April 27, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
obvious pieces of evidence upon this matter, we cannot 
entertain that conjecture as to his motives. 
The German Empire alone is concerned in this war to 
hold a total front, eastern and western, of about 900 
miles — or rither more. 
The eastern section, that is, the Hues north of the 
Pinsk marshes and stretching to the Baltic, can, during 
the thaw and until the drying up of the soil after the 
thaw, be held with a much smaller number of men to the 
mile than the western front. But it cannot be held 
with less than thirty-five divisions, and probably it is held 
with more. Upon the western front the enemy is believed 
to have over 115 divisions. He may have more, but 
I believe that number has been actually identiiied. He 
has put into the attack on Verdun, first and last, over 
thirty divisions ; thirty at least have been actually 
identified. He has further to keep certain forces— they 
are already grievouslv attenuated — as garrisons to watch 
his doubtful ally in the Balkans. He has to waste- 
very grudgingly — some troops among the Austro-Hun- 
garians. He has to hold down Belgium. That last point is 
one we should never lose sight of, for though Belgium is 
now ruled normally as a piece of occupied territory, the 
policing of it is a heavy drain. 
The available power of the German Empire in men, 
including the youngest classes in training, is to the 
available power of the French Republic in men, including 
the same classes, roughly as seventeen is to ten. But of the 
western front the French troops, thanks to the British 
alliance, have only to watch something over 430 miles — 
say just under half what the Germans have to watch. The 
French are not hampered by having to hold down any 
conquered territory at all, or to stiffen any doubtful 
Allies. We know the comparative exhaustion of the two 
bodies, and we know that it is already slightly more severe 
upon the German side than upon the French. The 
enemy was already putting his igi6 class into the field in 
large numbers about a couple of months before the French 
put any of their 1916 class into the field at all. Of the 
French 430 miles or so, about 80 is mountainous and 
densely forested, and can be held with a less number of 
men than the open country north and west of the 
Vosges. This, of course, will relieve the enemj^ potentially 
as much as it now does the French, when the French pass to 
the offensive. But since, by this hypothesis of the 
enemy's aiming at exhausting the French, we are only at 
the moment considering a French defensive, it is a point 
in favour of the French. 
Now these things being so — the enemy slightly, but 
appreciably, more exhausted proportionately than the 
French ; his total man-power (in the German Empire 
alone), not double the French, but only 70 per cent, 
greater ; the front he has to garnish more than double his 
opponents — an attack such as that which has been con- 
ducted upon the Verdun sector, has no chance of ex- 
hausting his numerically inferior opponent. It has no 
chance whatever of making the French army lose a ' 
larger proportion of its men than the German army 
loses in the same operation. 
Indeed, it is impossible to see how such an offensive can 
be other than immensely more expensive to the attack 
than to the defensive opposed to it. As a mere numerical 
calculation the thing is meaningless. Individuals who 
have seen this or that restricted section of the lines, 
especially where there has been a countei -offensive, will 
report equal losses on either side. Such tales are balanced 
by others which, from the observation of such slaughter 
as that in front of Vaux just a month ago, generahse the 
German casualties at an impossibly high figure. 
I know that the Germans have been lavish with their 
munitions, that the shelhng of the French trenches has 
been extraordinarily heavy. But I also know that the 
defence has never broken and that therefore the slielter 
has been good, and I further know that since the first ten 
days of March the French reply in shell has been as heavy. 
The casualties from artillery fire, other than that of field 
guns, on the two sides will not greatly differ, but will be 
rather higher on the enemy's side because, as he is attack- 
ing, there are frequently recurring moments when his 
trenches are packed just before an assault. There is no 
superior " convergence of fire " against the French. 
The salient is not sharp enough for that. While losses 
from rifle, machine gun and field gun fire enormously 
greater on the side of a prolonged offensive. 
The general principle stands and is in the nature of 
things. An offensive so directed, so prolonged and so 
restricted to narrow fronts, is enormously more expensive 
than the corresponding defensive. 
The German higher command may, of course, imagine 
that the French are so unstable that heavy losses at this 
moment will incline them to peace, although they know 
that they are inflicting much heavier losses upon their 
enemy. That is a political, not a military calculation ; 
and the Germans are quite wrong if they are basing 
themselves on that. But whether this be their conception 
or no, they cannot conceivably think that a continued 
attack in the present state of the Allies with the very large 
English body already in France, and the enormous 
reserves behind that body, is playing their game in the 
matter of attrition. The thing does not hold water. 
Further note this : we are in the tenth week of the 
affair, the allied forces on the west are at least 50 per 
cent, more numerous than the enemy's. And yet he 
has not provoked us to the least counter-offensive. Does 
not that decide the matter ? 
It will be of the highest interest when these things can 
be studied in detail, and with the ofiicial evidence before 
one, to discover with what minimum of men the French 
have worked their astonishing defensive along the sector 
of Verdun. I do not mean with what minimum of men 
all told ; on the contrary, the French have used (in rota- 
tion) very great numbers of men. I mean with what 
minimum of men in the front line, at any moment, and 
occupied in shooting at the enemy when he attacked, 
the French staff has worked upon these thirty miles. 
A Unique Example 
Upon the proportion of that number to the masses of 
the attack will largely turn the future science of modern 
defence. For Verdun will, in the future, be the classical 
example in the schools. The successful action of the 
French on the sector of Verdun is an example of the 
modern defensive upon a scale of men, munitionment and 
time, which makes it something unique even in the history 
of this war, quite unparalleled by any action of the past ; 
such lessons as it provides will outweigh all others. 
The same tactics have now been pursued by the French 
higher command for sixty days ; or, if we count the first 
rapid retirement for sixty-five days ; and during the whole 
of that time the bombardment has been continuous. The 
total number of separate attacks (in so far as they can be 
distinguished one from another, which is not always easy) 
would seem to be over forty, and of these no less than 
twelve have been attacks vipon a front of from two to 
nine miles, and with forces from the equivalent of one to 
perhaps seven divisions. This last figure, ithe largest 
in any attack upon one restricted front, was the French 
estimate of the forces engaged on April 9th. 
The enemy losses must, of course, be largely a matter of 
conjecture, and this is a pity, because the proportion 
between the losses of the offensive and the number of the 
enemy used at any moment upon the defensive is the 
essential point of the whole matter. The curve of losses, 
could we strike it, would certainly fall during the last 
few weeks because the enemy's attacks have been de- 
livered at such much longer intervals, and in the lulls 
between there has been hardly any action at all. On the 
other hand, the curve would rise rather sharply between 
the beginning and the middle of the affair, from the 
development of the Fi^ench heavy artillery fire against the 
German trenches, which grew very largely in volume 
between the end of February and the middle of March, 
since which date it has been maintained at about the 
same rate. 
It is worth noting that the estimates of German losses 
in front of Verdun put about through the Press, have 
never had ofiicial sanction, b'at there has evidently been, a 
very strong effort made to keep the published figures 
down below the true figure, to spread what business men 
call " a highly conservati\'3e " estimate. The reasons 
for such a public policy are obvious enough. Meanwhile, 
the best evidence obtainable has come from the great 
quantity of private infornaation which has been fairly 
widely distributed behind tiie scenes. Take, for instance, 
the attack on the Mort d'Komme of ten days ago. Those 
who were eye-witness of that affair and who are trained 
by months of warfare to the est mate of losses will not 
