L A X D &• W A r !■ R 
Juno 8, 191G 
The Battle of Jutland 
By Arthur Pollen 
I.N the early afternoon of Wednesday. May 3i>t, a 
battle— «hirh, from the number and power of tlie 
>hi|)s engaged on eaeli side, no less than from the 
important and signal character of its results, must 
t*' regarded as by far the greatest event in the history of 
modern sea war — was begun between the battle cruisers 
of the British and tierman fleets. The action Wiis fought 
in niist\- weather in which contact between the two fleets 
was occasionally lost. The fighting, therefore, was 
necessarily of an intermittent character. More especially 
was this the case in its later phases. From a quarter 
to four until a quarter to five the engagement was between 
the battle cruisers pnly. By this time von Hipixr had 
been driven back on to the High Seas Kleet and the 
British fast squadron, reinforced by four Queen Elizabeths 
fought a holding action for the ne.xt hom^ and a quarter, 
drawing the (lemian High Seas Meet towards the forces 
that were apjiroaching imder Admiral Jellicoe. During 
this phase the British squadron was greatly outnumbered, 
of course, by the (iermans, but at 6 they were reinforced 
by Rear-Admiral Hood with three further battle cruisers, 
and at 6.20 by I^ear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot with 
four armoured cruisers of tlie Defence and Duke of Edin- 
burgh classes. 
Shortly after 6.30 Sir John Jellicoe brought the drand 
Fleet on to the field of battle, upon which von Sheer 
retreated incontinently. From seven o'clock until dark- 
ness fell, the bad light, the thick weather, and the dis- 
orderly retreat of the German squadron made anything 
Ijke' an artillery duel between the two fleets impossible. 
'Oie. ,( ierjuan destroyers did all in their power to hamper 
tjlie jHirsuit by the British Dreadnoughts, and when 
pursuit 'by the capital ships was made impossible by 
darki«?ss, the British destroyers were sent forward amongst 
the rierman. ships. . There then followed a night action, 
the pursuit being carried on by the British cruisers and 
destroyers until three on the following morning, when 
such of the (ierman Fleet as survived had reached the 
mine defences of their main base. The Commander-in- 
Chief then recalted his fleet, and at daylight made a 
systematic search of the scene of the previous day's 
engagement, but without finding any disabled ships. 
At noon the British force returnccl to its bases, refuelled, 
and 24 hours later was once more ready for action. 
Thus the Germans, who had entered the North Sea, 
according to their own account to engage and destroy 
the British ships that have been systematically 
sweeping the waters north and east of the Horn Reef, 
attained the first part of their objective only. They 
did succeed in engaging. But the consequences were 
<lisastrous. The plan of o\erwhelming the British fast 
cUvision with superior numbers was defeated by the 
masterly handling of the British force, combined with 
the effective use that force made of its artillery. So far 
from Sir David Beatty having been overwhelmed, he 
succeeded admirably in his main object, which was to 
draw the German Fleet into a position where Sir John 
Jellicoe s squadrons could engage it. 
The enemy was only saved from total destruction 
by mist, and by the approach of night. Not only did 
his whole plan miscarry, but he was driven ignomi- 
niously from the field, and with a very heavy loss 
in ships and men. The British Fleet suffered far 
less severely, and that the losses were not greater must 
be attributed very largely to the tactical skill with which 
they were handled. The three capital units that were 
lost owed their fate largely to bad luck — a matter which 
I will touch on later. Thus the net result of the first 
contact between the main sea forces of the two belli- 
gerents is that the field was left in thfc jxjssession of the 
British: that the (Ierman Fleet was driven to seek 
safety behind the defences of Heligoland ; and that it 
lies there now, having suffered the loss of many more 
ships than we have, so that its relative strength is dis- 
proportionately retluced. The Germari defeat, there- 
fore, has ccrtainlv been signal and has probably been 
final. It is diliuult to < onceive a combination of circum- 
stances wliich can tempt or drive them into action again, 
nor au\- condition^ of action likely to be more favourable 
th.in were thosL- of .May 3rst. 
The Story of the Battle. 
The King, in noble words, has thanked the victors and 
paid royal homage to the heroic dead. A week hence the 
slain will hv commemorated at St. Paul's. It is the only 
way in which the nation can join in the homage of their 
King. But need the honours to the living wait till the 
tribute to the great dead is paid ? 
My readers will natiually wish to have something like 
a reasoned and consecutive account of this tremendous 
event. The official conuuunicjues have been exceedingly 
meagre, but they have been supplemented by certain 
scmi-ofhcial accounts of the action and by stories from 
officers and men who took part in it. Much interesting 
information has come, too, from British and neutral 
fishermen, who appear to have carried on their occupations 
regardless of the fact that the fate of the German Navy 
and the command of the sea were being decided on their 
fishing grounds. The Germans, too, have issued both 
an official and semi-official summary of these events. I 
have attempted in the following pages to collate all the 
available information and to elucidate it by a series of 
sketch charts to illustrate the principal phases of the 
action. But I offer this narrative and these sketches 
with considerable reserve. Practically nothing is known 
of the movements of the main fleets after contact was 
made round about seven o'clock in the evening. Of the 
pursuit from then till darkijess all the accounts arc 
most confused. And of the final phase — the night attack 
by the British light craft on the flying German Fleet — 
nothing is known whatever, except that the Commander- 
in-Chief seems to have recalled all his units at about 
three in the morning of June ist. 'The narrative and 
sketches then, are offered for what they are worth, and 
no more can be claimed for them than that they contain 
nothing, as far as I am aware, inconsistent with reliable 
information to hand. Though the positions of the Fleets 
are, I beUeve, generally correct, the sketches arc not to 
scale. 
It is unnecessary to say t^iat they are incomplete. 
But on one point the reader must be warned. The 
sketches indicate only the general direction and character 
of each movement. In the phase, for instance, in which 
Sir David Beatty, weakened by the loss of Indefatigable 
and Queen Mary was reinforced by Admiral Evan 
Thomas's four Queen Elizabeths, I have indicated the 
courses of the British Vice-Admiral and of the German 
Fleet as straight and continuous. It is most improbable 
that this can represent the events of an hour and a 
quarter of fighting. So, too, with the rest. At many 
periods during the afternoon the shifting mists and fogs 
made it impossible for the British to see their opposite 
numbers in the German line, and again and again the 
gunlayers had no other mark to aim at but the flashes 
of their opponents' guns. These conditions not only 
made gunnery extremely difficult, they made it quite 
impossible for participants to keep any clear recollection of 
the courses steered. With this preface, I will proceed. 
(1) The Disposition of the Opposing Fleets. 
Tliis sketch indicates the approximate position at 
2.15 of the forces engaged in the course of the afternoon 
of Wednesday, May 31st. Sir David Beatty was at 
position I, steering south-east or east-south-east. He 
had with him four Lions, I ndef a ligablc and New Zealand. 
There were of course also some flotillas of destrovers ant 
probably more than one squadron of light cruisers. 
Throughout these sketches the small craft have not been 
indicated, but they must be assumed to accompany ail 
of the main so.uadrons. Slightly asteni and a little to 
