April 13, 191G 
LAND & WATER 
II 
drifters, yachts, launches, etc., arc perfectly useless. 
Any news they may bring will be too late. They must act 
instead of reporting. It may not be possible to multiply 
the craft engaged in the hunt. It should not be impossible 
to see that every unit engaged in it is capable of taking 
an effective part. At any cost any one of them must be 
armed. And if it is necessary to despoil the old cruisers 
of their 3-pounders, 6-pounders and 3-inch guns, their 
loss of efficiency would be well balanced by the greater 
efficiency of the anti-submarine flotilla. So long as the 
old cruisers can keep their 6-inch guns, they can spare the 
armament originally put into tliem as defence against 
torpedo boats. It is useless against the modern destroyer 
and is far more wanted in craft actively engaged in 
the defence of commerce to-day. 
These remarks must not be taken to suggest that the 
Admiralty's counter-measures are inadequate, that no 
.changes of organisation are taking place, that the pro- 
cess of multiplying the means of attacking submarines is 
not in full swing. That the Admiralty measures have 
not appreciably reduced the rate is no proof that they 
are not effective. The counter-measures can only have 
a result proportionate to the numbers of submarines engaged . 
Without them the rate might easily have been twice as 
high. What is satisfactory about the present situation is 
this. The course of the campaign from September to the 
20th March seems to indicate that during this period, 
Ihe German Marine-Amt was making special efforts 
to produce boats and to tram crews, so that we now have 
upon the field the total product of five months' strenuous 
preparation. \\'hcn it is remembered that we have the 
maximum possible force against us, and this is employed 
with a total disregard to human rights or international 
obligations, the wonder is not that the victims are so 
many, but that the results fall so far short of achieving 
the German purpose. , 
The Loss of Ships 
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge contributed a letter to the 
Times last week, in which it was pointed out that the 
total enemy attacks on merchant shipping had in 20 
months only reduced the numbers of our merchant ships 
by 4 per cent, and the tonnage by about 5 per cent. 
While this is undoubtedly true, the totals are a little 
misleading, because that gallant and learned writer did 
not distinguish between ships engaged in foreign trade 
and the coasters, cross-Channel boats, etc. Something 
less than four-fiftlis of British steam vessels are usually 
employed in foreign trade and it is from these in the main 
tliat deductions clue to enemy attacks must be made. 
If we take 8,000 as our foreign trading fleet, and assume 
it to be reduced to about 5,000 by the requirements of 
the Navy and the oversea forces, then the losses due to 
the enemy attacks show a far higher percentage — roughly 
indeed 8 per cent, and 10 per cent, instead of 4 per cent, 
and 5 per cent. Not that there is anything really alarm- 
ing in these totals. In the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars the percentage of ships lost often attained 7 and 
sometimes exceeded 10 per cent, in a single year Eight per 
cent, in 20 months is of course not 5 per cent, per annum. 
Even if the rate of loss of British ships during the last 
three weeks were maintained, it would only mean an 
annual loss of just over 10 per cent. It is obvious 
then tliat while the diminution of shipping caused 
by the submarine losses may raise freights, and 
conseciucntly prices, may make it necessary to restrict 
imports more severely, and in many respects embarrass 
supply and trade, there is not the faintest ground for 
anticipating any grave shortage of food, any serious 
crippling of our economic life, above all, even the slightest 
relaxation of our military or naval activities. It is 
important to bear these facts in mind, because the whole 
of Germany's case for her sea savagery is based on it 
being necessary to inflict upon England the same priva- 
tions that the English blockade has inflicted upon (Ger- 
many. Where people throw over honour, decency and 
humanity, they are left with only one justification to 
console them for their crimes, and tliat is success. In 
this case it is clear that even tliis miserable consolation 
will be denied them. 
