LAND «.\: W A T F, R 
June 
1C)-[G 
salient indeed. He has, to feed that sahent, only two 
roads, and neither of these is tirst class. 
If he could force .Mount Pasubio he would have a third 
road, the road goinjj; from Kovereto up the Vallarsa, and 
crossing the frontier ridge at C. So far he has failed to 
force the Pasubio mountain ; his furthest advance up 
the Terragnolo valley (3) along the best road is as far as 
Chiesa at L). The only two roads he has as yet then for a 
continued advance (which, remember, is dependent 
entirely upon his preponderanct- in heavy artillery) 
upon this sector, are tirst the road up the valley of the 
Astico. where he has the advantage of holding the upper 
land and being already well down upon the southern 
slope, and secondly the road from Asiago up the Val 
d'Assa, where he has a similar advantage. But these 
two roads and the mountain paths of all that wijd land 
give him no avenue of supply for a large army. He is 
simply compelled by the nature of the case to force or 
turn the two main valleys. 
The Valley of the .\dige he cannot turn until he either 
masters the Pasubio or forces his way across the pass at 
C, in spite of the heights there dominating him. and so 
gets right down into the lower country on the southern side. 
The Brenta valley he has imfortunately a better chance 
of turning. From .\siago, to th>^ nearest point of the 
firenta road and railway at \'alstagna is only eight miles. 
There is no road at all across the tumbled mountain land 
there, but a successful action fought from Asiago would 
give him the mastery over the Brenta valley at \'al- 
stagna and its neighbourhood and even a threat to this 
would compel the immediate falling back of the Italian 
forces in -the Upper Brenta Valley. 
The last news received ui)on writing these lines shows 
us the enemy on the heights immediately dominating 
Asiago and Asiero from the north. The enemy's posts of 
observation look right down upon both towns in theii 
valleys at not more than 6,000 yards from the Austrian 
lines. But they show us this advance with no good 
avenues of communication behind and dependent for any 
success upon either reaching the lower Brenta valley 
at the critical point of Valstagna, or forcing the Italian 
positions on the Upper Brenta valley just behind Borgo. 
Whether they will succeed in reaching Valstagna or 
whether the slowness of pace inseparable from their 
dependence upon heavy artillery will give the Italians 
time for a concentration sufficient to prevent fult her 
advance the next few days will tell us. So far (this is 
written upon Tuesday evening with the matter (piitc 
\msettled and still in full development) no judgment is 
po-isiblo. 
Story of a Brandenburg Army Corps 
I PROPOSE this week to lay before my readers, by 
way of an object-lesson to guide our judgment with 
regard to the Battle of Verdun, the story now 
available in some detail of one single German 
corps ; of how it was selected and trained for the attack ; 
how it suffered beyond anything its command had 
thought possible ; how it was incapable of further effort 
after one week of such losses ; how it was recruited ; 
how one more attempt was made to use it ; taken to the 
rear, rested , and how in two days that effort broke down, 
. arid the corps disappeared for good. 
I think that the matter (which I have not seen dealt 
with at all in any English publication) will be illuminating, 
and, for many of those watching the present phase of the 
campaign, conclusive. 
The 3rd .^rmy Corps of the Prussian service is composed 
of Metropolitan and typically Prussian troops. It is 
recruited from the Province of Brandenburg. It has 
reputation in that service second only perhaps, to the 
reputation of the Imperial Guard. 
It was present, under the command of von Kluck, in 
the attempted enveloping movement by the ist Army, 
which ended so disastrously in the neighbourhood of 
Paris, and the failure of which determined the Battle of 
the Mame. It was present in the Battle of the Ourcq 
when the French (ieneral Maunoury surprised von Kluck 
and was himself so nearly counter-enveloped. 
It stood some days later upon the lines of the Aisnc 
when the (iermans dug themselves in. That was in 
September. I')I4. For nearly a year the 3rd Branden- 
burg Corps remained there facing first the British, later 
the French, upon the limestone heights of the Soissonnais. 
