8 
LAND .V WA T E R 
June I, 1916 
3rd Corps even thus reconstituted no longer paraded any- 
thing like its old numbers. The companies had mustered 
just before the attack on Verdun about 200 strong. 
They appeared upon the roll call of the 7th with an 
average lessening — in spite of the new recruitment — of 
40 per cent. They were upon the average 120 strong. 
The change in tiic constitution of the corps and in its 
monil after the business of the wiek before appeared at 
once. A new attack was launched upon Wednesday, March 
8th ; the jrd Corps being given its old sector with a slight 
extension towards the South. It was thrown in, fully 
deployed from Vaux Village right round to Douaumont 
Village. It was no longer of the quality to do what its 
predecessors of the same name had done only a week 
before. The attack of the 8th failed. The attempt 
to renew it upon the qth was even more disastrous The 
losses (as is always the case with inferior troops that 
fail in an attack) were disastrously large and out of scale 
even with the fearful casualties of the lirst rtghting when 
tiic jrd Corps was still composed of its original elements, 
and still thought itself capable of victory upon its sector 
of the line. 
These last two days achieved the ruin of the unit. 
In the night of Thursday, March (jth. the jrd Corps was 
withdrawn from the action altogether and has never 
reappeared.* 
Here is surely a most striking piece of evidence, con- 
crete and detailed with regard to the nat\ire of the 
(ierman losses in front of Verdun. The nature of the 
original attempt, its failure, its expense, are all before 
us in this one example because we happen to have upon 
it more complete evidence than upon any of the other 
German elements used in the battle. 
Even had we not further knowledge, such c\idence 
would be conclusive as to the nature of the (lerman 
wastage here, and the wisdom of the French restriction to 
that mere defensive which has astonished Europe. 
We know the way in which the first week of the fight- 
ing ruined a body to which the most complete prepara- 
tion possible had been given at the expense of four months 
in time and of its absence during those four months from 
all use in the field. 
We know that 20,000 bayonets had been massed against 
never more than 3,000 yards and at last against less than 
2,000 yards. We know what in that first week it had lost 
in officers and sergeants. We know the necessity it was 
under of recniiting from the younger classes. We know 
the changed temper in which it re-entered the field. We 
know that after a bare two days' experiment in renewed 
fighting it was hopelessly shattered and had to be finally 
withdrawn. 
I rep)eat, did we only know this we should have an 
instructive and indeed decisive picture of the failure 
before Verdun. 
But the French have obtained one last piece of evidence 
which clinches all the rest and which, read in connection 
with all the rest, is overwhelming. 
The French authorities arc possessed of evidence as to 
the losses actually suffered by the corps during those 17 
days of which only 10 were days of action. 
it will be remembered that the jrd Corps had gone 
into action on the afternoon of Sunday February 21st, 
mustering about 20,000 bayonets. When its losses were 
privately established after "the last and bloody defeat of 
March qth, it was discovered that the grand total, in- 
cluding of course castialties among the new recniits 
thrown in, as well as among the original members of ti)e 
force, ii'as nctual/v larf^cr than its, onj^inal total strai'^tlt. 
22,000 men had been hit in that brief space of time. 
It is no wonder that the corps had ceased, in any 
mihtary sense, to exist. 
The Moral 
What is the lesson of that astonishing story ? 
1 must begin by begging my readers to permit me a 
rather dry piece of introduction in which much of what 
has been said before with regard to the 'nature of the 
• Since writing this I have seen U suggested abroad (but not con- 
firmed, and the suggestion not backed bv evidence) that the body of 
troops which appeared in the last few days' before Verdun and was made 
the subject of numerous executions after a faihire to attack, was the 
partially rci onstituled .^rd Corps brought back into the field after 
more than .; month- ■' <'■ I'pse. 
battle is necessarily repeated. But when I have again 
put forward those general principles as clearly as I can 
it will be easier to understand the immense significance of 
what happened to the Corps whose fortunes I have just 
described. 
Roughly speaking, the Battle of Verdun was won 
upon the olh of April. In other words it was clear after 
the great attack of that day that the intention of the 
offensive had failed and the intention of the defensive 
had succeeded. For the intention of the offensive 
was to break the Fjench front upon this centre ; while 
the object of the defensive was to use that intention 
as a means of making the enemy waste very many more 
in proportion to his remaining numbers than the French 
lost in the process. 
This much being clearly settled nearly two months 
ago, there succeeded ji phase which everyone studying 
the war spent a good deal of energy in discussing, but 
whicli no one could pretend at first fully to understand. 
This pliase has consisted in a steady persistence in 
attack after the I'rench defensive had manifestly made 
good and after the only clear strategical purpose open to 
the enemy had been irretricvabh' lost. 
This phase still continues and there seems no particular 
reason why it should not continue indefinitely : That is 
until the Allies make their offensive movement or until 
the enemy proposes to make a new attack somewhere 
else— with such forces as may still remain to him. 
So long as it continues the enemy loses far more men in 
proportion than the men in the French sector opposed to 
him. So long as it continues he allows the British to 
accumulate their man power, and so long as it continues 
he allows the Russians to make the fullest use of the 
open water in the North and of the long daylight for 
the pouring in of arms and ammunition. 
Seeing that all the merely numerical calculations are 
obviousi}- against the enemy and tliat the military problem 
regarded merely as a mechanical thing (that is a thing 
upon the map estimated by the number of bayonets, guns, 
power of munitionment," etc., and presupposing both 
parties equal in moral factors) is clearly solved at Verdun 
already against the Germans, it follows that the (ierman 
General Staff is persisting in attack for reasons other 
than the strictly calculable military reasons upcm which 
one usually expects strategical action to be conducted. 
I have indeed seen one and only one explanation 
modifying such a conclusion. It proceeds from the pen 
of a man whom all his readers have learnt to respect, 
who writes as a civihan and even as a professor, but whose 
writing has, especially in the last few weeks, deservedly 
attracted universal attention in Paris. .' If I read him 
aright this critic (who may be read in the Dcbals news- 
paper) conceives that the" enemy continues because the 
French command will not now let him leave off. In 
other words he is in the position of which one reads so 
often tactically in the old battles, " he is no longer free 
to break off tlie action." He is " accroche," " Hooked 
on." If he ceases to attack he will be at once counter- 
attacked under conditions which he cannot support. 
This, I think it is suggested, explains the continued 
waste of men upon his side. 
Much colour is lent to it by the tactics the French have 
been pursuing during all the last seven weeks. 
Roughly what happens is this : The enemy masses a 
vastl\' superior number of men to rush some sector of the 
French covering line, usually he fails. Once in so many 
times he succeeds. He gains some acres ; picks uj) not a 
few wounded men in the trenches he has rushed. He 
smashes up a certain number of trench mortars and 
machine guns. But all that at an expense quite out of 
proportion to the result. He pays in these attacks say 
four of his men to put one Frenchman out of action. 
But the French.. though not fighting for ground but for 
numbers, usually reply to such a success by a counter- 
attack in which they recover the ground or a part of it 
at an expense in their own men superior to the expense 
of the enemy. 
On the balance they are still heavily the gainers. But 
they would be much more heavily the gainers if they never 
counter-attacked at all upon a 'large scale. Why then 
do they deliberately sacrifice a certain fraction of their 
orce in thus counter-attacking ? The critic whom I 
have quoted would seem to believe that this is done in 
