8 
LAND & WATER 
April 27, 1916 
allow less than 8.000 of the enemy hit between Bethin- 
court and Cumitr s in that one assault. It is a perfectly 
clear open tield and the chance of keeping an accurate 
estimate is at its highest. Upon the basis of this sort of 
private evidence one can hardly doubt that the total losses 
in the si.xtyjodd days are now well past the .]Oo,ooo. They 
were reaching that figure before the great attack of April 
yth. 
The Enemy Civilian Attitude 
One great factor in the enemy's military position 
which we are inclined to forget in this country is the 
attitude of his civihan population ; and not only of his 
civilian population, but of great masses of his rank and file 
in the army. For it is at once a strength and weakness of 
his upon the military side that this opinion is still quite 
simply and unalterably convinced, not so much that 
German victory is certain (as Hindenberg was clamouring 
the other day) as that victory has already been 
achieved. 
I say that this is at once a strength and a weakness. It 
is a strength in two wajs : it permits his liigher command 
to work untrammelled by criticism and to command all for 
any effort with a certainty of response. It is always an 
element of strength, though a dangerous and ephemeral 
one, to be governing men who over estimate their 
power. But it is a weakness chiefly in this : That, being 
a falsehood it has, like all balances on the wrong side, 
to be kept up at compound interest. 
Napoleon with a real foundation of decisive victories 
very different indeed from that enjoyed by the German 
higher command, suffered grievously from this weakness 
during the later part of the year 18 12 and all the year 
1813 and the first months of 1814 up to his abdication. 
What people who rely upon the " over capitalisation" 
of national confidence chiefly have to dread is exactly 
what a debtor has to dread or, for that matter, any one 
who shirks reality, and that is, ultimate liquidation. They 
even usually exaggerate in imagination the whole effect 
which the unpleasant truth will have when it comes, and 
they are therefore led into efforts more expensive than 
are really needed to stave off that moment. 
I am not sure that the continued waste of men upon 
the sector of Verdun is not largely concerned with this 
point. The German Press and the German orders of the 
day confirm one in such a conception. For instance, 
Deimling, in command of the 15th Corps (Strasburg) 
issued an Order of the Day doubtless similar to orders 
issued by many other commanders upon the German side 
last February, but peculiar in this, that it has fallen into 
our hands. This Order of the Day expressed to his troops 
the confidence of the higher command in an immediate 
reduction of the French forces west of the Meuse, and 
the occupation of the bridges and town of Verdun as part 
of the original attack now nine weeks past. 
There was no necessity for such bombastic utterances 
in the purely miUtary sphere. There is no military 
necessity for any part of that stream of prophecy which 
pours out over Germany (and America and England) from 
the enemy's pr.blicity bureaux. All Deimling had to ask 
of his soldiers was a special effort, and the only language 
necessary to such a pronouncement was the ordinary 
language of glory and duty and the rest. But hf felt it in- 
cumbent upon him, or rather he was instructed, to 
promise specifically a highly definite result, which in 
}K)int of fact was not reached. 
You see the same sort of thing in the daily press of the 
enemy, which is, of course, written up, so far as these 
notices are concerned, directly by agents of the German 
VVarOflfice. 
First an attack is bcinj.^ made to capture the local 
defences of a mighty " for:ress " called Verdun. It'is 
bound to succeed. For nearly every reader of the 
(ierman daily press has heard of the " fortress of Verdun " 
since he was a child. Not one in a thousand studies the 
war sufficiently to know that there is no such " fortress " 
left under present conditions' ; not one in 500, perhaps, 
even reads a map. The Emf 'cror goes to the front of the 
Verdun sector and makes every preparation for formal 
entry into the town, much as be did before Nancy nineteen 
months ago. Meanwhile the papers are instructed to say 
that "Verdun opens the ro.id to Paris, " a perfectly 
meaningless phrase. Next that Verdun is " the heart of 
France," which is not only empty but idiotic. Next, 
for some weeks, that progress " though slow, is sure," 
next that " Verdun is invested and besieged " (which 
it isn't), and lastly, that entry into Verdun is " certain " 
—with no fuller hint at what the vahie of such an entry 
might be. 
Now there was no necessity for all this save the keep- 
ing up of a legend. Save for that legend the Emperor was 
perfectly free to go quietly to the sector in which he was 
principally interested and to watch events like a soldier 
and not like an actor. There was no necessity for saying 
that the reaching of the Meuse at Verdun and the accom- 
panying capture of great numbers of prisoners and guns 
would " open the way to Paris." The German higher 
command knew perfectly well it would do nothing of 
the sort, and by using that phrase they were simply 
piling on more to the debt which would have some day 
or other to be liquidated. 
German " Victories " 
As the affair goes on one notices another development. 
The attack is not so often spoken of as the " siege of 
Verdun " it becomes " the victory of Avocourt Wood," 
" The victory of Malancourt," " The victory of Hau- 
court." The public in Germany is thus nourished with 
unfailing successes. 
I ha\e already suggested in these columns what I im- 
agine will be the last development of all. It is only a 
conjecture but it is worth watching. I conceive that the 
moment when this offensive is abandoned will be marked 
by the sudden publication in the German Press of im- 
mense (and false) totals of prisoners and material cap- 
tured, and probably some false and heavily cut-down 
total of the German losses incurred. 
One other point seems likely. It is this. Some con- 
tinuation of the attack on the Verdun sector will probably 
be maintained until another big offensive has been 
undertaken, (iermany is bound to attack. She has no 
choice. That is why it was perfectly safe to allovv, as 
was done in these columns, for a great enemy offensive 
on the Western front before the end of the winter and 
the drying up of the Polish front. She must attack again 
somewhere soon. And the political side of this over- 
lapping of two expensive operations will be inducing 
the public to forget the Verdun failure in their excite- 
ment over the next effort. 
Where that effort may be designed only those can tell 
who at Headquarters are noting the signs of concentra- 
tion. For all we know here in England there may as yet 
be no such signs apparent. One theory, plausible enough, 
suggests that the attempt will be made against some 
portion of the British front. Another, more likely, 
against the point of junction between French and British 
upon the Upper Somme, with the advantage if it were 
successful over a belt of a few miles of cutting the main 
railway communication between Paris and the Straits 
of Dover. 
Yet another theory is that no further great offensive 
upon the west will be attempted by the enemy, but that 
the west will be left to the defensive the moment the soil 
permits of an attack upon the Russian front. But all 
these things are mere guess work except to the men 
who are receiving the reports of (German movement, and 
it is waste of time to speculate upon them. 
A Note 
As I conclude the writing of this article, news reaches 
London of another carefully thoughtout offensive plan 
just launched by the enemy. It looks even more futile 
than the earlier ones. The great combination which was to 
have been a powerful feint on the British coast coupled with 
a sudden drain of troops to Ireland and chaos meanwhile 
through an attack by air, has so far resulted in a few 
of the Sinn Fein in arms, the sinking of the only munition 
ship sent, the capture of one mad man, the hurried 
appearance of a few Zeppelins, immediately chased 
away, and a few shells on Lowestoft. If it gives the men 
who themselves feel panic and also work on the fears of 
others, some measure of the enemy's lack of judgment 
the silly thing will not have been in vain. H. Bklloc 
