8 
L A N 1) cN: W A T E R 
June 8, 1916 
tactical skill ot the highest order in the face of great qdds, 
is obvious. But if skill is useless without the courage, 
so is the couraf;e dangerous without the skill. And it is 
primarily to skill that we owe last week's victory. 
As to the true explanation of the loss of the three ships 
that did blow up, the Admiralty, no doubt, will give this 
to the public if it is thought wise to do so. But there 
can be no harm in saying this. The e.vplanation of the 
sinking of eai h of these ships by a single luck\' shot — 
lioth they and practically all the other cruisers were hit 
repeatedly by shots that did no harm — is, in the first 
place, identical. Next, it does not lie in the fact that 
the ships were insufhciently armoured to keep out big 
shell. Nc.\t, the fatal explosion was not caused by a 
mine or by a torpedo. Lastly, it is in no sense due to 
any instability or any other dangerous characteristic 
of the propellants or explosives carried on board. I am 
free to confess that when I first heard of these ships 
going down as rapidly as they did, one of two conclusions 
seemed to be irresistible — either a shell had penetrated the 
lightly armoured sides and burst in the magazine, or a 
mine or torpedo had exploded immediately beneath it. 
But neither explanation is right. 
(3) Sir Robert Arbuthnot's self-sacrifice 
The manceuvrc in this action that is most likely to be 
criticised is that of Sir Robert .\rbuthnot's squadron of 
cruisers. The result seems to show that the risk taken 
was almost prohibitive. I say ", almost " because clearly 
if by the sacrifice of these ships cither the Germans 
were kept from flight for a sufficient period to enable 
the Grand Fleet to get up. or if the manceuvrc increased 
the speed of the Grand Fleet's advance by thwarting 
the effort to check it, then the improved prospect of the 
battle squadron's guns coming into action was worth 
a very heavf sacrifice indeed. The success or otherwise 
of the manotuvre does not, of course, in the least affect 
its tactical or strategical Tightness. The admiral in 
command has to play the cards in his hand. If there was 
a reasonable chance of his lead taking the trick, it was 
manifestly th^ right lead. That his sacrifice was not 
rewarded by such contact being obtained as could finish 
the business of the enemy is therefore irrelevant to 
appraising its merits. It remains one of the most glorious 
and inspiring memories of a historical day. 
(4) Destroyer Tactics 
The lay reader may be puzzled at finding that the cliicf 
role of the German destroyers was to attack the British 
ships by daylight, and that of the British destroyers to 
attack the Germans at night. The weapon of the des- 
troyer is the torpedo and the range of the torpedo in 
action is not absolutely so many yards, as is the range of 
the gun, for the reason that the time of its maximum run 
is so long that the target can travel an immense distance 
while the torpedo is on its journey. Thus, if a torpedo 
can go 10,000 yards at a uniform speed of 30 knots, and 
is fired at a squadron advancing at 20 knots, clearly 
the squadron will advance some 6,600 yards while the 
torpedo is travelling 10,000. 16,600 yards then is the 
effective range of the torpedo at the oncoming enemy. 
But if a torpedo is fired at a retreating enemy, the dis- 
tance that the enemy goes while the torpedo is travelling 
must now be deducted from the torpedo's range. The 
;50-knot torpedo then would not hit a 20-knot battleship 
retreating along the line of its passage, if the initial range 
were greater than 3.300 yards. The retreating force, 
theri, is armed with a 16,600 yard weapon and the pursu- 
ing force only with a 3,300 yard weapon. But at 3,300 
yards in daylight the destroyers have very little chance 
against the battleships's guns. In a daylight pursuit, 
therefore, the destroyer is of far less value than in a night 
.attack. But its defensive value in a daylight retreat is at 
its maximum. 
