34 
I \ \ ! ) .\ W A'T ]•: K 
juiic I, i(ji6 
disiuni fit lire. Shi|)s wire to bo Jiccrtcd (torn our llitt 
and su its strength reduced by the sucrilicc of sinj^le 
vessels to harry the trade routes. A battle cruiser let 
loose ujHjn the Atlantic would attract two or three to 
catch her. Then another would follow the lirst, and then 
a tliird, so that three or four (jcrman ships would reduce 
the British strength by nine or 12. Diversion would 
complete the work of attrition. Finally, the principle 
of division would make all things ready for the master 
.stroke. A couple of anny corps escorted by the older 
battleships would be sacrificed in an invading raid. The 
British fleet -already weakened —would have to send 
]X'rhaps half its units to avert the blow, then the un- 
divided German fleet would fall upon the hapless re- 
mainder. Skilfully laid minefields, daring destroyer 
attacks, cunning ambushes of submarines, all these 
devices would be brought into play, and the distracted, 
diverted, divided British fleet, with its harassed and 
impatient commanders would finally be crushed. 
It was a lovely programme, but many things were 
n«rded for its success. The chief of these were tiiat the 
(ierman fleet should be willing to risk everything for 
\ictory, and that the British commanders should be 
driven, by their own disappointed ambition and public 
unpatience, to a frenzy of insane imprudence. Of the 
(ierman wiliingiKss to lake risks we know only tiiis, that 
they liave taken mighty few so far. Of the j)rospect of 
our Admirals losing their heads, those who visited tlie 
fleet can form a fairly good opinion. Sir David Beatty 
may be what he looks, the personification of the eager 
fighting spirit, but it is an extraordinarily calm, level 
headed, self-contained incarnation at that. As for the 
Commander-in-Chief, he has long been the very type of 
imperturbabilit\'. Twenty months of the greatest respon- 
sibility and the greatest strain that any man in any part 
of the fields of warhas undergone, find him to-day without 
an added grey hair or an added wrinkle. Aifd as the 
Commander-in-Chief, so every officer and man seemed 
also. It really looked as if continuous "service, without 
a day's hoHday or a moment's remission of incessant 
duty, must certainly be the best prescription for perfect 
health and perfect nerves. When one reflects upon what 
all these men have been through, what sea cruising means 
to-day, the incredible standard of skill that is being main- 
tained, and the drills, practices and discipline that it 
calls for, the thing is a perfect wonder. Never has the 
fleet had less sickness ; never have so few oflicers broken 
down or become unfit. One thing is sure. Any German 
hopes that are built on the supposition that the fleet is 
war weary are doomed to disappointment. 
Peace and the President 
.\s has Hiot been unusual, the only outward ;mkI 
visible sign of naval war has, for the last fortniuht, 
Ix'en the under water attacks on shijjping. Lull details 
are not published of these, but it would appear that 
jiractically all the ships that have suffered in home 
waters have run upon mines, and all those sunk 
and damaged in the Mediterranean have suffered 
from submarine attack. In our issue of May 18th 
we showed the home casualties between April 20th 
and May I5tli inclusive. So far as positive infor- 
mation goes, therefore, there is no evidence that the 
( iermans have failed to keep the undertaking which they 
have given to the United States. We have few details 
as to tlie circumstances in which these attacks were madi'. 
We are simply not told if ships were visited and searched 
or provision made for the safety of the crews. But in 
certain instances no such provision could have been made. 
There is naturally, therefore, some curiosity to know 
whether Dr. Wilson will repeat in the case of Austria 
the action he has taken in the case of Germany. So far 
the Persia correspondence has not been followed up. 
