May i8, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
13 
How Germap Public Opinion is Formed 
By Colonel Feyler 
SPEAKING in the Reichstag recently, the German 
Minister of War declared that the German official 
communiques were invariably true, contrary to 
those of Germany's enemies. This declaration, 
coming on the heels of the fal^e account of the capture 
of Fort Vaux, near Verdun, and ecjually false news of 
the storming of the Mort Homme, may have caused some _ 
surprise. To those, however, who since the commence- 
ment of the war have made a special study of the methods 
of the German Press Bureau, it caused no surprise whatever. 
I would like to quote an example of similar manipulation, 
dealing with operations in Flanders during Spring, i()i5, 
which will be of special interest to the British reader. 
The Hill known as Hill 60 is situated south-cast of 
Ypres and south-west of Zillebeke. As can be seen from 
the number " 60," which denotes metres above sea level, 
this hill is a mere mound of no great altitude, but it 
suflices to dominate the surrounding plain. The British 
took possession of this position from the 17th to the iqth 
of April and on the 20th April published the following 
official statement : 
The operations started on the 17th April finished yesterday 
in the complete occupation of an important position 
known as Hill 60, situated about two miles south of 
Zillebeke, east of Ypres ; this eminence dominates the 
country to the north and north-east. Operations com- 
menced by the explosion underneath the Hill of a mine 
which killed a number of Germans and resulted in the 
capture of 15 prisoners, including one officer. 
Oil the i8th April at dawn the Germans counter-attacked 
vigorously in order to re-take Hill bo but were repulsed 
with heavy loss. The enemy then advanced in serried 
ranks, exposed to the fire of an EngHsh machine gun 
battery . . . they were everywhere repulsed with 
heavy losses. 
German Headquarters kept their public informed as 
regards these operations in the following manner : 
iSth April : After exploding several mines tlie British 
penetrated yesterday evening into one of our positions 
situated south-east of Ypres on an elevation immediately 
north of the Canal, but they were immediately turned 
out again by a counter-attack. Fighting has ceased, 
except for the possession of three of the craters. 
19th April : South-east of Ypres the British were ejected 
from the small portions of our position which they still 
held. Yesterday evening they made an attempt to re- 
gain possession of the Hill by means of a violent attack 
along the railway from Ypres to Comincs. This attack 
failed with heavy loss. 
The contradiction between the two versions is thus 
absolute. In England the public is under the impression 
that Hill 60 is occupied by British soldiers ; in Germany 
everyone believes the contrary. The question will 
without doubt, however, be solved by the Com- 
muniques of the days immediately following ; it 
can be taken for granted that the Germans, if indeed they 
have lost the hill, will not have given up hope of re- 
capturing a position of so much importance. This is 
proved indeed by their silence after their despatch of 
the 19th April, as they are no doubt waiting for a success- 
ful operation to wipe off the failure exposed in the British 
Communiques of the 20th. 
Experience during the present war goes to show that 
the Germans will certainly return to the attack, whether 
or not they see fit to publish their intentions. The opera- 
tion of attacking and defending a fortified position has 
almost invariably shown the following three phases. 
Firstly, a reconnaissance of the position to be captured 
and the crushing of advanced lines covering the position. 
Secondly, the decisive attack which, if successful, 
does not fail to provoke an immediate counter-stroke 
by the dispossessed party who by means of a swift 
counter-attack with his nearest available reinforcements 
hopes to take advantage of the victor's exhaustion and 
to re-take the position before the latter has had time to 
consolidate it. Should this counter-attack be successful, 
the original attacker has to re-commence his operations. 
If the counter-attack, however, fails, then the third 
phase becomes evident. The defender does not despair 
of recapturing his lost position, but the enemy has already 
consolidated his lines and the defender has, the ,'fore, 
to organise a methodical attack against his old positions. 
Unless a thorough comparison of communiques and an 
exhaustive study of earlier examples are at fault, the 
Germans have now arrived at the third phase of the 
battle of Hill 60. They have pubhshed on the i8th and 
19th April the probably quite correct news of the success 
of their first counter-attacks, but they have omitted to 
publish their final failure. They will now no doubt 
pass to the third phase, but they suffer from a manifest 
inability to publish this fact, having burnt their bridges 
by stating they are still in occupation of the position, 
and they cannot publish news of its recapture without 
confessing that it had been lost. We are, therefore, 
confined to statements from the Allied camp, and 
these certainly have an appearance of truth ; as, 
once Hill 60 had been occupied there was no plausible 
reason for composing fairy tales of more fighting for 
it. Any fighting that takes place after this point must 
as a logical certainty be fighting of the third phase, in 
which the Germans are attempting to regain their loss. 
No time is lost in informing us of the situation, first 
by the following French Communiques : 
22nd April, 7 a.m. : In Belgium an attack has developed 
against the trenches on Hill. 60, which had been captured 
, by the British. The attack was repulsed. 
23rd April, 7 a.m. : The British troops have repulsed 
two attacks on Hill 60. The German counter-attacks, 
whose violence is explained by the desire of the Imperial 
General Staff to repair the loss denied in their official 
Communiques, have definitely failed. 
Shortly afterwards we have General French's report : 
22nd April : The Germans continue to make violent 
counter-attacks before Hill 60. On Tuesday afternoon 
between 6 and 9 p.m. we repulsed two heavy infantry 
attacks, inflicting heavy loss on the enemy. Throughout 
the night the Hill has been bombarded by the enemy 
and we have repulsed several other attacks. 
23rd April : The German attacks against Hill 60 have been 
several times renewed since the last despatch. All these 
attacks have failed and have now momentarily ceased. We 
hold the whole ridge, to which the enemy attaches a great 
, deal of importance. There is not a word of truth in the 
German official statement to the effect that the position 
has been retaken by the Germans. 
The position was,-, however, retaken by the Germans 
two weeks later, on the 5th May, by means of the use of 
asphyxiating gases ; but of course Berlin was not in a 
position to announce this recapture and it was left to 
General French to make the news public. This, of course, 
was nof very satisfactory to German Headquarters and 
in their telegram of the 7th May they described the action 
as follows :— 
Near Ypres, all the attempts of the British to retake 
Hill 60, situated south-east of Zillebeke, which has since 
the 17th April been the centre of heavy fighting, have 
met with failure. 
In this manner the German public is given confirma- 
tion of the German despatches of the rSth and 19th of 
April, which had concealed the capture of Hill 60 by 
the British ; in order to meet the situation, the roles have 
had to be reversed and instead of the Germans attacking 
and expelling the British the British are represented to 
have attacked and been unsuccessful in expelling the 
Germans. As a matter of fact German Headquarters, on 
a later occasion were careless enough to give the lie to 
this description, when speaking of their recapture of the 
position in a despatch dealing with the uses of gases, thus 
showing how difficult it is to sustain a deception. 
The above is one of the most interesting examples of 
the German method of reporting nothing but victories. 
We have seen how the situation brought about by the 
denial of a British success has eventually been solved 
by a misrepresentation of the subsequent German success 
which had nullified its effects, and how this subsequent 
German success is described to the people as the third 
phase of the previous successfid attack. 
Many examples could be given of this process of a 
successful misrepresentation of unfortunate incidents, but 
the case of Hill 60 is outstanding in its blatancy. 
