LAND & W A i L R 
June 1, KjiO 
The Trentino Offensive 
By Hilaire Belloc 
THE three militarv movements of the week have 
been the crossing of the ("iieck frontier by the 
Bulgars and tiernians, the big and futile assault 
renewed upon the defensive line of Verdun, and 
.the continued Austrian offensive against the Italians in 
the Trentino. 
The first"' of these movements is not sufficiently de- 
veloped for us to know even whether it is intended as aiH 
offensive movement at all. It, may be a purely political 
act, not even intended to menace, let atone to lead up 
to the attack of the Salonika lines. We must wait for. 
further developments before it is possible to give it any 
commentarv at all. 
The second movement— the massed attack upon the 
Verdun lines, I will deal with briefly at the coiu'lusion of a 
general survey of the ("lerman and French theses which 
I append to the story I print this week of how a certain 
German Corps disappeared in the fighting round Verdun. 
.. The Austrian offensix-e deserves more particular treat- 
ment, both from its novel features, and also because, 
although it is still in process of development so that we 
cannot yet define either its full objects or the measure 
of success it is attaining, yet the immediate results and 
the peril thev involve are sufficiently grave. 
■ The ground o\-er which the new Austrian offensive is 
-de\Tloping is an oblong about 30 miles By 45. This 
oblong is roughlv bisected by the old artificial frontier 
between the Austrian Trentiiio and the modern Italian 
state. 
Its importance consists in this : that the communica- 
tions between the chief arsenals, depots, of men, etc., of 
the Italians and their main I.sonzo front pass right in 
front of the projection down from the Alps, which the 
. Trentino makes. This projection, the southern main point 
of: which is at Borghctto, a few miles from Lake Garda, 
was specially designed when the frontier was drawn to 
weaken the new Italian state and to strengthen the 
Austrians. and the modern importance of railways has 
greatlv increased its advantage. 
There are two lines, roughly parallel, serving the front 
upon the Isonzo and each connected with the mass of 
peninsular Italy to the south of the Po and the industrial 
centres and depots of Lombardy and Piedmont. The 
first passes through Brescia, Verona, Vicenza and Treviso. 
The second passes through Mantua, Padua, and so to the 
Isonzo front. 
The second, which is marked (i) upon the accompany- 
ing map. is the principal line of communication. 
The northern one, marked (2), has fewer sidings, fewer 
facilities for rolling stock and, I believe, only a single 
line. 
It is clear that the enemy astraddle of the northern 
line alone and in occupation of Verona or Vicenza, or 
both^ — nay, seriously menacing the northern line — would 
be a very great peril for the Italian main front and would 
almost certainlv proxoke a retirement from it. The 
enemy's occupation of the other main line, the southern 
one, would still more clearly be fatal. 
Now from the southernmost point of the old Austro- 
Italian frontier at Borghetto to Verona is, as the crow 
flies, less than 20 miles, and even by road and by rail not 
30. Vicenza is from the nearest point of the frontier ex- 
actly 20 miles as the crow flies, and further east at Castel- 
franco there is a point almost equally near to that 
frontier. 
Finally the distance from the first, least important 
lines of communications to the second absolutely riial 
one. is between Vicenza and Padua well under 20 miles 
of dead level ground. 
We must also appreciate the fact that Verona and 
Vicenza lie on the edge of the Venetian plain, and the 
foot-hills of the Alps touch that plain ujwn a line 
corresponding to the line bounding the shaded area upon 
the map. 
It is evident from all this that a passage of the 
frontier, upon even a narrow belt, by the enemy here 
would be of the very gravest importance, and it was 
to prevent it that the Italian Commander-in-Chief 
pushed forward in the first days of the war in order to 
block the avenues whereby the enemy might attempt 
such an advance. 
There are two such avenues, as we pointed out last 
week. The Val Sugana, or valley of the Brenta and the 
Val Lagarina, or valley of the Adige. These valleys 
meet at Trent, and the whole importance of Trent in 
military as in social history consists in the fact that it is 
Moimtaixious 
ffHUlCoiuitty 
Theatre of 
Operations 
I 
To Piedmont 
and Lombardy 
' To Penuisutaf t)F Italy 
