10 
LAND & W A T E R 
April 13, 1916 
his first great effort was made nearly two months ago ; 
and that his effoiis to capture the Goose Crest, Hill 
304 and the Mort Homme, which are still proceeding, 
are undertaken with the object of permitting this linal 
attack to be delivered along the whole line A B, the 
western portion of which on the line of the arrows E E 
is now hampered by the remaining French possession of 
the shaded ground upon the sketch. It is suggested 
that if he captured the northernmost positions between 
Avocourt and the Meuse he would not go on to attack 
the Charny ridge, but having thus eliminated the threat 
to the flank of the arrows at E E would attack all along 
the western position between Vaux and the river. 
I g ve the suggestion for what it is worth. It has 
been attentively listened to and discussed in I'-ranre. 
It is all a question of numbers. If he cares to lose enough 
men he can, of course, after carrying the Mort Homme 
and 304, attack the whole line of the Charny ridge as well 
as the position east of the Meuse between that river and 
Vaux. As a mere problem of ground it is self-evident 
that he would get greater results by attacking the Charny 
ridge alone, because he would thus, if he were successful, 
automatically compel a retirement from A B. But that 
would mean a redisposition of his heavy artillery, which 
is now in the woods of Mazeray and JHingry, and the new 
emplacement and making of new heads of munitionment 
for 380's and 420's (15 and 17 inches) is a verv long 
business. 
rSote on the German Mineral Supply 
r believe that information has been received with regard 
to the condition of the iron ore supply in Lorraine, which 
is of capital importance to the enemy at this moment. 
The information is of double importance as showing us 
how the Germans are breaking the solemn treaties to 
which they put their names (for what that was worth) in 
the treatment of prisoners and also the straits for labour 
into which they have fallen. 
It seems that the mines in the Briey basin, especially 
those nearest Metz, Hommecourt, Moutiers, Landres 
and others, are now being worked by gangs of Russian 
prisoners. But some of the mines have got flooded, 
particularly Pienne, and none of the blast furnaces 
there are at present working. In this connection it is 
further worth recalling the fact that the whole of this bit of 
country, of which Verdun is one principal centre and 
Metz. opposite, the other, is the one field of supply for iron 
ore upon which the German Empire can securely depend. 
Just before the war three-cjuartors of the iron ore won 
within the Empire was, if I am not mistaken, provided 
by the territory annexed from France in '71, in Lorraine. 
Much of the foreign supply was provided also from French 
Lorraine, just over the frontier. A confidential memoir 
was addressed, according to the French authorities, to the 
German Chancellor last May by a group of the great 
industrial interests, pointing out that any grave inter- 
ference with the supply of Lorraine ore would mean the 
loss of the war. And in this same memoir the annexation 
of Verdun was urged as one of the conditions of peace — 
at that time, of course, the basis of such illusions, though 
flimsy, was a little less flimsy than it is to-day, the German 
losses at that moment being actually less than half of 
what they are now, and the effect of the great success on 
• the Dunajec recent and fresh. It may further be remem- 
bered that the trace of the new frontier in 1871 near 
Metz was exactly calculated to convey to Germany, 
what was then known as the whole iron bearing area of 
Lorraine. It is only since that date that the mines on 
the French side of the frontier have been put into 
exploitation. H. Belloc 
COMBINED ARMS IN WAR 
By Arthur Pollen 
WHILE the submarine war remains the absorb- 
ing topic of the moment, there has been news 
of several minor naval incidents of interest, 
and Sir Charles Monro's j^rotoundly interesting 
description of the evacuation of Gallipoli has been pub- 
lished. Never have the complexities of war been more 
clearly laid before us, and the dispatch is full of lessons 
to those, and they appear to be many, who imagine that 
the great campaign in which we are engaged can be 
simplified and made more efiicient by the problems of air 
war being divorced from those on land and sea. I 
touched on this subject last week. The situation has 
developed markedly since then, and in response to several 
correspondents, I propose to discuss it at slightly greater 
length to-day. But the purely naval events must be 
dealt with first. 
The Submarine Campaign 
Undoubtedly the most serious fact of the present 
naval situation is that the (lerman submarine successes 
continue at the high level that prevailed last week. Our 
last diagram showed the total reported up to April 3rd, 
but three have to be added to that total. In the ensuing 
week 22 ships have been sunk in home waters, and four 
in the Mediterranean. The casualties then in the last 
three weeks, excluding the Mediterranean, have been 
20, 25 and 22. 
Of this total of 67, 6 are allied ships, 26 neutral and 35 
British. That the rate has been so high and has been 
sustained so long is to be explained more by there being a 
greater number of submarines engaged, than by these 
submarines being of a new type. But the chief ex- 
planation is that all the submarines "seem to act alit'ays 
on the principle of sinking at sight. It is noteworthy 
for instance that in no single instance in the last three 
weeks has it been reported that a ship was sunk, or even 
attacked, by gunfire. It is equally noteworthy that, in 
almost every case, those on board the attacked ships 
saw no submarine. When in September the German 
Government volunteered a promise to America that they 
would sink no more ships without visit, search and pro- 
vision for the people on board, it was pointed out in these 
columns that were this promise carried out, the sub- 
marine campaign would be robbed of nine-tenths of its 
terrors. It was this that made it obvious that if both 
Germany and the United States were serious — the first 
in her determination on an effective blockade, and the 
second in the maintenance of national honour — a conflict 
between them must be inc\itablc. The success of the 
last three weeks would have been quite impossible had 
the bargain with America been kept. 
That it has not been kept, that Germany is in fact 
carrying out the ruthless and relentless campaign origin- 
ated by \on Tirpitz, urged by Reventlow, and forced upon 
a vacillating Chancellor and a shaken Emperor by a 
bloodthirsty popular agitation, creates an entirely new 
problem for the counter-attack. The Admiralty very 
rightly keeps its own counsel as its form. But it is clear 
that if submarines avoid the surface altogether, if they 
eliminate all the delays — even the five minutes' delay 
incidental to giving the crews of the doomed ships time 
in which to lower their boats — if ships are sunk every- 
where by invisible foes, whose pres2nce in the locality 
only becomes known when the survivors in boats are 
picked up, either by other steamers or by patrol craft, 
then the kind of organisation necessary for dealing with 
such tactics must differ altogether from those that 
characterised the milder campaign of last summer and 
autumn. The essence of the matter now is pace in getting 
to the spot from which news of the enemy is received. 
And pace is not so much a matter of the speed of the 
ships engaged as of promptness in sending them upon their 
work at the first intimation that there is work for them to 
do. Promptness of this kind is quite imposible unless the 
control of the patrolling and attacking craft is completely 
decentralised. It is quite useless for information of a 
submarine's presence to be telegraphed to the Admiralty 
and for the initiative in the pursuit to originate from 
Admiralty instructions. This is the first and the most 
obvious lines of modification that the counter-campaign 
must take. The second is an alternative way of attaining 
the main object, viz : bringing armed force more swihly 
to the infested swt. In preen conditions imarmed 
