LAND & WATER 
April 20, i<)i6 
is another side to the business wltich has so far been 
barely stated in these columns, and which now merits 
a more thorough cUscussion. It is the French side of the 
atfair. 
What are the French doing upon the sector of Verdun ? 
They stand week after week. They retire occasionally 
In their retirements they necessarily lose a certain 
quantity of men and material. They attempt no serious 
counter-attack. What is the meaning of this ? 
The best informed of the London daily papers took 
up this question the other day, and replied to it — I think 
a little si-perciliously — by saying that the whole thing 
was quite clear. The (iernians were attacking and the 
French were defending, and that was the end of it. We 
were to watch very anxiously the German attack, which 
might succeed. We were to watch with equal an.xiety 
the French defence, which might fail. We were to regard 
the whole struggle as an undecided balance between these 
two forces, the ec^iilibrium between which would at last 
fail to the detriment of the one side or the other. 
Tnis same conception, put with less clarity and with 
varying degrees of knowledge, runs through the most 
of our Press. It is apparent in all the current comment 
of the French Press, except in the half-dozen daily articles 
which appear from the pens of competent students (tlies.- 
by the way, often helped in their suggestions by the 
French Command). It appears (with similar exceptions) 
in all the neutral Press. 
Now this view is obvious and undeniable. But it 
brings us no nearer to the answer of the main question 
which is not merely "Wh^it are the French doing," but 
" Why are they doing "it ? " 
Objects of the Defensive. 
Consider the various objects which a defensive can 
have in view. 
(I) A large body of men and of material is contained 
within a certain area from which it cannot escape. It 
consists, let us say, of a quarter of a million men with 
their complement of guns and of military stores of all 
kinds. Its enemy prevents its leaving that area because 
(a) this enemy is more numerous and can therefore every- 
where concentrate superior forces against its attempt at 
retirement, (b) He is in positions or can at will arrive in 
positions, which block that retirement. This is, in fact, a 
siege. The enemy's object in attacking in this cas3, if he 
attacks at all, is to crush back the ring of the defence 
upon a confined space where it has not elbow room to 
manoeuvre, so that the besieged force shall fall into con- 
fusion and become his prey Or he attacks to break the 
ring which, once broken, is no longer a defensive organisa- 
tion and equally falls a prey to him. If he has reason to 
think that food or munitions will be exhausted in useful 
time he does not actively attack, he merely sits down 
before the besieged place and lets time do its work. 
The object of the defensive is to delay the enemy as 
much as possible until succour shall arrive ; to keep the 
area within which it can manoeuvre large enough to 
prevent confusion, but not too large to be held 
adequately upon every side. 
If the defensive can hold out until succour arrives and 
the siege is raised, it has won and the offensive has lost. 
Ladysmith in the Boer War was an example ; Man- 
beuge in 1793. The effect of the delay has been to 
immobilise numbers of the enemy over a critical period. 
If the defensive is either crushed or starved into 
surrender it has lost. W^e have had plenty of examples 
of that in the present war. Przemysl surrendered from 
exhaustion ; Kovno was rushed ; Maubeuge saw its 
ring of defences broken. In all these cases the defensive 
was standing a siege against superior forces, and failed. 
There is nothing of this sort at all about Verdun. 
Verdun is not besieged ; no large force is contained 
without issue there, within a circle of foes. It is simply 
a town standing in a shallow salient, the Unes of which are 
lines of trenches, and behind these trenches artillery 
helping to hamper and to break the attack as does machine 
gun and riHe fire from the trenches themselves. 
(II) A large body of men with their material stands in 
a salient with a comparatively narrow neck. The enemy 
does not surround this body, but he nearly surrounds it. 
The issue by which that body can retire is small for the 
movements of such numerous forces. The enemy while 
" holding " his opponent along all the bulge of the salient, 
strikes with particular force against either edge of the 
" neck." If he cuts the neck before the retirement has 
begun he will put out of action all the troops and the 
material within the salient. Even if he narrows the 
salient so much that the retirement gets congested, he 
will reap a very big harvest of men and guns by crushing 
in the bulge during that retirement. 
There is nothinj^ of all this in the case of Verdun. 
The salient has no neck. It is a mere slight curve and 
the main attacks are not even delivered against the 
extreme points where that curve begins its projection. 
(III) .'\ weaker force holds up a stronger one liy stand- 
ing on the defensive upon a particular part of a long line. 
Its object in so holding up the attack of the stronger 
force is either to deceiv-e the enCmy upon the places where 
strength is concentrated in other parts of the field or to 
allow time for developments in that other part of the 
field or both. 
We have had what is now a classical example of this 
kind of defensive in the case of the (irand Couronne in 
front of Nancy in the first week of Saptember, 1914, which 
made possible the victory of the Marne. 
There is nothing of that sort ahoitt \'erdun. 
The enemy knows perfectly w.^ll what troops we have 
and where they are, nor is there any necessity for the 
I'Vench to m:'et him, imless they choos?, with less-r 
numbers. There is no tactical play to be considered ; 
an immansely long line of trenches over 500 miles stands 
intact ; one particular portion of it, about 4 p?r cnt., 
is being \igorously assaulted ; upon the rest there is 
freedom of concentration at will — within the limits 
permitted by the numbers withdrawn for the defence f)f 
the small sector attacked. Troops can be sent to aid in 
that defence, withdrawn shortly afterwards and sent to 
another part of the line, replaced by other troops taken 
freshly from elsewhere, and so on in rotation. 
(IV) Even where a long line of this sort exists intact 
and only a small section of it is vigorously attacked, a 
prolonged mere defensive may be necessary, and its success 
may be of critical importance, because the lateral com- 
munications behind the whole line are bad and because 
the moving of m^n up and down the line is therefore 
difficult, very slow or impossible. The defence in this 
case must depend upon its own resources. If it breaks 
down the line will be pierced. Its mere tenacity is of 
the greatest moment to the caus3 of the defenders. 
There is nothing of this about Verdun. 
The lateral communications behind the French line are 
the best in Europe. They are superior even to the 
corresponding communications behind the (icrman line, 
for they are not interrupted by the n^ccssit}' for garrison- 
ing occupied districts, or the interruption caused by such 
masses as the Vosges and the Ardennes. It is a very 
small point. The lateral communications of both oppo- 
nents are first rate, but at any rate the French and British 
lateral communications are perfectly clear and sufficient 
for practically any movement of troops whatsoever at 
the shortest notice. 
(V) Lastly, there is the attack- upon a particular sector 
which may have great political or great economic or great 
strategical importance, or all three cfHiibint'd, and which 
therefore must be specially defended. Antwerp was 
a first-rate example of this kind. For the (Germans to 
enter Antwerp in the autumn of 1914 was economically 
of great importance to them. It gave them building yard;., 
a great town for the repose of troops, huge titocks of 
materials, etc. Strategically it was of great importance 
to them, because it cleared their fianks of all menace, 
and if they had not blundered in neglecting to cross the 
Scheldt it would have given them a mass ot armed men as 
well. Even as it was, it gave them the elimination of 
very many thousands of their opponents at insignificant 
experise to themselves, and a very great (pnntity 
military stores and guns. 
The defence of Antwerp, had it 3cen pos ;ible (and it 
would have been possible if the Allies had cared to violate 
the nei.trality of Holland and had at the same time been 
prepared with a large force to throw into the place), would 
have been of the utmost value. 
Politically the entry of German troops into Antwerp 
was also of very high value. It decided the occupation 
of Belgium. It gave them what was incomparably the 
most important centre of civ-ilian life within the area 
