April 20, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
11 
the first week of September, we had precisely the same 
conditions. The rate then dropped suddenly from the 
highest on record to the lowest. I am far from sa^anf^ 
that we are to infer that the present drop from the recent 
high rate forebodes a continuance of a low rate. But it 
was inconceivable that the high rate copld continue ; 
equally almost inconceivable that what we have just seen 
is not the highest rate possible. The agencies which 
reduced the rate last autumn — though probably less 
efficient than they were because attacking at sight gives 
to the U boats opportunities of sinking ships, and 
lessens our opportunities for sinking them — are still 
formidable enough, and they have doubtless been in- 
creased in numbers and in efficiency. Those engaged in 
these operations have a wider experience, and the or- 
ganisation for pooling these experiences, and making the 
lessons of one field available in another, has been very 
greatly improved. The directions which these improve- 
ments had to take 1 indicated last week. The process 
of decentralising began going into effect about last June. 
And in foiu^ months we saw the value of the new principles 
cirployed. It may take a month or two to bring Ger- 
many's present equipment of submarines once more to 
negligible proportions. Meantime, for the moment at 
any rate, it looks as if the Admiralty had the thing in 
hand. 
Force Direct and Indirect 
The curve of destruction will inevitably tend to return 
to the normal for reasons inherent in the character of 
this peculiar kind of war. Where two forms of force 
arc engaged in opposition, of which one is incapable of clos- 
ing and fighting the other, and relies upon chance strokes 
from a distance to effect its end and on evasion for its 
safety-, while the other is able and willing to close and 
f.ght it out — because in contact its pov.-ers of attack 
and resistance are superior, the former evasive force is 
^lippift^perda:^ Shippcn^pcrJaif 
%- 
UWetk, I 
imik. 
irdlVkk 
.--'2k 
-. ^ _ .. 
z 
z 
\h. 
4thmek 
y NbrtzuH 
k-- - . 
> 

ITomal Istmek. Znd 3rd. ' 4th. 
Daily Average Curve: The above curve shows how the daily'average 
rose in the fir3t week of the new Submarine Campaign from slijihilv less 
than one per day during February and the first 17 days of March, to 
2; in the firs; week; 2: in the second; dropped to 2\ in the third, and 
aga-n it l! in the past week. 
ultimately doomed to failure. It is a truth illustrated in 
many experiences of guerilla war. The South African 
campaign and the American wars with the Red Indians 
are excellent instances in point. The weakness of the 
guerilla is his inability to combine and defeat the main 
force against him. The weakness of the organised force 
is to counteract the swiftness and secrecy of movement 
of the guerilla. In the submarine war the case is com- 
plicated by the submarines having objectives that cannot 
defend themselves. Success is measured bv the number 
of these that they can waylay. The true analogy is 
with bandits and highwaymen, who have hills and deserts 
to hide in, and from them communications. But 
until a submarine is produced that can attack and destroy 
its pursuers or is impenetrable to the weapons its pur- 
suers bring against it, the ultimate defeat of the submarine 
is certain, because while their pursuers can combine 
against them, the submarines cannot combine against 
their pursuers. 
Lord Montagu, I imagine, called in the submarine to 
strengthen his argument, which in the main, of course, 
vvas that we could only decide the land war in our favour 
if we strengthened our attack by aircraft good and numer- 
ous enough for the jiurposc. But does not the argument 
of the submarine really apply with even greater force 
to the aeroplane ? \\'hen used for warlike operations on 
their own account, all aircraft arg subject to a similar 
disability — They are unable to close and fight the enemy. 
They, too, have to ixly on chance blows, and they areata 
disadvanta;i;e greater than that of the submarine in that 
their objectives are many times more difficult to lind and 
fifty times more difficult to destroy. Like the submarine 
they have no means of engaging the fi.xcd defences put up to 
drive them off, so that they too must rely upon evasion for 
safet}'. Aircraft are only unlike submarines in that they 
can fight each other, and this is of course a disadvantage. 
If the statement is accurate that in a month's 
time Germany will have 50 Zeppelins, 20 of which may 
be used for bombing the civil population of this country, 
it will certainly become highly desirable that we should 
have enough suitable aeroplanes — that are not wanted 
for the Army or the Navy — to engage these murderers in 
their qwn element. But even if we had aeroplanes numerous 
and good enough to bring down every Zeppelin that 
crossed the North Sea, we should be making the greatest 
mistake if v/e siij:)posed that thereby we brought victory 
any nearer. It would be a case of the enemy compelling 
us, by an unmilitary use of force, to devote part of our 
force to the unmTlitary object of thwarting it. And in 
calling this object unmilitary, I am far from saying that 
it is not a proper object. 1 am merely saying that its 
achievement does not carry us on one inch towards ending 
the war. 
It is no answer to. say that Zeppelins, coming often 
enough and in sufficient numbers, must inevitably destroy 
factories and arsenals vital to military efficiency. In 
the first month of the war France lost j^^ per cent, of her 
coal supply and over 80 per cent, of her engineering 
resources. Yet it was not a fatal loss. Neither aircraft 
nor submarines can conceivably do damage on this scale. 
Their share in war is for practical purposes only indirect. 
They are dependent upon chance for success, and they 
must not be confused with those factors in the war which 
are decisive. 
Important News 
As wc go to Press, two important pieces of news arrive. 
Trebizond has fallen to the Russians in what was, quite 
evidently, an operation in which land and sea force 
were brilliantly combined. Some ten days ago, it may be 
remembered, the Breslau made a dash to the Anatolian 
coast to assist in resisting the Russian push along the 
coast. She was driven off, according to the Turkish 
account, by a squadron which included one of the Black 
Sea Dreadnoughts. It was the first news we had had 
that any of this class were finished. The Breslau's speed 
enabled her, naturally enough, to escape. Whether the 
Maria Imperatritza's big guns could have been of very 
material assistance in the question one cannot tell without 
studying the contour map of the field of operations. But 
the squadron's intervention in landing artillery to cover 
the final advance appears to have been decisive. The 
official account does not say whether these were naval 
guns or not. They may, of course, have been field artillery 
landed from transports under the protection of the battle- 
ships. The conquest of Trebizond gives Russia a much- 
needed advance base for an Anatolian campaign, and for 
the first time, she will begin now to reap the full benefit 
of her unquestioned control of the Black Sea. It is an 
event of the greatest importance. Note that once more 
submarines have failed in preventing a landing. 
Artiu'r Pollen. 
Mr. Unwin published yesterday The Book of Italy issued 
imder the auspices of Queen Elena of Italy in aid of the 
Italian Sailors' and Soldiers' Families and the Italian Red 
Cross. For several generations there has l)ecn a deep sym- 
pathy between the peoples of England and of Italy, a sort of 
natural and instinctive understanding of one another. There 
are f.w English writers or artists who have not felt the charm 
of Italy and her people, while on the other hand the cultivated 
Italian is generally attracted towards England and English 
life. The Rook of Italy edited by an Italian scholar. Dr. 
Rafl'aello Piccoli, I'nivcrsity Teacher at Cambridge, and with 
an Introduction by Lord Rryce, contains contributions from 
writers and artists of both nations. The net profits from the 
sale will be handed over by the publishers to the Pro Italia 
Committee in aid of the Italian Sailors' and .Soldiers' Families 
in the United Kingdom and of the Italian Red Cross, imder the 
patronage of the Italiau .Ambassador, .Marchese Imporiali, 