Meanwhile due acknowledgment should be made of 
the fact that for the best part of a month, British and 
neutral ships in the neighbourhood of these islands have 
been free froiu the ravages of submarines. The emanci- 
pation — temporary though it may be — is one of real 
value, and in finally insisting upon a doctrine laid down in 
February, 1015. President Wilson has shown that where 
lie has the will he possesses the power to compel belli- 
gerents to observe a civilised code in war. There 
seems no reason why this same ix)wer should not enforce 
in the Mediterranean the standard of conduct which it 
has exacted in the t hannel and North Sea. Tardy though 
the diplomatic triumph of Washington has been, it is so 
real a triumph that we are left wondering why a capacity 
to enforce right action, which should have been obvious, 
was not exerted earlier and over a wider field. Even if 
America were to compel the .\ustrian limpire to yield 
as Germany has >aelded, the fact would still remain that 
secret mine laying on the trade routes is a gross and 
hideous violation of civilised practise, whose criminality 
has only been obscured by the greater villainy of the sub- 
marine campaign. There are real difticulties, no doubt, 
in taking the same action here as in the latter case. 
But it certainly seems odd that no action should be taken 
at all. The first American ship to suffer under the war, 
the Evelyn, perished by a mine. And the practice of 
using them in this way is not only inhuman, but unlike 
the attacks by submarine, forbidden not onlj' in implica- 
tion, but specifically by international agreement. In this 
matter Germany lias not only been shameless in action, 
-,ho has been defiantly shameless in speech. In the first 
of all the Berlin replies, America was warned as cynically 
IS the passengers in the Lusitania were warned, that the 
whole war area would be indiscriminately mined so that, 
aj)art altogether from submarines, no neutral shij) could 
enter it in safety. This threat in face of the standard set 
up both by precedent and the Hague Conventions might 
surely have given the American Government all the 
material necessary for taking a Ikm attitude. The 
weakest points in the American position in these matters 
are first, the immense lengtli of time between her first 
protest and the effective threat of action, secondly, the; 
limitation both of protest and action to submarine attacks 
only, and lastly confining the protest to attacks on ships 
carrying Americans. 
It is of course a larger weakness that the protest has 
never extended beyond Germany's sea crimes. And this 
is much emphasised by Mr. Wilson's somewhat unfortun- 
ate address to " the League for Enforcing Peace." I 
call it unfortunate, because in tliis address he encouraged 
Americans to think that their Government would have 
a natural right to a voice in the after war settlements, 
on the ground that whether they wished it or not, the 
States of .\merica were partners with the rest of the world 
in the grand affair of civilisation, and that all that affected 
liumanity affected them. He sketched out in terms that 
could hardly bs improved, the main outline of what the 
civilised nations should combine to maintain — the free- 
dom of weak nations to choose their allegiance ; their 
right of immunity from unprovoked a,;^gression ; the 
right of all peo])les to the free and orderiy use of the ocean 
highways. To have achieved such freedom of the seas 
for the whole worlds shipping is the justification and 
boast of a century of British sea supremacy. 
To vindicate the right of small peoples—like 
Serbia and Belgium— to choose their own allegiance ; to 
win back for them the lands of whicli they have be;'n 
despoiled ; to guarantee Flurcipe from any renewal of 
the present horror of unprovoked war — these are not 
things that the nations of the worid must combine, after 
the war is over to secure— it is precisely to secure them that 
the war continues. Had President Wilson been defining 
the object for which the Allies are now fighting, he could 
not have put their ])urpose into happier terms. 
If the American ideal of a civilised code of inter- 
national life is realised, it will be by the heroism of the 
Allied nations, by their financial sacrifices and by their 
industrial efforts. All thinking men would wish the 
world to .settle down to a new life once this war is over. 
And when it comes to organising this new life, the 
American help will be vital. But two things have to be 
done first. The military power of Pmssia has to be 
crushed, and those who crush it must decide what restitu- 
tion IS due, what guarantees of future safety are necessary. 
1 he problem in all its immediate aspects will be European, 
and one in which America would hardly have a title to 
co-operate, nor could co-op(>ratc usefully. Mr. Wilson's 
speech seems to imply something different. 
Arthur Pollen. 
