Uay i8, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
THE REALITY OF SEA POWER 
By Arthur Pollen 
BY the time these pages are in the reader's hands, 
a fortnight will have elapsed since the German 
reply to America was written. A glance at the 
diagram of the ships lost since April i6th, that 
is to say, in the fifth, sixth and half of the seventh week 
since the new campaign against British, Allied and neutral 
shipping was begun, will show how immediate has been 
the effect of the surrender. For^ in the latter half of 
the seventh week, it will be seen that, possibly by design, 
or it may be only by accident, only four sailing ships 
were attacked, while in the eighth week only three ships, 
all of them British, have gone under. These three are 
the Cymric and the Eretria — one torpedoed in the Atlantic 
the ■ other in the Bay of Biscay — and the Dolcoath, 
apparently sunk in the southern portion of the North Sea, 
but whether by mine or torpedo is not yet known. The 
case of the Cymric was cited as if it qualified the sincerity 
of the German submission to America. But this criticism 
is not called for ; for it is obvious that no U boat so far 
afield as those that sank this ship and the Eretria could 
possibly have been warned. And the sinking of the 
Cymric— iSiV from being a disquieting symptom — though 
deplorable enough in itself — is both interesting and re- 
assuring, because it proves that this particular U boat 
must have been at large in the approaches to the Irish 
coast and Channel for aconsiderable time without being|able 
to seciu'e any other victim — a fact that is eloquent both 
of the inefficiency of the present submarine captains, and 
of the effective character of the counter-measures direc- 
ted from Queenstown. If the Dolcoath was sunk by a 
mine, it would seem as if, so far at any rate, Germany 
was abiding for once by her written word. 
Fear of America 
There seems to be excellent reasons for supposing that 
she will continue to observe it. The issue is not 
Germany's sincerity, but her fear of American sincerity. 
It appears from the very limited comment allowed 
to appeal in the German press that the surrender 
to America has created a profound arid most dis- 
agreeable impression, and is acquiesced in for the 
same reason that inspired it, viz.. sheer terror of 
American intervention on the Allied side. The Chan- 
cellor's explanation to the Reichstag took the odd 
form of saying that the value of the submarine blockade 
had been grossly exaggerated, and that in no case were 
any really important military results to be expected from 
it. This throws a curious light on the dismissal of von 
Tirpitz and the subsequent revival of his policy in defer- 
ence to the public outcry. It is more to the point that 
the Government has been able to suppress a similar 
• outcry now. Even the most flamboyant jingoes seem 
to have been sobered by the continued failure at Verdun, 
the increasing stringency in the matter of food supplies, the 
new and formidable threat the Grand Duke is developing 
against Turkey, more than all by the reaction of all these 
things on popular sentiment in Germany, which plainly 
shows that the country is in no mood for the indefinite 
prolongation of an unsuccessful war. Thus the effort to 
save the face of the higher command has only met with 
very indifferent success. Harden openly scoffs at the 
argument that Great Britain is inhuman in trying to 
starve Germany into surrender, and all parties seem to 
reahse the futility of reconciling the doctrine that the 
blockade of England could never be decisive with the. 
previous boasts that it would bring this country to its 
knees. If it was so ill considered a course, why have such 
sacrifices been made, why such risks run with America ? 
If the Government "has failed to conceal from its 
people that it has yielded out of weakness, it has been no 
more successful in disguising the character of its sub- 
mission to those tp whom the submission has been made. 
As we saw last week, the effort to present this surrender 
as a bargain failed dismally. For Germany's repute for 
observance of her word is such that the mere suggestion 
that it was a bargain left Mr. Wilson no alternative but to 
state publicly that th?re could in no 'circumstances ba 
any bargain in such a matter. By her own clumsiness 
then, Germany has deepened, not mitigated her own 
humiliation. But this was not the only, nor in some 
ways perhaps the worst, result of her perverse and stupid 
diplomacy. Something might have been expected from 
the notorious disagreement between the State Depart- 
ment and our Foreign Office as to certain details of our 
blockade methods. Left to itself, the situation — or, at 
least, one can imagine Germany so thinking — might 
have developed in a way embarrassing for the Allies. 
But so little do the Kaiser and the Chancellor understand 
the American character, that in their effort to use the 
situation to their home advantage, they have actually 
made it impossible for America to do anything. 
The effort to dictate a pohcy to Washington has, it 
is said, led to the crushing retort that Great Britain and 
the United States have a machinery defined by treaty 
for 
dealing 
with such disagreements. And with 
the retort there was a reminder that it was exactly this 
machinery that Germany had politely declined. Not only 
then is there no chance of the embargo being relieved by 
any immediate or effective action by America, but Ger- 
many is faced with the uncomfortable fact, that should 
America think her rights impugned, she would proceed 
to their vindication hy the legal but leisurely method 
provided by our arbitration treaties. 
The chief interest of the present situation then con- 
sists in this. Germany has manifestly yielded to America 
because it is obvious to her Government that the German 
internal and military position would make a quarrel with 
America a disaster of the first importance. The people 
of Germany have acquiesced in this surrender because 
they — no less than their Government — fully appreciate 
the dangers of the situation. They realise the humiliation 
of their Government to the full, because its surrender has 
been robbed of all its pretences, and shown to be no bar- 
gain. It is the first time since August, 1914, that Ger- 
many has had to submit to a public reproof, acknowledge 
herself wrong, and admit that her submission is due to 
Sovtes Sbakespeadana^ 
By SIR SIDNEY LEE 
A Redmond-Carson Pact : 
A peace is of the nature of a conquest, 
For then both parties nobly are subdued 
A nd neither party loser. 
2 Henry IV., IV., ii., 88-90. 
Bluster and the Coalition : 
For it comes to pass oft that a terrible 
oath, with a swaggering accent sharply 
twanged off, gives manhood more appro- 
bation than ever proof itself zvould have 
earned him. 
Twelfih Niiht, III., iv., 199-2(M. 
Disraeli's Posthumous Fame : 
It so falls out 
That what we have we prize not to the zvorth, 
Whiles we enjoy it ; but, being lacMd and 
lost, 
Why, then we rack the value, then we find 
The virtue that possession would not show us 
Whiles it was ours. 
Much Ado About Nothinj. IV., i., 219-24. 
