May II 1916 
LAND & WATER 
which ran originally about half way down along the 
northern slopes now runs along the crest. 
The curious result following upon this partial gain upon 
the part of the enemy has been that the belt between the 
original French line of advanced trenches and the present 
line upon a crest is a No Man's Land. If the enemy had 
been able to occupy it and organise it after compelling 
the French to retire, or if he succeeds in doing this in the 
immediate future, he can claim a considerable advantage. 
He will then lie to Hill 304 as he has long lain towards 
the Mort Homme ; that is, in the immediate neigh- 
bourhood of its summit. 
Such a situation compels the defenders either to 
evacuate the height or to reinforce. 
To evacuate the height means probably a retirement 
uDon the second line towards the Charny Ridge, for the 
Mort Homme and Hill 304 are the two capital points 
of the first line ; while to reinforce and to take back the 
lost ground, though a mere matter of concentration in 
munitions and men, is expensive in both. 
We know what happened previously in the case of the 
Mort Homme. The French command decided to 
render it secure lea days ago ; they delivered a bombard- 
ment against the German trenches immediately below its 
summit ; reinforced the covering troops there, pushed 
the Germans down the slope again, and got elbow room. 
The last enemy assault upon Hill 304 — far more 
expensive in men — was a reply to that French effort on 
the Mort Homme ; and we have yet to see whether the 
French will send forward reinforcements to recover the 
now abandoned slopes of Hill 304, or whether they will 
decide that the enemy's losses make it worth while to 
leave things as they are. 
Judging by the French policy in the parallel case of the 
Pepper Hill, on the other side of the Meuse, and its oppos- 
ing hill (called the Hill of Talou) they will not specially 
reinforce this sector, but will be content to leave it a 
No Man's Land. It is swept and observed from every 
side, but only the immediate future can tell us which of 
the two policies will be pursued. 
So far as the northern slopes of Hill 304 are concerned, 
therefore, we have this balance sheet for the week-end. 
The enemy has thrown away a far greater number of 
men than it has :ost the French. He has expended the very 
maximum amount of munitions which he can expend 
upon so small a sector. He has rendered untenable the 
northern slopes of Hill 304, which the French have 
evacuated. He has compelled the French to establish a 
new defensive line upon the northern crest of the hill. 
He has been unable himself to occupy the belt thus 
evacuated because it is swept by fire from the Mort Homme 
in flank as well as from the crest of Hill 304 in front. 
But there are two other points in this very small field 
which must be carefully watched. 
The first is the easy approach up to Hill 304 from the 
woods that climb this easy side, the horn called the 
" Wood of Avocourt." This was the approach by which 
the enemy attempted, with at least two divisions, a 
month ago, to get to the top of the hill. It will be 
remembered that he was broken in that attempt, that his 
occupation of the extremity of the wood was easily thrown 
back and that this gate, as it were, of Hill 304 has been 
closed to him ever since. During the recent main attack 
upon Hill 304 of last week-end a portion of his troops 
tried again to force this gate and were, as we have seen, 
defeated. They could not even get' out of the woods 
towards the north-west of the hill. 
The second point in the field to be carefully noted is 
the ravine which lies between Mort Homme and Hill 304. 
Here the enemy had a very distinct success, the fruits 
of which he was able to gather for something like 24 hours. 
His troops upon this left wing of his assault carried the 
French front trenches and penetrated into the com- 
munication trench beyond, and there was a moment at 
some time on Sunday afternoon or evening when his 
most advanced men must have been placed somewhere 
between the two hills. 
It was of no use occupying this ravine even if he had 
had time to consolidate it unless he had proceeded to 
attack either the one hill or the other immediately from 
its depths. For it is overlooked thoroughly from both 
sides, and it is at the mercy of observation from both. 
But he was not given the time to consolidate himself in 
this ravine. Apparently about dusk upon the Sunday 
evening, at any rate during the succeeding night, a 
counter-attack drove him out of these communication 
trenches and he was thrown back upon his original 
position at the mouth of the gully. 
In the course of these attacks upon Hill 304 three 
divisions, or the main part of three divisions, were used. 
One has been identified as a new division brought from 
the north of the line. It was a Pomeranian division. 
The other two would seem to be as yet not identified, 
but the enemy in his communique speaks of "Pome- 
ranian troops" for the whole. 
With the German account of these actions and with 
their significance I will deal later. Upon Monday evening, 
th.e last date with regard to which news has reached 
London, the whole thing may be summed up thus : . 
The Germans had brought into play, first and last, 
the best part of three divisions against Hill 304 in the 
space of five days. 
Their attack concerned three points (i) The old bit of 
Avocourt Wood to the north-west ; (2) The centre or 
northern slopes of Hill 304 ; (3) The ravine between Hill 
304 and the Mort Homme. 
(i) They had (against what French covering line we 
know not) failed altogether at the easiest point of ap- 
proach, the Avocourt Wood. (2) They had rendered 
untenable the northern slopes of Hill 304 by artillery 
work, but had not. been able to consolidate the evacuated 
belt nor to put infantry into it, though they had com- 
pelled the French to establish a new line upon the crest. 
(3) In the ravine between Hill 304 and the Mort Homme 
they had pushed forward successfully at a very heavy 
expense of men in the course of the Sunday, but on the 
Monday lost all that they had gained. This last point, 
hovyever, was scored by the French, a counter-offensive 
which must have cost a certain price in men. 
Attacks East of the Meuse 
Now let us turn to their efforts east of the Meuse, 
which were less important than the efforts west of the 
Meuse upon the Mort Homme. 
They there launched an attack with something between 
12,000 and 15,000 men on the sector just west of the 
ruins of Douaumont village. They occupied at an 
expense in losses of perhaps 3 or 4 thousand men, about 
a third of a mile of first line trenches in the course of the 
same Sunday. It was thought worth while by the 
defence to send reinforcements and to drive the assailants 
out of the greater part of this small gain in the 
course of the Monday. This being done matters came 
to a standstill for the moment and the lines no longer 
moved. 
What enemy regiments were used upon this sector we 
have not been told, but the F>ench have described them 
in general terms as " Prussian " : the point is of some 
significance, as we shall see in a moment. 
Now let us analyse these very general and imperfect 
statements with which we have been furnished and see 
what we can make of the enemy's intentions. 
We note the following points : — 
(r) An attack in considerable strength has been de- 
livered after a -lull of a whole fortnight, during which 
there has been no serious effort upon the part of the 
enemy in this sector. 
(2), It has been delivered a full month after the last 
great effort, for there has been no general offensive 
upon his part since April the gth. 
(3) It has been delivered with those. troops which he 
coiints the best, his Pomeranian regiments and other 
Prussian units not particularly specified. , , . 
(4) It has achieved exactly what has been achieved -in 
the past at almost exactly the same ratio of very heavy 
expense to very slight and tactically insignificant ad- 
vances. 
(5) The one point which seems tactically significant 
to the defence, the ravine between the two hills, was 
recovered by the defence at the expense of a-successful, 
though no doubt locally expensive counter-offensive. 
(6) (And most important of all) there is no evidence 
of his having moved his heavy artillery ; for the attack 
has been delivered upon a piece of ground, the prepara- 
tion of which by bombardment has already been familiar 
to the defence for more than six weeks. There has been 