The Washington-Berlin Crisis 
The Amsterdam Tclegraaf published a telegram from 
its Washington corresoondent on Monday to the clfcct 
that an ultimatum had been sent to BerHn, but this is 
not confirmed. It is more to the point that there is no 
indication that American public opinion is weakening. 
It still finds the continuance of the present position 
intolerable. That Mr. Wilson will have to break with 
Berlin appears then to be certain. 
German Trade in the North Sea 
On Monday it was reported in the Times and con- 
firmed from Copenhagen, that Hamburg' had sent two 
ships to Aalesund, taking fuel and returning with pro- 
visions and oil. It is added that they left and returned 
under the convoy of destroyers. The story is told as if 
these ships had put to sea in the ordinary manner, 
confident in the ])rotection of their escort, and had 
entered Aalesund, and left again exactly as if the British 
fleet could either be ignored or be driven off by the craft 
that con\oyed them. But an impartial view oi the facts 
shows the situation to have a quite dift'erent significance. 
That German ships can leave Hamburg and maintain 
themselves for a time in the North Sea is obviously 
jVjssible. There are the examples of the Moeur and the 
G'm/ to prove it. Any ship that has sufficient ingenuity to 
disguise herself as a neutral, and sufficient enterprise to 
take the risk, will be reasonably sure of a certain number 
of hours, if not days, of rather exciting cruising in the 
North Sea. But the journey from Hamburg to Aalesund 
would not even call for many hours of exciting cruising. 
The distance is about 700 miles, but except for the 
crossing of the Skagerrack, the whole journey coTild be 
done in territorial waters. Save then for the passage of 
the Skagerrack —and e\en this could be avoided by 
coasting round Denmark, and then taking the Swedish 
territorial waters until those of Norway were reached — 
German ships could embark upon this journey reasonably 
sure of protection for the entire journey. But note two 
things in regard to this. First, this journey could not be 
undertaken regularly, but only occasionally, for, as recent 
news has told us. Commodore Tyrwhitt is sometimes to 
be found cruising off the Island'of Sjdt, and it is after 
all, less than a month since the Kong Inge was taken by a 
British submarine in the Kattegat, and sent home in 
charge of a prize crew. In no sense then is the journey 
between Hamburg and Norway one upon which the Ger- 
mans can rely. Note next that it can only be made at all 
because the ships arc protected from the attentions of the 
British fleet. But such protection as exists is not derived 
from the High Seas Fleet of the German Admiral in the 
Atlantic, but from the inviolability of Danish, Swedish 
and Norwegian waters ! Thus the whole aifair, instead of 
being an assertion of Germany's freedom to use the r.ea, 
is a confession of German naval weakness, and is jx)ssible 
only because tlv.' Germans can rely upon our naval respect 
for international law. 
A Superb Amphibious Operation 
Sir Charles Monro's despatch describing the evacuation 
of Gallipoli, throws important light on the art of uying 
naval and military forces in combination. He pavs a 
generous tribute to the Navy's efficiency, and reminds us 
of a truth insisted upon in these columns since the first 
landing, tha-t throughout these operations the fleet has 
taken the place of all the paraphernalia and organisation 
summed up in the expression " lines of communication 
and transport " in land operations. Never have the 
two arms been combined on so important a scale before ; 
never has the combination been more perfectly and 
successfully exhibited than in that final test of efficiency 
— the successive evacuations of Suvla, Anzac and Holies. 
Air War — Sea War— Land War 
During the last week Mr. Billing has carried through 
an oratorical campaign that has only been very imperfectly 
reported. Lord Montagu and Lord Derby have resigned 
from the air committee, and according to one journal, 
because the need of centralising and co-ordinating the aii 
service in a single department is not recognised. Exactlji 
what these distinguished men mean by this centralisation 
is not explained. It is probably rash to attribute to them 
the views which Mr. Billing has proclaimed. But Pro- 
fessor Wilkinson's endorsement of Mr. Billing lends im- 
portance to the rumour that the real issue now is not 
disagreement as to the best way of organising the supply 
