April 27, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM 
By Arthur Pollen 
THE past week has been marked by mcmmtous 
events. The long expected American uld natvim 
to Germany has actually been dispatched. 
Lowestoft and Zecbrugge have been bombarded. 
An attempt has been made to land arms in Ireland. 
This invasion was at first treated as a joke — but subse- 
quent news shows that it was a carefully considered 
effort. It was made by a disguised cruiser, helped by a 
submarine. The ship itself was sunk by our forces, 
though the curious wording of the Admirahy announce- 
ment makes it quite impossible to guess the means. 
Amongst the survivors, all of whom it must be supposed 
were made prisoners, was the .rebel Casement, and at the 
moment of writing h :; is in London awaiting trial by court 
martial. On Tuesday at .^(.30 a.m., the German battle 
cruisers attempted a second bombardment of Lowestoft, 
this making the first effort to cross the North Sea since 
December, 1914. The squadron was engaged by all the 
naval forces in the locality, but these, one must presume, 
were limited to destroyers and light cruisers. The 
Germans took to flight incontinently, but not before they 
had dropped shell enough in Lowestoft to kill three adults 
and a child. The British light craft pursued, and kept 
in touch with them, in the hope no doubt, that our own 
battle cruisers would cut off the enemy and bring him 
to action before he had got within the defences of his 
minefields. Some of the pursuing squadron were hit, but 
none were sunk. But as no mention is made of these 
more powerful squadrons being engaged, it must be 
assumed that, as after the 1914 attacks on Yarmouth 
and Scarborough, the raiders have managed to get clean 
away. Twenty-four hours before this Admiral Bacon's 
forces seemed to have got into touch with some German 
destroyers off Zeebrugge, to have driven them into that 
harbour, and then to have given that place such a bom- 
bardment as it has never had before. In this case the 
initiative was probably purely British. Two points in 
connection with the Lowestoft and Irish raids are note- 
worthy. In the first the safety of the ravaging cruisers 
was secured by Zeppelin reconnaissance. Would the 
possession of similar craft by us have made it too dangerous 
a venture ? In the Irish effort a submarine and cruiser 
worked in company. This is a combination, the possi- 
biUty of which our patrolling squadrons will have to 
keep constantly in mind when they search seeming 
neutrals. 
The Casement attempt to land arms in Ireland and 
the raid on Lowestoft must be read together. 
The Admiralty announcement taken . by itself, and 
read in absolute ignorance of conditions in Ireland, 
suggests a touch of light comedy. But probably it is a 
mistake to look at it in any such light. Neither Case- 
ment nor his German employers would be likely to start 
on an enterprise of this kind without hopes that, in the 
unlikely event of the arms being got through to the Irish 
coast, there would be somebody willing to use them. 
If there was any expectation of causing serious trouble 
in Ireland, then the raid on Lowestoft may well have been 
calculated to make the most of the situation. 
The Germans are great architects in moral effects, and 
though their assaults on British nerves have so far not 
been repaid by any great perturbation of the popular 
judgment, there are not wanting signs, at any rate in 
London, that persons of reputed light and leading ma\- 
yet be susceptible to terrorism. And moral considera- 
tions apart, it is always a good card to play on England's 
fear of invasion. If it does nothing else it may serve to 
keep troops in these islands that would be highly danger- 
ous elsewhere. 
And beyond both of these objects the German go\ern- 
ment is face to face with a difficulty with America now 
from which there is no outlet that is not disastrous either 
to its home prestige or to its mihtary hopes. It has be- 
come, then, an obvious necessity of the situation 
to create some kind of diversional attack on Great 
Britain, either by bombarding its coast or by pretending 
to foster a rebellion in Ireland, for not otherwise could 
German civilian attention be turned from the most 
important issue of the day. 
Mr. Wilson's note to Berlin leaves Germany to choose 
between the absolute abandonment of all the methods 
that have given success to her submarines, and a final 
rupture with the United States of America. In sending 
this note Mr. Wilson has done exactly what he was 
expected to do. It followed logically on the discussions 
which have taken place during the last thirteen months. 
His demand that the Senate and the House of Repre- 
sentatives should each pass resolutions supporting the 
Government's policy clearly indicated that this step was 
imminent. 
It was inevitable that the United States would take 
this line for two reasons. The issue with Germany is on 
a plain matter of right and wrong. And it occurs in the 
form of war which, for a great many years now, has been 
regulated by law in a sense in which land war never has. 
No cruiser captain can capture or sink an enemy ship 
without his action being liable to review in a court of law. 
Note, for instance, the recent case of the Captain of the 
Carmania having to tell his story of the sinking of the 
Cap Trafalgar in open court. A German General can 
capture and plunder a town and abuse the inhabitants 
apparently at will, and do what he likes with the loot. 
Anyone who is interested in a neutral which is captured 
or sunk has his remedy in the Prize Courts, and all naval 
action is liable to be reviewed by a court martial. These 
are truths that should prove illuminating to those who 
talk of " navalism " and " militarism," as names for an 
equal tyrannj'. 
Effects of Sea Action 
It is, historically, strictly true to say that the humanis- 
ing of war began with sea war. Sea action is in its essence 
always simple and always direct. It lends itself to strict 
investigation, to accurate and unmistakable analysis. 
The moment, therefore, that Germany carried her con- 
tempt of the Christian and civilised code into this field 
her crimes were not only open to the detection and con- 
demnation of the neutral world, but no excuses or 
mendacities could cloud the issue. The clearness of the 
facts then, the tradition that sea war was governed by 
law, the simplicity with which it was seen that the issue 
was one of right and wrong, made the attitude, which the 
United States has now assumed, inevitable from the first. 
The consequences of this ultimatum will be twofold. 
It has already had an overwhelming moral effect. It gives 
a final shape to the judgment of the neutral world, and 
the allied belligerents would be less than human if they 
were not comforted and encouraged. The judgment of 
America on European affairs in a way anticipates that of 
posterity. When the New World is called into existence 
as a critic of the morals of the Old, it redresses the balance 
which the war has thrown out of gear. If, like the judg- 
ment of posterity, it has taken some time to become 
effective, this fact only adds emphasis to the finality of 
its character. The event, then, is one that has only to 
be defined for its value to be measured. The largest 
neutral state, the most democratic community in the 
world — in which opinions and judgments are canvassed 
and expressed with a freedom unknown elsewhere — has 
spoken with due deliberation and in unmistakable 
words, and with its protest has put a term to its neutrality. 
The thing is a portent, when we remember that no country 
is less prepared for or less desirous of war than the 
American States. That this reluctance is a measure of 
American sincerity will not be lost on the German Govern- 
ment ! Nor will it fail to perceive that if the United 
States become belligerent, fellow victims among the 
neutrals may be encouraged to join as well. 
Very few enemy expressions of opinion have reached us 
and it is not certain that any of these are of importance. 
There has been no general press comment — perhaps 
because none lias been permitted. This reticence is an 
excellent proof that the Higher Command realises that the 
