4 
LAND cV W A T E R 
April 27, 1 9 16 
THE TIGRIS CAMPAIGN 
Stragetic Value of British Operations in Asia Minor 
By Hilaire Belloc 
EVERYONE in this country is chiefly concerned 
at this moment— ^and naturally — with Kut. 
The chances of relieving (ieneral Townshend 
seem the principal business of the war, and the 
army on the Tigris is regarded in the light of that task 
alone. 
But there is another far more important point to be 
considered in connection with any allied arin\' in 
Mesopotamia at this moment, and that is the strategic 
effect of its presence upon the great war as a whole.) 
That effect is considerable and to ignore it in our 
anxiety for Kut is to suffer a grave error in judgment. 
Whether the small force now contained at Kut el 
Amara be compelled to surrender or not, the strategic 
value of an advance on Bagdad, which was entrusted to 
it, and the consequences that will presumably follow upon 
that advance, in any event remain. 
In order to judge this we must get rid of the immediate 
anxiety for a very small isolated force, we must. refuse 
to consider the Mesopotamian campaign as an isolated 
adventure, and we must consider the whole field of the 
war and its development. 
What Led up to the Importance of the Turkish 
Empire in the War 
Of the Alliance ranged against the British, French and 
Russians, and later the Italians, much the largest portion 
of the Central Empires (which was also the original portion) 
is, in a military sense, nearly homogeneous. The German 
word of command is universal from the Danube to the 
Bdltic and from the Vosges to the Vistula. What this 
central body originally lacked in homogeneity it fully 
obtained upon the peril of Austria-Hungary during the 
first winter of the war and the consequent submission of all 
her organisation to direct control from Berlin. 
This formidable power outnumbered for many months 
the available forces of the Allies opposed to it, for a still 
longer period controlled a much greater industrial output 
and, what was perhaps most . important of all, enjoyed 
a great disparity of force between its various opponents. 
It could be confident that on its eastern front industrial 
resources would always be lacking to its enemy. , 
This homogeneous central body was also fully mobilised, 
that is, it had an organisation and means for levying men 
and material and communicating orders which permitted 
it to sustain at the very outset of the campaign a maxi- 
mum effort so far as men and their moNcments were con- 
cerned. 
Of the opponents toyirhis central body France alone was 
in a similar position, and France counted in men only 
about a third of the central body ; in opportunity for 
industrial effort originally —after the occupation of the 
northern departments and before the marvellous develop- 
ment of production in 1915 —not a tenth. 
The Central Powers thus attacking civilisation with 
such odds in their favour suffered from two grievous 
sources of weakness which, combined, threatened them 
with' an eventual loss of the great war. These two 
sources of weakness were the inferiority of their land 
strategy to the strategy of the French, and the in- 
feriority of their naval power to the naval power of the 
English. Before the main operations of the war had been 
in progress a month, the bad strategy of the Cierman staff 
had destroyed all their advantage of initiative and dis- 
counted most of their advantage of numbers on the 
western front. Before they had been in progress another 
two months the enemy, for all his vast superiority in his 
munition and manufacture was pinned and caged upon 
the Western front. He has not yet been able to break 
the bars of that cage. 
He was defeated at the Battle of the Marne which, 
early as it appeared in the operations, is the turning point 
of the whole war. After being defeated in the Battle of 
the Marne lie missed his opportunity to restore freedom 
of movement b\- his right or northern wing and struck in 
vain against the sector of Ypres after the doors of his 
prison had been closed upon him. One may say that by 
the nth of November, 1914, he was definitely contained 
on the west. 
The Britisli supremacy by sea, the two factors wherein 
arc the excellence of the British Navy and its size, 
blocked the enemy's supplies from the outer world to an 
extent only limited by the policy of the British Govern- 
ment towards neutrals. It thus completed the bars of 
the cage which had been forged by a superior military 
strategv ujjon the western side of the Continent. Bnt it 
did far more than this, for it left the sea open for the Allies 
to supply themselves ; and j)articularly for the P'rench, 
whose industrial opportunities had been so grievously 
curtailed, to obtain munitionment, arms and every 
necessity from abroad. 
As a counter to this state of affairs the enemy had two 
opportunities, (i) He could put Russia out of action 
and either obtain a separate peace from that Power or 
leave it by the defeat of its armies and their disintegration 
■or capture negligible for the rest of the war. (2) He could 
further endanger both France and Britain, but Britain 
much more than France, in their political position through- 
out the Mahommedan ivorld. To do this his instrument 
was obviously the men, the religious and political organisa- 
tion, and the territory of the Turkish Empire. 
Entry of the Turkish Empire into the War 
and its Effect 
Early in the war he obtained the support of that alh'. 
The Near East promised to Germany and Austria- 
Hungary not only this power of offence against the British, 
but also some ultimate chance of further supply in cotton 
and food and the rest in spite of the blockade, should the 
blockade become at last really severe. Further, the 
Turkish alliance with (Germany and Austria-Hungary 
completely shut in Russia so far as her main outlet to the 
sea was concerned ; prevented the armament of Rou- 
mania as a possibly ally of Russia, and heavily affected 
for the worse Russia's financial position as well. 
It behoved the French and the British and the Russians, 
but particularly the British, to take measures against this 
new threat. 
Supposing, to take an extreme hypothesis, the British 
had done nothing, then the Turkish Empire could easily 
have found men sufficient to cross the existing natural 
defences of Egypt and to overwhelm the small garrison 
of that dependency. Apart from the formidable moral 
effect upon the whole British position in the East, the 
attack would have cut the main communication between 
Britain and India. It would at the least have enor- 
mously increased the expense and the time of all com- 
rnunication between India and England. At the same 
time, there were men to spare in the Turkish Empire 
(supposing the Allies had done nothing) to move into 
Persia and interrujit any communication of men, news or 
policy through that avenue. It was even conceivable 
that Turkisli forces moving against the comparatively 
small Russian garrison south of the Caucasus miglit 
defeat them and lay hands upon the Russian province 
which was also the main source of petrol supply for the 
Russians. Nor should we forget that an uninterrupted 
move against Persia would ultimately have cut off one of 
our own main sources of oil supply. 
Of course, this hypothesis is purely imaginary. What 
really took place was a vigorous initiative of attack by 
the British against the new menace. First, there was the 
attempt to force the Dardanelles ; next the rapid increase 
of the forces in Egypt ; next the observation of essential 
