1 A N D & \\^\ T E R 
May 4, 1916 
the Mcsopotaiiiian field and to cover. Bagdad from the 
Hritisli on the south and the comparativily small 
Russian forces advancing on the ca.>i. from the boundary 
ranges of Persia, ran he at the sitme time defend the 
lines whereby recruitment in men and necessary inunition- 
mcnt reach him ? 
In order to answer that fundpjiiental question those 
who, like the present writer, have no local knowledge 
and depend upon the evidence of others or upon the map, 
work at a disadvantage, but it would seem the opinion 
of those -iclto have local kotowlcdge, and it is certainly 
the conclusion to be drawn from the map, that the Turks 
cannot efficiently ward olif that threat to their com- 
munications of which I have spoken. If they cannot do 
so then we shall witness >vithin a comparatively short 
limit of time a complete change in the military situation 
of the Near East, and follo\ifing upon it a whole chain of 
political lonscquences ultimately affecting the war in 
every part of its 3,000 miles of front. 
There are two avenues of approach from Europe, the 
Bosphorus. and Asia Minor, to any force keeping the 
field near Bagdad. The first is the road, now supple- 
mented by a railway across the northern part of the 
>Iesopotamian plain to Mosul., upon the Tigris, and thence 
down the Tigris itself. The other that same road as far 
as the Euphrates only and thence down the Euphrates. 
Let us see how the matter stands in the case of each 
of these communications severally. 
What may be called the " Tigris communications " 
arc those which ha\e so often appeared in these columns 
viien the Mesopotamian position was discussed. They 
are the railway from the Bosphorus which, after the 
junction of Muslimje (12 iiilcs north of Aleppo) is con- 
tinued along the edge of tire Mesopotamian plain where 
this meets the foothills of the mountains, and is generally 
known as the " Bagdad raihvay." When I last wrote of 
this line it had certainly reached the wells and springs of 
RaselAin. It had certainly not then reached and lias 
probably not yet reached the point of Nisii>in to which it 
is prolonged upon certain (ierman maps. But it would 
be a fair guess to say that it has at the present moment 
reached the point of Amude, where the road or track down 
from Dairbekr strikes iL Thence a track now certainly orga- 
nised for petrol traffic leads to the Tigris at Mosul, and 
thence both along the side of the river and down the 
stream itself the communications proceed to the rail- 
head of the sector being built up north from Bagdad. 
This railhead was some little time ago, if I am not mis- 
taken, at Tekerit. It may have been pushed further, 
though hardly beyond the point where the Tigris cuts 
through a peculiarly sharp and narrow range of hills half 
way between Mosul and Bagdad. For it would be bad 
policy to waste lalxjur upon that part of the communica- 
tions which are already fairly well ser\'ed by water. 
These communications, from the vital " knot " near the 
(iulf of Alexandretta, which will be discussed in a moment, 
are in all their sinuosities over 700 miles in length. The 
mere distance, therefore, constitutes a formidable element 
of difficulty, for when your communications are very long, 
even if they are passing through friendly country, all the 
delays due to counter orders, local checks, etc., get multi- 
plied at a rate which increases far more rapidly than the 
mere mileage, and this is particularly the case in un- 
developed country. 
The second line of comnumications, which wc will call 
the Euphrates line, is of about the same total length in 
mileage, but is very much less convenient, for serving 
Bagdad as a base for a Mesopotamian force. On the 
other hand, it provides better directions and oppor- 
tunities for a retirement. 
The Euphrates comtxiunication is not a single line, but 
a complex. Its main portion is the river Euphrates 
between the bridge by which the Bagdad railway crosses 
that river at Jerablus, and the point of Musseyib which, 
though not the nearest upon the Euphrates to Bagdad! 
is yet that upon which the only good road runs from the 
river to the town. It will be clear from the map that this 
use of the Euphrates as a line of communication lea\es the 
troops of the Turkish Empire on the Mesopotamian front 
far more dependent upon primitive methods than that 
by the Tigris. After Jerablus there is no further rail 
even for a section of the wav. 