THE COST OF VICTORY 
The losses suffered in this battle have naturallv been 
exceedingly heavy. The British navy has lost. Queen 
Mary, Invincible and Indefatigable, battle cruisers, 
Defence. Black Prime and Warrior, armoured cruisers, 
and eight destroyers. Between 5,000 and 6,000 officers 
and men have perished, a loss that it is difficult to face 
with equanimity. But heavy as this loss is, the enemy 
loss has been far heavier. They have lost two Dread- 
nought battleships of the first class, and several others 
have been so battered as clearly to be untit for work for 
many months to come. Two of their latest battle cruisers 
are gone also, and a third is either lost or disabled. Since 
the Iseginning of the war Germany has produced a new 
type of light cruiser armed with six-inch guns. Two of 
tiiese have been sunk and two light cruisers of an earlier 
tj'pe as well. Six destroyers and a submarine complete 
what has been officially announced. In the fleet, how- 
ever, the opinion seems to be universally held, that the 
German losses were far heavier than this. But it neces- 
sarily happens that in an action fought over 10,000 
square miles of sea, largely at night and entirely 
in misty and foggy weather, there should be wide 
uncertainty as to the ultimate fate of many ships 
crippled and apparently disabled. It will be surprising, 
however, if serious additions are not made to the list we 
know. Von Scheer did not probably have under his 
command all the Dreadnought ships completed, but 
whether that total before the battle was 16 or 20, a 
reduction by two is the loss of a very serious percentage. 
The British Dreadnought fieet remains in the meantime 
what it was before. Of battle cruisers we have fcst three 
out of 10, the Germans two out of six, and we have none 
disabled and they certainly one. The loss of Sir Robert 
Arbuthnot's armoured cruisers is undoubtedly a heavy 
one, but their military role is far less obvious and im- 
portant than it was when they were first designed in pre- 
Dreadnought days. Certainly the loss of four light 
cruisers by Germany is a greater handicap to the prospec- 
tive employment of the enemy's fleet on any future occa- 
sion. F'or Germany's cruiser losses have been serious 
from the beginning, and her margin now must be an 
extremely narrow one. The most difficult point to 
determine is the extent of Gennany's destroyer losses. 
Six are claimed for certain, but the total is likely to 
exceed that very greatly. 
The Worth of Victory 
It should be borne in mind, however, that though the 
actual losses of the enemy are far heavier than ours, our 
victory would have been worth winning Xvith the tale 
of lasses reversed. In the first week of war Gcrmanv 
was deprived of the whole of her overseas trade, and 
before the end of the second week of war. Great Britain 
was using the sea as the high road of her military com- 
munications. In the 22 months of war the (rfrman 
navy has attempted no stroke, cither to restore her trade 
or to interfere with our reinforcing and supplying the 
army that must pro\'e decisive in the continental war. 
Never before has a Power possessing a great fleet waited 
inertly for so long in face of so heavy a loss as our sea 
blockade is causing, or in face of so dreadful a military 
menace as our army in France holds out. Precisely what, 
after so long a patience, brought the German navy out on 
May 31st is uncertain. Its professed object, as we ha\-e 
seen, was to attack the squadrons that had been in the 
habit of cruising off the Danish coasts. But would such 
an enterprise have been ventured on had there not been 
some impulse from witliin the country, some fading 
confidence in the higher command, some despair at the 
stringency of the grip on Germany's food supply, that 
made it absolutely necessary to restore the dynasty's 
prestige and put heart into "a despairing people ? 'Fhe 
very promptitude with which this great defeat has been 
held up as a great victory seems to lend colour to the 
idea that the German navy was to sacrifice itself gallantly, 
After Quinncy's, Mr. Horace Annesley Vaclicll's new book. 
The Triumph of Tim (John Murray, 6s. net) is in the nature 
of a disappointment, for Tim is rather an ineftectual person. 
His varied adventures- for the hook is no less tlian his life 
story— make good reading ; out in California, on board shi]), 
and in the rest of the phases through which Mr. Vachell 
conducts him, he holds the reader, for the adventures are 
worth reading, but all the time we feel that Tim himself is 
not as good as his author tliiuks. The vicar, too, who has 
some share in the making of Tim's life, is mildly exasperating, 
and the only character who merits whole-hearted admiration 
is Daffy, the heroine. Mr. Vachell's skill saves. the bo^k 
from mediocrity, but it is not up to his usual levcL 
