10 
LAS I) .\ WATER 
May II, 1916 
gun, went 3,000 yards to ri^ht or left, tlie gun would not 
be able to reach it at all. whereas in a similar case a 30 
knot ship could bring it under tire. If there is any sort 
of a breeze the Zeppelin would have very limited power of 
manoeuvring to avoid the lire of the ship. In other 
words, if the fire control arrangements and the gunnery 
skill are equal, a ship's gun in broad daylight would have 
many more opportunities and far better opportunities 
of engaging a Zeppelin than any immobile gun could 
have. 
We must next remember that, as the nights get shorter 
and the days longer so must the period >)f the daylight flight 
of the Zeppelin over the North Sea increase, if we asMiiue 
that they only desire to operate over England during 
darkness. In mid-winter there are about 14 hours of 
darkness, in midsummer less than 5!. l-'rom Heligoland 
to Edinburgh is about .150 miles. If a 60 mile-an-hour 
Zeppelin left Heligoland on the 21st December half an 
hour before darkness, it would go straight to Edinburgh, 
spend half an hour dropping bombs, and make its way 
back to Heligoland, arriving half an hour after dawn. 
But in midsummer it would ha\e to leave Heligoland 
3} hours before darkness, and would have to make a 
journey of 270 miles over the North Sea in broad daylight 
both in coming and in rettirning. Every British criiiser 
and destroyer cairying a gun for vertical lire and cruising 
in the North Sea, is a highly mobile, and as the (lermans 
now know, a highly dangerous obstacle. The excite- 
ments of a Zeppelin raid during the summer months will 
then be impleasantly magnified. 
Though no one foresaw this very interesting develop- 
ment, I think the naval pundits as a bodv should be 
heartily ashamed of themselves that they did not. For 
Commodore Alexander Sinclair's, Captain Cameron's and 
Lieutenant-Commander I'eilman's success is after all only 
a fresh illustration of the eternal truth, that mobile force 
is of incalculably greater value than fixed force. Those 
who have studied the controversies that raged in the 
last century between those who pinned their faith on 
fortifications and coast defence ships on the one hand 
and the fiery spirits of the blue water school on the other, 
ought I think to have foreseen that as the days got longer 
the chances of the fleets engaging the Zeppelins must 
grow greater, and that as the chances increased so the 
probabilities of success would grow. 
The worst of it is that the fast ship with well-served 
anti-aircraft guns is only a summer time protection. 
We obviously can no more dispense with the fixed de- 
fences of searchlights and guns, nor with the other kind 
of mobile defence, the counter-fleet of airships, than we 
can allow our naval ports and depots and coaling stations 
to remain incapable of protecting themselves against 
raiders by forts, destroyers and submarines. In other 
words, the blue water theory of anti-Zeppelin defence is 
subject to the same limitations as the blue water theorj' 
of national defence. And it is subject to a great many 
more as well. Tiic fleet has to deal with a force twice as 
swift as itself, which jiossesscs to boot the enormous 
advantage of a \astly superior range of \ision. In the 
most favourable oi seasons, then, it can never be a coiii- 
plefe defence, though it may be singularly effective when 
it gets its opportunity, and in the unfavourable seasons 
it nuist of course be no defence at all. Still it is pleasant 
to know that the number of our counter strokes has grown, 
and that at any rate during the next four months, while 
no doubt preparations for a better defence for next winter 
will be made, the navy has added a new terror to the 
seas over which the raiders must pass. 
AKTIU'R ir POLI.KN. 
Postscript 
Since writing the above, President Wilson's rejoinder 
has been published. It accepts the German surrender, 
but only on condition that it is a surrender and not a 
bargain. Cicrmany must have expected the President 
to act on this understanding, though there may be an 
element of unpleasant surprise in his making it so 
brutally clear. This will not, in all probability imperil the 
settlement, which, at this moment, Germany must, at 
all costs, secure. It has for some time been evident 
that the failure at Verdun had made peace overtures 
inevitable before the year is out. So long as anything 
is expected from these, Germany cannot afford to 
estrange America. But if they are to be based on 
the theory of a German land victory, they will fail, 
and then — to quote the Kaiser's note— " a new situation " 
will have arisen. 
Rise and Fall of the French Air Ministry 
By F. W. Lanchester 
IN the present article I propose to make a digression 
and to leave the dispassionate and academic 
consideration of the subject, in order to speak 
of the position as it actually exists, both in this 
country and in I'rance. 
For several months past there has been widespread 
talk in the Press of an Air Minister and of an Air Ministry. 
Coupled to this there has been an agitation centring on 
the question of the efficiency, and in some cases — in 
most cases — on the alleged deficiencies of our aero- 
nautical forces. There have been grave allegations made 
against the naval authorities, against the (iovemment 
itself, even against the poor unoffending experts, if there 
^rc such people as " experts." 
Various parties have come forward both inside Parlia- 
ment and out of Parliament with alleged nostrums and 
c\ires for \-ariousIy alleged evils. I'nfortunately the 
diagnosis of these self-appointed physicians is not always 
the same, the latter in fact do not agiec even as to the 
symptoms of the supposed disease. Rarely is evidence 
offered of the statements or allegations made, still more 
rarely does the self-appointed do<tor jiresent his own 
credentials as evidence of his capacity to effect a cure. 
The medicine prescribed varies in its character from a 
veterinary dose of " ginger " to a liberal employment 
both internally and externally of industrial alcohol, and 
rims through the whole gannit of tonics and stimulants. 
Thus the suggestions offered varj' widely both in kind 
and degree ; sonu' have been discussed in the preceding 
articles, others remain for discussion, others again do not 
pos.sess sufficient merit to justify even a passing reference. 
Our Government has made one i-ttempt at reform— 
the Derby Committee — and failed. The French Govern- 
ment also has made one attempt — an Air Ministry— and 
has also failed. In both cases the present position is 
" as you were," and in this country the press and ptiblic 
agitation, backed by a certain measure of political support, 
continues as before. 
Now the whole of this agitation and debate has already 
had its counterpart on the other side of the Channel, in 
France. There a real Air Minister was actually appointed, 
and five months later the Air Ministry was disolved and 
control restored to an Army Officer, and thus in the course 
of the past twelve months the control of Service Aero- 
nautics in France has twice been put into the melting pot. 
We have in these experiments of administration of our 
neighbouring Ally a fund of experience on which to draw, 
which cannot be other than of great value to those 
on whom responsibility rests to shape our own air policy, 
and to those who are prepared to make a serious study 
of the subject. Although these experiments of the French 
Ciovernment in the administration and management 
of service aeronautics have not been productive of good 
from the standpoint of the French Nation, they cast a 
flood of light on the difficulties which must be encountered 
by anyone approaching the subject de novo. 
There is a very close parallel between this French 
history and our own, we have had the same press and 
jniblic agitation, the same accusations of Service ineffi- 
ciency. In F'rance the outcry was summarised in the 
words " La crisc dc I'avialion." Here the analogous 
term coined by the Press and the Parliamentary mal- 
contents has been "the air muddle." But in l-'rance 
the whole history developed earlier than it did in this 
country' ; the following is an abstract of the bare events 
as they have taken place. 