The hurried concentration of German troops to meet 
trie gre<ii3* French offensive in Champagne last September 
called dowi.n to that region certain elements of the 3rd 
Germany Ai -my Corps. But later, with the month of 
October it be{,|ins a series of adventures which it is of the 
highest interest,"^ for us to follow, because they show how 
thoroughly and from what long date the attack on the 
Verdun sector w./vs planned, what that attack was in- 
tended to do, and at what a cost it has failed. 
I-'our months bef(\jre the lirst shells of the great bom- 
bardment were deliV«^red against the Verdun lines, the 
tody of infantry whicvi, ^ygs; ^q deliver the shock was 
already carefully selectc*w ^nd prepared. The method is 
familiar from half a dozi^^ great examples in this war. 
A hammerhead of picked *ti|-oops separate from the rest 
are collected and hurled at on^oint to deliver the hammer- 
blow that shall break the Vpposing defensive cordon. 
The^main difference between ^^ preparation of Verdun 
and the other actions of the waiv.jj^ ^j^g greater expense in 
time and in men which were ^ntcmplated. It was as 
though the Germans had said y, themselves after the 
attempt to envelop the Kuss^ armies had failed, 
" We will stand or fall by one last great offensive against 
the Western front." At any rate, this picked corps of 
typically Prussian troops, tlie corps from Brandenburg, 
was chosen with others to form part of this great new 
agglomeration that was to strike the decisive blow. The 
iirst part of their preparation for this task was to take 
them away from the fighting line, to train and even feed 
them specially for a long period ; to refresh thent 
physically and morally in every way and produce by a 
l^atient attention to ever}' detail and ample expense of 
time the very maximmn effort when they should come 
to be launched against the French. 
Like the rest of those chosen for this great task the 
Brandenburgers of the 3rd Corps were taken to the interior 
just when the exhaustion of the imperfect effort against 
Russia was apparent— that is, in the last third of October 
191.S (i). 
For nearly four months the special training, the repose, 
the special feeding even of this corps and its fellows 
proceeded far from the lighting. 
At last, upon February 8th. it arrived upon the scene 
where it was to undertake the work to which all this 
preparation had been designed. 
The 3rd Brandenburg Corps stood on February 8th 
billeted in the country behind the hills of Ornes, that is 
in Gremilly, Azannes.Ville, and to the north of those 
\-illages. It formed the extreme eastern or left wing of 
the great body which was to be launched a few days later 
against the French lines to the North of Verdun, and on 
the 2 1st of February it took the shock. 
Let us review its strength and situation upon that day, 
Mon4ay the 21st of February, the opening day of the 
infantry work before Verdun. Only so can we under- 
stand what followed. 
The 3rd Corps had been given the task of driving the 
French covering lines in on a front of not quite tw o miles. 
Its strength in infantry actually present and designed 
to take part in the shock itself was no longer the full 
complement of 24,000 bayonets, but in the neighbourhood 
of 20,000. These 20,000 consisted in two divisions of 
about 10,000 each. These di\-isions were numbered the 
5th Division and the 6th Division. We know a good 
l^art of the composition of these divisions. They were 
formed of three regiments each, or the equivalent of three 
regiments, and we arc acquainted with the numbers of 
fonr of these and a portion of the 5th. The 6th Division, 
that on the extreme end of the "line to the east or left 
was composed of the 24th and 64th regiments, and of a 
body of Jaegers, while the 5th Division contained ^the 
52nd regiment and the 12th regiment with a third element, 
(i) It is possible that cert.iin olomcnts of the 3r(l corps were present 
not in the fighting but in rosi-rvc durinR the, Serbian Kxpnlition - 
hut the point is not certain. At am nitc, the grcnl bulk »f the f oios 
was at rest at that moment. 
