April 27, 1 916 
LAND & WATER 
13 
Air Defence Problems and Fallacies 
Air Ministry or Board of Aeronautics 
By F. W. Lanchester 
THERE arc, in addition to the ordinary military 
duties, certain operations of indirect military 
value V hich experience has shown can be under- 
taken by aircraft with advantage. Such may 
be exemplified " in the bombardment by aeroplane 
squadrons of the enemy's arsenals, shipbuilding yards, 
munition and explosive factories, depots, warehouses, 
magazines, etc., also for destroying his transports, com- 
merce, etc. Such duties may sometimes be said to come 
within the definition of ordinary military operations as 
has actually occurred in the present War. When this 
definition does not apply they may be undertaken by 
the Air Forces of either the NaVy or Army, that is to say 
in our case by the Royal Naval Air Service or the Royal 
Flying Corps, whichever may happen to be the more 
suitable. : ._ _ 
So long as we have to deal with operations of a decisively 
military character or a decisively naval character, as 
bearing directly and immediately on the conduct of 
hostilities, there is no difficulty in settling to whom the 
responsibility belongs, or as to which Service shall 
undertake the work ; but when we are dealing with 
those operations of indirect mihtary value which are under- 
taken in the interests of both Army and Navy — more 
broadly in the interests of the Nation — there is no natural 
line of demarcation, and under existing conditions it is 
necessary for an authority higher than War Office or 
Admiralty to intervene. "Hie Ministry — the immediate 
advisers of the King — must decide. More generally, since 
ways and means cannot be improvised, some standing 
ruling must be laid down to determine on which Service 
the responsibility for any particular class of operation 
shall rest. It is probable that the absence of an authorita- 
tive and sufficiently early decision on this point is at the 
root of some of the difficulties which have been met 
with in the administration of our air services ; it is 
likely to have been one of the difficulties which has con- 
tributed to the failure of the Derby Committee. What- 
ever may turn out to be the facts it is quite certain that 
neither the Army nor the Navy can be accused of having 
neglected their responsibihties with regard to these 
indirect aeronautical operations, unless the Ministry 
has clearly laid down which of the Services is to be 
responsible for the work in question, and defined this 
responsibility sufficiently in advance to permit of due 
preparation. 
Home Defence 
In addition to these operations of aggression there are 
also the duties connected with Home Defence, mainly 
concerned with the exclusion of enemy aircraft from 
British territorial air. This includes the provision of 
flight grounds, or aerodromes, of the necessary squadrons 
of aircraft with sheds, repair depots, and all the attend- 
ant paraphernalia. Also of the counter aircraft artillery, 
popularly known as " Archies " in the Service, search- 
hghts, and the whole of the attendant personnel, pilots, 
gunners, etc. 
Now an attempt has been made by the Ministry to 
define this latter responsibility, namely, that of Home 
Defence, audit must be agreed that the lack of decision 
exhibited has been lamentable. Thus the responsibility 
has been given to the Army, then to the Navy, and now 
again to the Army. It cannot be right, and there can be 
no adequate reason for the responsibility to rest with the 
Army in the spring and summer and the Navy in the 
autumn and winter. It must be borne in mind in any 
criticism launched against the Government that in the 
order of military importance the immediate requirements 
of the Army and Navy in the direct conduct of hostilities 
takes first place ; home defence and operations of in- 
direct military value are rightly subordinated. There is 
grave danger, if public clamour is allowed to rule, and 
the Government is continually attacked by the Press 
and public (and more vitally by the electorate) that home 
defence may be given a first place in the aeronautical 
programme, and support may be withdrawn or diverted 
from our Armies in the field. Already, owing to the 
campaign which has been carried on by certain sections 
of the Press, and the ill-advised support which has been 
lent to certain persons whose credentials are at least 
doubtful, it is possible that this question of home defence 
may be absorbing the attention and the resources, i.e., 
anti-aircraft guns and searchlights, also personnel, which 
should, " by all rules of the game," be devoted to direct 
aggression and be at the disposal of our Armies in France or 
elsewhere, to be employed in the major military operation 
of the smashing of the Huns. If one could have a definite 
statement from a responsible Minister that under no 
circumstances will the present agitation be allowed to 
involve the withdrawal or diversion of one gun or one 
aeroplane from the support of our Armies in the field, 
against the better judgment of the military authority, 
it would go a long way towards easing the minds of those 
who have the country's welfare at heart, and who look 
upon the present phase of the Air Agitation with grave 
misgiving. 
Let it be laid down as an axiom that the corabatant 
services must be accorded the first claim to consideration 
and the first call on our resources. Whatever part 
aircraft can play in bringing the present War to a success- 
ful issue is primarily by its activity as ancillary to the 
existing services. The part played by operations of 
indirect military value may be greater or less, but the 
independent use of aircraft, whether it be for long distant 
raids on the enemy (unconnected with other military 
operations) or in the solution of the problems of Home 
Defence, do not and cannot command a decisive issue. 
Air Ministry or Board of Aeronautics 
The very existence of what I have in the preceding 
paragraphs referred to as operations of indirect militarv 
value is in itself a strong case for some form of control, 
such as an Air Ministry or a Board of Aeronautics apart 
from the Army and the Navy. Such operations are new 
to warfare. We have neither experience nor tradition to 
guide us ; they are outside the ordinary defined respon- 
sibilities of either Army or Navy. This latter assertion 
may be combated by some, especially in view of the fact 
that our Naval Air Service has executed raids which can 
only be defined as operations of indirect military value, 
such as the air raid on Friedrichshaven. However I do 
not feel that I shall be seriously challenged when I say 
that the said duties and operations are foreign to the 
experience of those who hitherto have had to control 
the preparation for and conduct of military and tiaval 
warfare. 
It is not currently as well understood as should be the 
case that an Air Ministry as distinct from a Board of 
Aeronautics betokens as a corollary an Independent 
'Air Service. If, as is probable, the operations of indirect 
military value become in course of time of sufficient impor- 
tance and assume in fact an importance beyond anything 
yet demonstrated, an Air Ministry with an Independent 
Air Service may turn out to be a proper and necessary 
solution. It is well to keep an open mind. The case for 
a full blown Air Ministry has yet to be made good. 
The subject bristles with difficulties which will inevit- 
ably take time and patient]consideration for their solution. 
For example, if we assume that an Independent Air 
Service is to be created to take charge of Home Defence 
against aircraft, and also to deal with long distance 
raiding and generally duties of indirect military value 
we immediately strike difficulties of fundamental and 
elementary difficulty. Thus under what authority will 
our anti-aircraft artillery be required to operate ; and 
under whose commands are our searchlights, etc., to be 
placed ? Searchlights are essential to the working of 
anti-aircraft guns, and are liable to interfere with the 
effectiveness of the defensive aeroplanes if not controlled 
in close co-operation. If, on the one hand, these combined 
