LAND & WATER 
May II, 1916 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 
By Arthur Pollen 
THE German reply to President Wilson, with its 
characteristic jumble of rodomontade, prevarica- 
tion and idle repetitions of things all the world 
knows to be untrue, will hardly have surprised 
those who have followed the discussion of the Washington- 
Berlin controversy in these columns. The dismissal of 
von Tirpitz in the early weeks of March made it clear 
what it was that the German higher conmiand uishcd 
to do. It defined the attitude that had ultimately to 
be taken towards America. It was the agitation of 
the jingoes that deflected the Government from 
its purpose. The reply published on the eve of the 
Lusilania anniversary is the Emperor's effort to regain 
control of the situation. He had to deal with a tangled 
and difficult situation. He had to address the neutrals 
of America, he had to cow and bring into line those of 
his subjects who had taken his previous boastings as 
literally true, he had to do this without unsaying too 
much of what he had already said, and he had to remember 
that every word that was written would be read by his 
enemies as well as by his friends. It is no wonder that 
there was considerable doubt as to what it all meant. 
The London press, disclaiming dictation to America, 
was almost unanimous in insisting that the reply did not 
meet the American demands. The American press was 
more divided. Some writers looked upon the note as a 
mere effort to gain time, an obviously dishonest con- 
tinuation of that inconclusive word splitting of which 
the American public is after twelve months excusably 
weary. Others took it to be a sufficient concession to 
America, though by no means all that was asked for. 
Others again saw in it as definite a German surrender 
as could possibly be expected. There is certainly much 
in the note that stands in sharp conflict with this last 
being even a tenable view, but for all that I cannot help 
thinking it was the right one. I read it to say that 
Germany had given definite orders that submarines are 
no longer to sink any ships at sight, nor at all, without 
ensuring the safety' of those on board. These orders 
of course may be rescinded. With superfluous frankness 
Germany has gone so far as to say that she reserves 
her freedom of action. And those that have followed the 
story hitherto will have no difficulty in seeing that this 
resers-ation is necessary, not because America is expected 
to press for a modification of the British blockade, but 
beicause what has happened in Germany before may happen 
again. The dynasty having nourished its dupes in the 
absurd belief that the Central Powers are already vic- 
torious on land and can be made victorious on sea by 
the submarine blockade of Britain, may, in spite of every- 
thing, still have to choose between a final conviction at 
the bar of German public opinion and a final effort to 
make good its promise. But for the present it can 
hardly be disputed that the note complies in all essentials 
with the American demand, and that for the moment 
the trading ships of the world are safe from unseen and 
sudden attack and that the crisis with America is post- 
poned. 
The American Terms 
The indications at the moment of writing, that is on 
Tuesday morning, are, that President Wilson will act 
upon this view. In doing so he will not be deluded by 
the idea that it is safe to accept German statements 
at their face value. I'ltimately the relations between 
the two countries will be decided not by words but by 
actions. And the question of the moment is, not what 
(ierniany will do but what she has done. Is the reply 
one that would seem to justify the President in accepting 
it as satisfactory ? 
To answer this we must see exactly what it was that 
America asked, and so far as it can be disentangled from 
the note, exactly what it is that Germany yields. 
As to the American demand, n9 doubt can possibly 
exist. 
The note of April 20th put the issue into the plainest 
English- conceivable. Before the submarine campaign 
began, it said, America had protested that the thrca 
was incompatible both with law and with the highe'' 
justice upon which law is based : the past twelve months 
had shown the reality to be worse than the threat. The 
hopes raised by German promises to amend had been 
blasted. The case of the Sussex had completed the 
lessons of the Lusitania and Arabic, and now no possible 
doubt was left that the employment of the submarine 
for the destruction of enemy trade was "completely irrecon- 
cilable with the principles of humanity, the undisputed 
rights of neutrals, and the sacred privileges of non-com- 
batants." " So that if the Imperial Government should 
not now, without delay, proclaim and make cffcctivo 
renunciation of 77s present methods of submarine warfare 
against passenger and cargo ships, the United States can 
have no choice than to break off completely diplomatic 
relations with the German Government." Gennany had 
to choose between submission and defiance. She has 
made a defiant submission. 
The German Dilemma 
The tone of the reply is explained by the circumstances 
in which it was written. They are familiar to the 
reader. When the outbreak of popular frenzy forced 
the Government's hand, after von Tirpitz's dismissal, the 
sink-at-sight campaign was begun, though its author was 
no longer behind it. It began disastrously, if it was 
meant to be consistent with remaining friendly with 
America. First, two Dutch passenger ships were sunk. 
Finally, the Sussex was torpedoed with nearly 100 
Americans on board. That all these cases were outside 
of the commander's instructions did not alter Germany's 
actual guilt. The dangerous folly of the thing had 
become manifest, and, as we have often seeo, the 
problem that the Kaiser and his Chancellor had to settle 
was not what to do, but how to do it. 
If the reader will put himself into the position of 
these two harassed men. he will realise without difficulty 
that the' Note had to achieve three separate, and 
inconsistent purposes. First, it must save the face 
of the German higher command. For this purpose, it 
must repeat the stale and foolish lies that had done 
duty so often before. It must repeat them because 
the German jingoes believe them to be true. Incredible 
as it may appear to us, the German docs believe 
that the British blockade, which was proclaimed in the 
middle of March of last year, actually preceded the pro- 
clamation of the German war zone, which was published 
more than a month before. He accepts without question 
the statement that the campaign was directed against 
British cargo ships only — although in the fifteen months 
of the campaign half as many neutrals as British ships 
have been attacked, while, two neutral and near a dozen 
belligerent liners have been sent to the bottom unwarned. 
Although, after more than a year of this onslaught on 
our trade, British imports and exports show an increase, 
and not a decrease, though there is not a single necessity, 
and lamentably few luxuries that the British people 
m'ust deny themselves, he still implicitly believes that 
the campaign has only to be continued for famine to 
bring us to our knees. In spite of hunger he does not 
yet 'realise the fatal handicap of sea impotence. He 
thinks Germany can win despite British sea supremacy. 
He believes these things because the Government has 
told him so and the Government cannot unsay what it 
has said, and so it must repeat them now. 
Having thus saved its face, the higher command must 
next make a seeming virtue of necessity by making it 
appear an alternative — and perhaps a swifter — means 
of gaining the very end the submarine campaign itself 
was to achieve. The Note accordingly states that Ger- 
many confidently expects America to force Great Britain 
to abandon her illegalities and follow the laws of humanity. 
Should America not succeed, Germany, says the Note, 
will reserve her freedom of action. All this will sound 
very fine to the German reader. It makes the surrender 
look Uke a bargain. But the German Government knows 