On the other hand, the Euphrates route is supplemented 
by a possibility of petrol traction along the two historic 
ways that lead from Syria to the Euphrates itself. I 
owe to the cf)urtesy »)f a correspondent who has given mc 
most valuable ix-rsonal evidence of the journey made in 
a petrol-drixen motor from Syria to Bagdad, details of 
this opportunity open to the enemy. It seems that the 
going is good and that the total consumption of time, 
excluding the time taken in the crossing of the river, is 
not more than two days and a half. Of these ways the 
best is that which leaves the Syrian railway at Homs, 
passes TadnuH- and the ruins of Palmyra near Erck, 
strikes the Euphrates at .\bukeinal and makes for Ana, 
at which point there are ferry boats for the conveyance 
of heavy vehicles. 
The alternative route, further south and nearly parallel, 
starts from Damascus and strikes and crosses the 
Euphrates at Hit. It seems that the open country of 
The Jezinc beyond affords perfectly good going without 
obstacles to Bagdad itself. 
The continued provisionment of a large force — say, 
four divisions— by motor lorries alone, however, over a 
space of nearly 500 miles, is a formidable task, and, as 
wc shall see in a moment, the crossing of such a stream as 
the Euphrates upon the way, adds another very serious 
obstacle. Eurther, there is a change of gauge between 
the main railway and the Syrian railway at Aleppo. It is 
probable, therefore, that if the enemy can be compelled 
to rely upon the Euphrates line he will use the river 
mainly for the conveyance of munitions, recruitment, 
and all the necessities of his army. 
Now what are the ad\antages and drawbacks of this 
line ? 
At the present moment the Euphrates would be 
navigable for very considerable cargoes even from a 
point as high up on its course as Jerablus. The same 
cause which has led to the floods on the Tigris below Kut, 
which played so great a part in the checking of the force 
attempting to relieve (ieneral Townshend, swells the 
w'aters of the sister riv'er. It is the melting of the snows 
in the Armenian mountains which raises the flood level 
at this season of the year. I understand that these 
conditions of navigability on the I'ppcr Euphrates continue 
in normal seasons to a date about two months hence or 
a little less : at any rate, well over the time within 
which the power of the Turks to maintain themselves on 
the Mesopotamian front and on to Bagdad will be decided 
one way or the other. Because the progress of the Russians 
from the north will either be successful or will fail well 
within that limit of time. 
But though this rise of the water at the present season 
presents such an advantage, the task of bringing munitions, 
let alone further heavy pieces and their shell, down some 
700 miles of winding water (the mere line as the crow- 
flies is 450 and the river is extraordinarily full of loops and 
bends) is hardly less serious than the task of attempting 
that munitionment by petrol traffic from Syria. The 
current is exceedingly rapid, so much so that a ferry at 
this season allows in rowing across the half mile of the 
stream something like a mile drop between the point of 
departure and the point of arrival. All the first part of 
the journey, and especially the higher reaches are a 
tangle of islands and there are throughout the whole 
journey, I belie\e, certainly throughout the greater part 
of it, a mass of perpetually' shifting banks of sand in the 
bed of the stream. This same factor of the rapidity of 
the current militates gravely against the use of this 
avenue of communication in its reverse function, that is 
for all traflic back from Bagdad towards the north-west. 
Slow and difficult towing is the only means available, 
and this for a large force is out of the question. Should 
a retirement be determined on the only form it could ' 
possibly take would be a retirement directly westward 
across the desert and half desert lands between the 
Euphrates and Syria, and beyond Abu Venial (or Hit if 
the two tracks were used) theEuphrates would no longer 
be of scr\-ice. 
From all this consideration of both the Tigris and the 
Euphrates system of communication with Bagdad, it is 
clear that the nodal point upon which the security of the 
enemy army in Mesopotamia turns is the junction of 
Muslimje just north of Aleppo ; that is, in practice, the 
Aleppo town itself and its neighbourhood. The 
Tigris road would be thrown out of action the moment 
a Russian force got astraddle of the railway, say, at 
Ras el Ain, the Euphrates route the moment an opponent, 
