10 
I. A N D Cv WA T E R 
April 27, 1916 
final liioicr must now br made. It is an imInc'n^c result, 
(ierniany has to inako its rhuiro knowing that it stands 
at the bar of tin- pubUc conscit-ncf convicted of crime. 
What will the Highrt" Command's choice be ? I'tiose 
who have followed the de\elopments of (jerman policy 
in the months of February and March will see without 
difficulty the choice it will tctsh to take. For six months 
previously von Tirpitz had devoted the whole engineering 
resources of (lermany to the preparation of a vast sub- 
marine campaign against the shipping that served these 
islands. While these jireparations were going on at 
home. Count Bcrnstorft was trying to keep American 
opinion in check. Six weeks or so before the grand 
attack was due he played his master card, and for a time 
it looked as if, by our arming of merchant ships in self- 
defence, Germany had been supplied with exactly the 
argument that would take America out of the contro- 
versy. In the first Hush of this seeming victory, March 
1st was announced as the date on which the slaughter of 
the merchaJitmen would begin. Then suddenly it 
became clear that Bernstorft had failed, that the American 
(iovernmcnt were too well advised, both of law and 
historv, to accept his sophistries. It became obvious 
that the Tirpitz campaign, if carried out as Tirpitz meant 
it to be, would precipitate the crisis which the German 
The Consequences of Defiance 
But if the public opinion in Germany compels a deliancc 
of America, if the true proportions of the surrender are 
appreciated and are seen to be intolerable, something 
much more serious than the continuance of the submarine 
campaign will follow. For ruthless as it has been during 
the past five weeks, it is to be noted that the only liners 
and passenger ships attacked, have been the victims of 
misunderstood or disobeyed instructions. The cases of 
the Palamban^ and the Tubantia I dealt with over a 
month ago. It is against reason to suppose that the 
German Higher Command could ever have intended these 
ships to be sunk. Neither do I beheve that the Sussex 
was sunk by order. The official account of this incident 
as published by the enemy is a lame enough affair, if it 
is interpreted as an effort to prove that the Sussex was 
not sunk, but if it is read as an explanation or an excuse for 
sinking her, it is a different matter altogether. In no 
conceivable form of naval operation can the difficulties 
in identifying an opponent be so great as in submarine 
operations. If, as one supposes, all the more experienced 
U boat commanders have perished, if all the present 
commanders are doing their work reluctantly and, re- 
membering their predecessors' fate, in a pardonably 
Sliipsperdm/ 
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' — + 
ff. 
2—1 -r :- L ] - ■ 2 
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I 
'iJbrmal 
'2^WeeIi 
Shipsperday 
kekt-^ ^3-^Week, ] Jx.Si 
4^Week\ 
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formal I^Week 2'^hheA Sr^hM. ^Week S^lVeek 
Daily average of Ships sunk. Note that in the past week the losses have fallen below normal 
CJovernment knew at all costs must be avoided. Von 
Tirpitz was thereupon dismissed. 
But the Government had reckoned without the effect 
of its previous education of German public opinion. The 
=reed that the submarine was the only weapon against 
England and could be made an effective weapon, had 
sunk deeply into the German conscience, and the strange 
spectacle was seen of a submissive people forcing the 
hands of their autocratic rulers. Three weeks behind 
time, then, the campaign began. A month of it has 
brought the ultimatum which the clearer heads had, from 
the first days of March, fully realised to be inevitable. 
The first, and indeed the only instinct of the German 
Government in this crisis must be to go back to their 
attitude before the agitation forced their hands. The 
Kaiser and Bethmann von Hollweg will then do their 
best to surrender. The American (government will do 
its best to make that surrender easy. So much is clear 
from Mr. Willard's exceedingly interesting notes from 
Washington in the New York Evening Post. And Mr. 
Willard is credited by his countrymen with a close and 
singular knowledge of Mr. Wilson's wishes and intentions. 
But though everything will be done to make the surrender 
ea.sy, the surrender itself will have to be absolute. It 
must take the form of a complete suspension of the whole 
submarine campaign as we have known it hitherto. Only 
time can show whether the German Government that 
had to yield after dismissing von Tirpitz is strong enougli 
now to face so abject a humiliation. If it is, there 
follows from the American note a military result of the 
first importance, to wit, a virtually complete security for 
the sea service of the allied belligerents. 
shaken state of nerves, the wonder is, not that such a 
mistake as happened in the case of the Sussex occurred 
but that there are not many more such blunders. At any 
rate, Tubantia, Palambang and Sussex stand alone, anil 
it seems incredible that some eighty ships could have 
been sunk during these five weeks, and no other liners 
sunk or attacked, except on the supposition that liners 
have been deliberately omitted from the proscription. 
If Germany refuses to yield to America, the first result 
must be that the attack on liners will become as ruthless 
as has been the attack on freighters. This is a matter 
in which the belligerents' new Ally— if , indeed, she should 
decide to become an Ally— will not be able to help us. 
The only effective naval defence against submarines arc 
fast, well armed light craft, and in this the American 
Navy is conspicuously lacking. The immediate result 
then of America's intervention may throw a far heavier 
strain upon the Admiralty's defensive organisation, by 
breeding a new, and in some respects, a more formidable 
threat against our shipping. This no doubt is a situation 
which the Admiralty has anticipated, and it is difficult 
to suppose that there is any form of defensive that is not 
being pushed to development at the maximum pressure. 
But other Departments of Government must realise 
that this new situation, if it should arise, will retpiire 
special measures. The building of new merchant shipping 
must be made to rank as equal in national importance 
with the making of munitions or the supply of the Royal 
Navy. So far Admiralty restrictions on merchant 
shipping have been largely withdrawn, but this for two 
excellent reasons does not sufticc. First, shipwrights, 
boilcrmakers, rivetters, etc.. while wiUing enouirh to 
