April 20, 1916 
L A >J D & W A 1 E K 
LAND & WATER 
EMPIRE HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C 
Telephone: HOLBORN 2828 
THURSDAY, APRIL 20. 1916 
CONTENTS 
PACE 
I 
Bunkered. By Louis Raemaekers 
The Alarm. By G. Spencer Pryse 2 
Folly of a Truce. (Leading Article). 3 
The Advance on Trebizond. By Hilaire Belloc 4 
War by Submarine. By Arthur Pollen * 10 
Air Defence. By F. W. Lanchester 12 
The New Dominion. A Poem. By Lord Montagu of 
Beaulieu 15 
Shakespeare To-day. By Sir Sidney Lee 15 
Chaya. By H. de Vere Stacpoole 17 
Town and Country 20 
The West End 22 
Choosing Kit 25 
THE FOLLY OF A TRUCE 
No sane man can believe that the interpretation 
placed by the German papers on Mr. Asquith's 
reply to the German Chancellor, corresponds 
to anything tliat was in the Prime Minister's 
mind wlieU he spoke. Tne enemy has a very obvious 
motive for Jumping at anything which could possibly be 
twisted into. an indication that this country was weakened 
In its determination to prosecute the war unflinchingly 
until complete and final victory had been obtained ; for 
a truce which will leave their power intact and the 
resources at their disposal still formidable and give them 
time to prepare for a renewed attack upon this country, 
is now the only hope of the Prussian rulers of Germany, 
and constitutes the true end of all their present policy, 
whether mihtary or political. Tne fact, however, that 
some publicists, even in this country, have shown a dis- 
position to put upon Mr. Asquith's words a gloss, less 
monstrous indeed than that of his German interpreters, 
but none the less unjustifiable and very mischievous, 
makes it a pressing duty to emphasise once more the 
reasons why no peace will be tolerable which leaves the 
military power of Prussia in being. 
Tne great majority of the people of this country wel- 
comed the Prime Minister's Guildhall declarations be- 
cause, as tlie Nation expresses it, " it might be taken to 
mean that the military aim of beating Germany in the field 
nnist be pressed until either the German army had ceased 
to exist or the German State had been reconstituted, and 
the Prussian hegemony, established in 1870, annulled.'' 
In point of fact this seems the least that it possibly could 
mean ; nor have we any reason to doubt that it is what 
:Mr. Asquith mt-ant and what lie means still. At the 
same time, it is doubtless true that there exists a minority, 
small indeed in numbers, but by no means devoid of 
political power, which would not be indisposed to put an 
end to the war so soon as it could point to what the Nation 
(which may be taken as more or less representing the views 
of this section of opinion) calls " a more or less beaten 
Germany." And since this minority is beginning, how- 
ever unjustly, to claim the Premier as a sympathiser, it is 
nece.ssary to explain once more why their policy, howaver 
well intentioned, amounts to national suicide. 
First, let us remember that a " more or less beaten " 
Germany— that is to say an uncrushed, imhumiliated 
and undisarmed Germany— will remain a Prussian (Ger- 
many. Tlie ccjutrary view strikes us as one of the most 
curious miscalculations into which men otherwise in- 
telligent have fallen in regard to this war. They think 
that if Germany is " beaten " in this very qualified sense 
she will voluntarily change her aims and perhaps her rulers. 
Such a view is based upon a complete misunderstanding 
of the German attitude, and of the relations between the 
Germans and their Prussian masters. We may call 
Germany " more or less beaten," because her aggression 
against the liberties of Europe has failed. But that is not 
how the rulers of Germany will represent the matter to 
the people of Germany. They will claim that the whole 
world combined in arms to crush Germany ; and that, 
thanks to Prussia and the Hohenzollerns, the whole world 
failed. They will point to the ravaged provinces of their 
enemies and to a Germany almost e.xempt from invasion 
as a practical justification of their " mihtarism." Finally, 
they will say that if their enemies are still armed and able 
to renew the attack, that is a reason for even more 
extensive military and naval preparations, and for even 
more concentration of power in the hands of the military 
authorities in Berlin. 
It is no good arguing that the picture thus drawn 
would, from a historical point of view, be ludicrously 
false^that the war was deliberately planned by the 
Prussian authorities for two years, that they started with 
an enormous advantage over the Allies in men and 
materials, and that they counted on immediate and 
decisive victory. All the pictures drawn by the rulers 
of Germany for home consumption ai^e as false ; but they 
are believed, as this one will certainly be. Only if Gcr. 
many suffers patent and ruinous mihtary defeat, if her 
territory is visibly occupied by foreign armies and the 
terms of peace dictated to her involve open and uri- 
disguised humiliation, is there the smallest chance of the 
German people asking if Prussian rule is worth bearing at 
such a cost Any such peace as that indicated above 
would certainly both increase the prestige and confinn 
the rule of the Prussian mihtary caste. 
That is the first point. The second is that tliia 
Prussianised Germany, which would still exist after such a 
peace, and which would still have at its disposal the 
enormous resources of the German and Austrian Empires, 
would certainly make the first aim of its future policy 
the isolation and final destruction of this country. On 
the Continent Prussia is already defeated ; and though 
she will not admit it unless we make her, it will be long 
before she again ventures on a policy of aggression against 
France or Russia. But some compensation might be 
found in the establishment at our expense of a great 
Colonial Empire and a predominance at sea. To tliis 
achievement the new efforts of Prussia will be bent. 
Our isolation will be the first objective. This may 
actually be made easier by the fact that Prussia's conti- 
nental schemes have miscarried, that she may have had 
to give up Alsace-Lorraine to France and recognise 
Russian predominance in Poland and the Balkans. It 
will certainly be made enormously easier if we have had 
the chief hand in making the inconclusive peace from 
which we shall be the chief sufferers. Under such circum- 
stances, we could not reasonably expect our present 
Allies to come to our rescue, when our folly and timidity 
were about to receive their due punishment. We should 
have to fight our battle for existence alone against the 
energies and resources of two great Empires devoted 
this time to a single end, and that end the dismemberment 
of our Colonial possessions and the reduction of our country 
to a position of permanent inferiority. 
With the question of what terms should after victory 
be imposed upon the Germanic powers, we do not here 
deal. It is too early to think of such things. What 
is not too early to say is that such terms must be imposed 
and not negotiated, and that before we even speak of 
them " the military power o| Prussia must be utterly 
destroyed." 
