
That height, as the reader knows, is the point upon 
which all this first line, four or five milts in front of the 
main Charny ridge, depends. The enemy must hold the 
Mort Homme and Hill 304 if he is to have full and secure 
possession of the first line : only when he holds them can 
he even begin his advance towards the main position 
behind. 
It is possible, as we shall see later in this article, that 
