20 
LAND & W A T E R 
May 
tqtG 
months, and the transport of bodies for tlie attack, soint- 
thing at the best a matter of 15 miles a day, at the worst 
seven, but half that distance. 
What has been done to-day has been done in the face 
of an enemy intimately prepared ; with all his powers 
for war alive and ready from the first day, with infor- 
mation conveyed in a few seconds over any distance of 
space, with mobilisation a matter of a few days, and the 
concentration of a million men upon any small front made 
possible by invention in the course of a couple of weeks. 
It is perhaps the power to improvise under !?iich 
circumstances and in the face of such an opponent that 
has been the most amazing feature of the whole story. 
THE TRENTINO 
These lines are written twenty-four hours earlier in 
the week than usual from the necessity of going to press 
a day before the usual time. 
I am therefore compelled to interrupt any examination 
of the new offensive upon the frontier of the Trentino, 
for that offensive is still in progress at the moment of 
WTiting. The critical point, the power of the enemy to 
force the Italian main line, or their failure so to do, re- 
mains undecided. 
Rut what has happened up to the last news received 
upon writing this may bo tabulated as follows : 
Beginning upon Saturday, May 13th, and throughout 
Sunday, May 14th, a violent intensive bombardment with 
heavy pieces, the characteristic of every great offensive, 
was directed uninterruptedly along the Italian front 
between the Upper ^alley of the Astico in front of the 
Folgaria plateau and the valley of the Adige. The 
Italian front here ran everyvvere in front of the permanent 
werks, now transformed into field works, which crown 
the positions defending the Trentine ->'alley. The two 
main groups of heavy guns are on either side of the valley 
on the ridge of the Biaena east of J^overeto and on the 
Folgaria to west, and somewhat to north of that town. 
After the bombardment of Sunday, May 14th, the 
Austrian assault on Monday, May isth, attacked the 
height of the Zugna Torta, which stands out rather in 
front of the most advanced Italian positions ; with the 
village of Moscheri, at its base. 
The attack was carried on all the Monday and the 
Tuesday agaiast the Italian advanced positions, and on 
the latter day Moscheri was entered. 
Meanwhile during the same Monday and up to dawn 
on Tuesday, the second attack was proceeding upon the 
advanced Italian jjositions in the Val Sugana, that is in 
the Upper Valley of the Brenta, between the summit of 
the Collo and the height of the Armenterra, with the 
village of IJoncegno between them which marked the 
e.xtreme limit of the former Italian advance up the valley. 
By Wednesday the Austrians were suffering something 
of a check, especially in the Val Sugana, where they lost 
a certain number of prisoners and fell back. But on 
Thursday the Zugna Torta, at the base of which the 
Austrians had already entered Moscheri, was evacuated 
by the Italians. On Friday, the iqtli, the western end 
of the Armenterra ridge was occupied by the .Austrians 
and the village of Roncegno at its foot, while a subsidiary 
movement between the two valleys was being pushed 
against the Santo between the Terragnolo torrent and the 
Zugna Torta ridge. By the evening of that day the 
Austrians claimed 13,000 Italian prisoners, 107 guns and 
li large howitzers. We shall see in a moment how 
these claims may be criticised. 
The Saturday and the Sunday gave no appreciable 
result, at least in the news reaching London by Monday 
afternoon, and it looked as though the great offensive had 
reached some main line of defence upon which our Ally 
proposes to stand after ha\'ing retired in some places 
over two miles of ground, in others over a mile to a 
mile and a-half. 
The first main general object of these offensives, from 
the great model of Verdun down to the smallest efforts 
such as the attack on the Vimy Kidgc last Sunday, is to 
postpone the counter-offensive of an enemy growing in 
power, and with luck to render that offensive weak or im- 
possible by the time it comes (that is, supposing one has 
compelled the enemy to lose more men than a defending 
force ought to lose) and with greater luck still to arrive 
at some decision. 
Armies as they reach the end of their resources are - 
always compelled to attack. To stand upon the defensive 
means nothing, strategically, except using in one's own 
favour the element of time. It connotes increasing 
strength in comparison with one's enemy. The only 
other things it can connote are despair — which is not a 
strategical consideration — or the political hope that delay 
will secure more favourable terms. When things are 
the other way, when one knows that one's enemy will 
get stronger and oneself weaker as time proceeds^ then 
the defensive is useless and the offensive imposes itself. 
It is clear that a decision of any kind attained before the 
disproportion of forces became overwhelming would be 
the salvation of the declining force. It is equally clear 
that bad blundering on the part of a superior enemy so 
that he should lose too many men though standing upon 
the defensive, might cripple his power of greater action. 
It is clear that upon the very least a vigorous offensive, so 
Siae/ia ~ 
