12 
LAND & WATER 
April 20, 1916 
Air Defence Problems and Fallacies 
The Failure of the Derby Committee 
By F. W. Lanchester 
PERHAPS the most important announcement 
which has been made in relation to service 
aeronautics during the last few weeks — in fact, 
since the appointment of the Derby Committee — 
is the collapse of that Committee, notified by the resigna- 
tions of Lord Pcrby and of Lord Montagu, the latter of 
whom only joined the Committee in March. I do not 
know whether the terms of reference of this Committee 
were ever published, but it is impossible from the 
conditions that it could have been a Committee with 
executive power. The responsibility for the efficiency 
of our Navy and of our Army during the European War 
must rest absolutely in the hands of the Admiralty 
and War Office respectively. It is immaterial whether 
we are dealing with the infantry, with the cavalry, or 
with the artillery, or whether we are dealing with the 
Flying Corps ; they are to-day the four arms of the 
Service (if we exclude the Royal lingineers from Ix-ing 
described as an arm), the respensibility cannot be divided. 
Likewise in the Navy it is of no consequence whether we 
are considering our battle fleets, or bur cruiser squadrons, 
or our mosquito flotillas of various denominations, or 
whether we are considering the Royal Naval Air Service, 
again the responsibility cannot be divided. In every 
case the inter-relationship between the different " Arms," 
be it of our Army or of our Fleet, is so close and intricate 
and the co-ordination of their movements is so necessary 
to the successful performance of their duties that no 
division of responsibility is possible. Ultimately as 
concerns the conduct of operations in the field the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of an Army must be absolute, and the 
Admiral in supreme command must have implicit power 
over the naval and air forces in his control. 
Supply 
From these elementary facts, which are not disputed by 
any competent mihtary or naval authority, it follows 
that such a Committee as that appointed under the pre- 
sidency of Lord Derby must be dependent on the agree- 
ment between the naval and military representatives 
serving thereon. If such a Committee could be dragooned 
by a majority in which the Service members were on 
opposite sides there would be an end to responsibility. 
It may be considered deplorable that when the machinery 
of a Committee has been formed with the object of bring- 
Mig the responsible parties together to reach an agree- 
ment on. vital points as they arise, that failure should 
result, but this is not the point at issue ; deplorable or 
otherwise, it is perfectly clear and evident that the cure 
must not be sought in the direction of destroying that 
complete and plenary responsibility which is essential 
to the well-being of the Services, and proper conduct 
of naval or military operations. 
It is said that the actual difficulty or rock on which 
the Committee was wrecked related to the supply of 
material. If we take this to be the case it is not a trouble 
under present conditions which is peculiar to the Air 
Service ; it is a trouble which has manifested itself in 
other directions and in the supply of material of other 
kinds — shells, artillery, machine guns, small arms, etc., 
etc., even within a few weeks of the outbreak of war ; 
it has led to the creation of a Ministry of Munitions and 
the appointment of a Cabinet Minister to organise and 
regulate supplies. It would be indeed strange if the 
supply of the special material demanded by the Roj'al 
Flying Corps, and the Royal Naval Air Service, were 
exempt from difficulty : aeroplanes, aeroplane motors, 
counter-aircraft artillery, bombs, Lewis guns and other 
items of etiuipmcnt. "in brief, the weakness of the 
Committee in the matter of executive power, and the 
particular difficulties in relation to the supply of material 
were both such as could have been reasonably anticipated 
and expected from the outset. 
It would have been indeed a happy issue if under these 
conditions the Committee had been "able, by the exercise 
of argument and persuasive power, to have accomolished 
successfully the duties assigned to it, but such is more 
than in the conduct of human affairs could have been 
hoped or anticipated. The Committee Was an experi- 
ment and it has failed. The discussion of the fundamental 
difficulty as touching the supply of material will be 
res(uned later. The Press and public, of course, jirocecd 
to blame the Ciovcrnmcnt for having set up a Committee 
which has proved abortive in its results. Perhaps the 
(iovernmcnt are to blame for not having foreseen the 
difficulties, and for having brought into being a com- 
mittee which has after so short a career proved a failure, 
but the question of blame or otherwise is not what 1 am 
out to discuss. Naturallv on the public admission of the 
failure we turn to examine the alternative proposals 
which have been made from time to time for the 
strengthening of service aeronuatics, and for the more 
active persecution of air warfare, we find ourselves faced, 
amongst other ]irojects with a proposal for an Air Ministry 
with full executive powers. 
Responsibility. 
This proposal requires to be examined and studied from 
the two points of view by which any scheme of military 
or naval reform is dominated : the question of responsi- 
bility, 'and that of the suppl\-. The rjuestion of respon- 
sibility is one which is always paramount and which 
cannot be " jockeyed with " without disaster. , The 
question of supply is one which under normal conditions 
is of comparatively easy solution, but which as ex- 
perience has shown in the present great war, is one of 
grave and fundamental difficulty. 
In dealing with the question of responsibility I take 
it as an axiom that the responsibility of a Commander- 
ir'^-Chief for the employment of the forces allotted to him 
for the conduct of military operations must be absolute. 
There may be restrictions and he may have to act within 
the limits of instructions as to the actual task he is called 
upon to perform; these may be dictated by political 
circumstances, or by reason of grand strategy ; but once 
given his job his authority must be supreme. 
I take it as a further axiom that in the supply of material 
and personnel full responsibility must rest with tlic 
Admiralty and War Office respectively, and the said 
responsibility being limited by the resources of the 
country either as defined by the" Parliamentary %Mauts on 
supply which are made available from war to year, or in 
the case of national danger by the "ultimate financial 
and material resources of the" country, or as judged 
expedient by the Cabinet or by the section of the Ministry 
on which plenary powers have been conferred. 
When as in the present great war the resources of the 
country, both in recruiting for all arms, and for industrial 
purposes in the manufacture of munitions, are utilised 
or commandeered to the utmost, it becomes one of the 
most anxious and diflicult duties of the Ministry properly 
to allocate these resources between the authorities 
who are responsible ; the conditions are without parallel 
in our previous national experience. If the question of 
the great war had been studied closely by competent 
authorities it is not unreasonable to suppose that to a 
very great extent the position could have been forecast, 
and on the outbreak of war every man could have had his 
duties allotted to him, subject of course to after adjust- 
ments based on experience, but nothing of the kind was 
done, and it is scarcely probable that our Ministry would 
have dreamed of devoting the necessary time or attention 
to the consideration of any such hypothetical study. 
The fact, however, which is "of importance is that it was 
not done. Hence we have had industrial firms and 
recruiting officers competing for the same man ; we have 
had the Army and the Navy competing for the output of 
the .same factory, we have seen firms galore with pressure 
applied from two different authorities, in entirely opposite 
directions, not knowing, for example, whether to en- 
courage their men to attest under the Derbv recruiting 
scheme or whether to toll th-m that thev'were doing 
