May 4, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
13 
Air Problems and Fallacies 
Air Ministry or Board of Aeronautics 
By F. W. Lanchester 
IN the preceding article it has been pointed out that 
the case for an Air Minister or Air Ministry, such 
as it is, depends mainly upon considerations relating 
to operations of indirect military value, these opera- 
tions being broadly divided into home defence and attacks 
and raids on tlie enemy. The difficulties surrounding 
the former of these so far have bsen dealt with, and it has 
been shown to be nearly impossible to dissociate air 
(home) defence either as to organisation or command 
from the existing services. 
Passing now to the question of attack. Up to the 
present very few raids have been made by our own air- 
craft or that of the Allies which can be considered as 
lying outside the range of legitimate military or naval 
operations. The distinction between a raid or attack 
from the air of direct and of indirect military value is not 
a matter of place or distance, but rather of purpose. 
Certain writers and speakers have failed to recognise 
the vital distinction which exists between raids having 
an immediate military object and forming part of a pre- 
concerted scheme, and those of an independent character, 
and of indirect value only. 
Considered broadly it is comparatively rare that an 
operation of indirect mihtary value is able to serve a useful 
purpose ; every such operation in warfare requires to be 
considered on its individual merits. Any act which would 
not in the ordinary way be undertaken by the Admiral 
or Commander-in-Chief as part of his strategic scheme 
is suspect at the outset, it is prima facie, contrary to an 
admitted principle of strategy — the concentration of the 
whole available resources on a single object or purpose, 
i.e., that object by which the war is to be brought most 
rapidly to a successful conclusion. As in all human 
affairs there are exceptions, and the most common 
operation constituting an exception known to warfare, 
is blockade. 
The Case of Blockade 
Excepting where a blockade forms a definite siege 
operation,* it is essentially of indirect military value ; 
the present blockade of Germany, for example, has 
for its object by the general weakening of the Central 
Powers to render their offensive less dangerous and their 
power of resistance less formidable. But even when 
there is so clear a case for action, and so well established 
and time-honoured a method of exercising general pressure 
on an enemy, the conduct of the operation reveals the 
fact that the method itself has inherent weakness. 
Thus is it not a fact that every loaf of bread or pound 
of meat consumed which is unnecessary for the welfare 
of our population is just that much loss to the country, as 
assuredly as if it had been destroyed by the enemy ? 
Are not our statesmen continually preaching economy', 
and the avoidance of luxury. Our Government cries 
out for economy, begs for economy ; what is the re- 
sponse ? 
Reports show an increase of consumption of bread and 
an increase of consumption of meat per head of population. 
Our cheap jewellery trade is experiencing a boom, our 
pianoforte trade cannot procure supplies fast enough, 
picture palaces arc reaping a golden harvest ! 
The German Government also know well the import- 
ance of economy. The German Government ask their 
people to economise. The British blockade enforces 
the order ! 
When we pass from a particular case to consider 
indirect operations broadly, we bump at once into the 
real fundamental weakness of such operations. I do not 
go so far as to suggest that there are no circumstances 
under which air operatiqns of indirect value may not be 
• In a siege in which the high command has decided to reduce a 
fortress or position by hunger tlie e.xclusion of supplies becomes the 
operation of direct value. This is reflected in the fact that the killing 
off of part of the Garrison by Artillery fire or other means(which now 
befwmes an operation of indirect value) might actuiUy enable the 
defending force to prolong its hold. 
justified, I merely point out that in the present state^of 
aircraft development opportunities must be rare and' of 
unusual occurrence. What conceivable value is it to an 
enemy that he bombs a few of our farm-yards and Tishing 
villages, if we ihially defeat him in the main lield of 
battle ? And if we fail to defeat him in the major 
operations, what gain is it to us if we have driven off or 
destroyed a few airships or squadrons of his aeroplanes, 
or if we in turn have bombed a few of his cities or 
factories ?. 
Air Supremacy 
I am not writing against the ultimate necessity for 
Britain being supreme in the air in every field of operation, 
I fully uphold it ; if after this war we neglect to place 
ourselves (and to maintain ourselves) in an unassailable 
position we shall deserve, man and woman, the downfall 
which will inevitably be ours in time to come. But the 
country is now at war with the greatest military power 
that history has known, and the present problem is to 
smash the enemy, and e\&vy operation of indirect military 
value must be weighed on its merits in view of the fact 
that the sum and total of our resources are limited and 
our Navy on the high seas and our Army in the field 
must take precedence of everj'thing. Thus during the 
present war, the prospect of widespread air attack on 
the enemy's country must be regarded as remote. It 
will take all we can do to produce the air auxiliaries 
necessary for our existing services. If there should be 
enough independent air aggression during the present 
war to give us the measure of its future utility it is as 
much as we can expect. 
But going beyond the present war, a considerable 
period must elapse before it will be possible to build up an 
independent air service, and when this is done it will need 
to be done stone by stone, brick by brick, if the structure 
is to stand. One has only to reflect on the enormous 
accumulation of experience and data which has been 
necessary to render possible the organisation of a modern 
European army or fleet, lo realise that 'the task of forming 
an independent air service, if eventually it should come to 
achievement, will be an affair of decades rather than 
years, and can only be considered as proven when it has 
emerged successfully from a first class European war. 
' It is clear from the "foregoing that if an Air Ministry 
were to be founded to-day to operate with due regard to 
existing needs and obligations it would have to " mark 
time " so far as its main purpose is concerned for a long 
while to come, and indeed might eventually prove little 
more than a monument to shattered expectations. Such 
a Ministry could only begin its real work when the war • 
is over. Its main duties during the continuance of 
hostilities could be carried out by a Board having com- 
paratively limited executive power. That is there 
room for such a Board few to-day question ; the con- 
troversial side hinges mainly on such points as to what 
extent executive powers can be assigned to' it, and in 
what directions it can best prosecute its activities to be 
of real assistance to the air branches of both the Army 
and the Navj' as at present constituted. A Board 
of Aeronautics would incidentally serve as a medium for 
the collection and co-ordination of experience — the 
natural prelude to the creation of a full blown Air 
Ministry if at some later date this should be found 
necessary or desirable. 
Two objections have been raised to a Board as against a 
Ministry. The first of these is that we don't want 
any more Boards and Committees, we want a man. 
This expresses an excellent sentiment, but unfortunately, 
that which in this sense is known as a man is a com-» 
bination of exceptional ability and " grit " with experience, 
and our whole system of Government of late has not lent 
itself to the training of the man so much as the team. 
In a sense we have already the man or men — in the 
Services — in my opinion, exceptionally able oflicers who 
