April 27, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
points in southern Persia, and lastly the sending of a small 
jorce up the Tigris to threaten Bagdad. 
Meanwhile, the Russians in December, 1914, destroyed 
all danger of Turkish menace against Caucasia, and 
slowly advanced into Turkish Armenia itself. To the 
opportunity afforded the enemy by the Turkish Alliance 
there was one grave lesion, which lay in the presence of 
neutral territory between Austria-Hungary and Turkey. 
This weakness was eliminated last autumn [by the 
adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, the over- 
running of Serbia and the establishment of through com- 
munications with Constantinople. 
This moment, about the beginning of November, 1915, 
may be regaided as the ma.ximum point in the develop- 
ment of the enemy's strategy as a whole so far as that 
strategy concerns the Near East. He founded great 
hopes upon the through communication with the Bos- 
phorus and Asia thus provided. He rapidly munitioned 
the Turkish armies and added largely to the instructors 
and leaders whom he had already begun to provide. It 
seemed possible that in the long run a serious attack upon 
Egypt might be made and might be successful. It was 
even conceivable, "if there were a total collapse of the 
Allied forces other than those in the west, that the 
land route to India itself might be menaced within the 
space, say, of the ne.xt eighteen months or two years. 
It is at this point that the advance on Bagdad, small 
as K'rts the force with which it was attempted, b:gins to 
take on a strategical meaning in our eyes. 
Effect on Turkey of a Hostile Force 
the Tigris 
on 
A study of the map, coupled with an appreciation of 
the political importance of Bagdad explains the strategical 
situation therefore created by the threat to that city. The 
rule of Constantinople over the Turkish Empire depends 
mainly upon a complex of military, religious and social 
prestige. Bagdad, a distant but important capital upon 
its own account, fallen into the hands of an enemy would 
have shaken the whole of that organisation. Any threat 
to Bagdad must therefore be met by the assembly of a 
considerable force to save the city. 
But such a force (the sea being closed by the power of 
the British ilect) depended upon the line of communication 
1,1, I, a hne interrupted by two ranges of mountains at 
A A, losing the advantage of the rail at B and dependent 
between B and the front at F for communications, upon 
a track across Mesopotamia and the waterway of the 
Tigris River. The assembly of a considerable force thus 
at F interfered with the scheme of attacking Egypt along 
the second line of communications branching from the 
first, marked 2',2. At this the rail had been carried 
as far as D and posts of water and supply established 
along nearly the whole of the dotted line beyond. 
To undertake both operations at once would have 
involved a heavy strain, especially as a very large garrison 
had been accumulated in Egypt. This force by the s^ca, 
whenever the danger to Egypt should be past, would 
form a reservoir for use either in the further East -or 
against Syria or for the drafting of reserves to any foFcc 
based upon the Balkan port, should such a force be 
engaged in active operations. Meanwhile, far off, but 
upon the flank of the main line of Turkish communica- 
tions, 1,1, 1, was the threat of a considerable Russian army 
which had for its objective in the first place Erzerurh at E ; 
next the great gate for supply to all this region, the Pprt 
of Trebizond at T, and lastly through Bitlis as well as 
through Er'zerum, the road to Diar Bekir. This Russian 
force was operating in the mountains. The communica- 
tions were atrocious. The winter was a most formidable 
handicap. But once it was in possession of all Armenia 
and once its own bodies should reach Diar Bekir, the 
large force which the Turks had concentrated in Meso- 
potamia — the province known in the Turkish scheme of 
administration as Irak — would be in peril, for Diar Bekir 
stands at the edge of the Mesopotamian plain, and any 
large body of men there present would, in a few days get 
across the only railway supplying the Mesopotamian 
front. 
Now let us see how all this fits in with the position of 
the small British forces at Kut. 
Suppose the worst and suppose this small force sur- 
rendered. What would be the strategical consequence ? 
It has brought down to F and kept there a considerable 
Turkish Army. \\'ill that army retire after achieving this 
success against General Townshend's small force ? 
It calinot do so because it has in front of it the very 
large force gathered for the relief of Kut. It must remain 
in front of Bagdad so long as this very large force im- 
mediatelv facing it stands on the Tigris. Whether 
General Townshend's small body is still in existence or no 
Allied (groups 
TurkLsh Grjup^\ 
