June 8, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
13 
far it is political and how far strategic, has been more 
discussed than any other matter in the war — and has 
been less decided. 
He may be merely playing for time. But whatever 
his thesis may be, it is clear that the whole French thesis 
in this struggle reposes upon the apparently elementary 
truth that the offensive at Verdun is far more expensive 
than the defensi\-c. 
As a general truth this has been affirmed over and 
over again in these columns. It is upon the face of it 
impossible to believe the opposite, if only from the fact 
that the French have refused a^ counter-offensive of any 
magnitude during the whole business, while the nature of ■ 
modern defence makes the losses of the offensive, ■ 
save those of a very rapid and successful offensive or of 
one where the losses are quickly cut, necessarily higher 
than the losses suffered by its opponent. 
Nevertheless, the German authorities instruct their 
press to repeat continually the legend that the German 
losses are actually inferior to the French upon this sector. 
One inspired writer said half ! And whatever Germany 
says about her losses or any other matter is religiously be- 
lieved by a certain section of opinion here. It may be 
of service, therefore, if we go into some detail on the 
matter, though I have already dealt with the rough proof 
more than once. 
Those who are on the offensive in such work as that 
which is going on at Verdun act as follows : 
First they deliver a very great number of large calibre 
high explosive shell over the advanced trenches they are 
about to attack, delivering at the same time a certain 
proportion of shell upon points behind the lines : Points 
where they believe, or have discovered, a battery to be 
established : Points through which men and supplies 
must pass to reach the advanced trenches. 
Under this intensive bombardment the advanced 
trenches are virtually obliterated in a certain number of 
hours. A few machine gun shelters will remain and 
possibly a few sections of trench which men can still 
hold. But the design and the effect of this continued 
bombardment is to obliterate the defensive quality of the 
first line. 
Now it is never possible to be certain of the extent to 
whiclt your initial bombardment has really destroj'ed 
your opponent's defensive powei-s in these first lines.- 
You do not know in what strength he was holding them 
to begin with, nor exactly where his principal fire-power 
may lie when you come to advance, nor even what de- 
fensive elements may have escaped the effects of the 
bombardment. But, at any rate, during this preliminary 
stage the attacking party is suffering no losses in direct 
connection with attack ; the defending party is certainly 
suffering some losses and may be suffering heavy losses. 
Meanwhile, the defenders are also at w'ork busily de- 
livering shell against places where they believe the 
attackers' batteries to be situated, upon his communication 
trenches, and other points through which men and supplies 
must pass and, of course, upon the enemy's own advance 
trenches from which the attack will be launched. The 
defence cannot be quite certain of the line from which 
the assault will spring. It is further handicapped by the 
fact that the offensive concentrates fire upon points 
chosen by itself, and a counter-concentration is not possible 
at short notice and in equal strength. 
From all these causes it is reasonable to suppose, and 
it is in fact the case, as many months of experience have 
taught all the belligerents, that during this preliminary 
phase the losses of the defensive are superior to the 
losses on the side which is about to attack. 
How much superior depends upon a hundred local 
accidents. But the capital point to seize in the nature 
of the losses suffered during this first phase is that, short 
of excessively bad management or bad quality of troops 
which cannot hold a line save very densely, or the effect 
of surprise, the main losses of neither party are suffered 
during this preliminary phase. 
It is in the second phase that the really heavy losses 
appear. 
This second phase opens in one of two ways : Either 
a whole large body leaps out of the trenches to the attack 
and attempts to rush the battered trenches of the defence 
immediately before it or — what is much the commonest 
plan now in front of Verdun — comparatively small bodies 
arc sent out as a sort of skirmishers to find out what 
resisting, power remains to the battered lines. In the 
second case, if the skirmishers find that the defensive 
power is greater than was expected no main attack is 
launched ; while if it is found, or thought to be found (for, 
of course, the defensive attempts to deceive) sufficiently 
weakened by the bombardment, then the main attack 
follows in a great swarm, sometimes as many as five men 
being allowed in it (exclusive of all reserves) to the yard 
run. 
Here enters a point of considerable moment in this 
discussion. What is the enemy's formation in attack 
before Verdun ? Some people speak as though he always 
came on in very close formation on which the play of 
fiel-d-gun, rifle and machine-gun fire is murderous. Others 
aflirni that he has abandoned tliis old tradition of his 
and attacks in open order. 
The discrepancy in evidence is simply due to the fact 
that the enejny uses both methods ; one witness has 
experienced the one,' another the other. 
For instance, the great attack on the eastern slope of 
Mort Homme two months ago, the Silesians were disposed 
in successive waves of assault. But in the attack before 
Cumieres the other day, there were dense columns ; 
columns as dense as the old formations. Whatever 
the reason for such a murderous plan, that was the fact 
as reported by actual witnesses in the French press. 
The moment these considerable bodies appear they are 
a target not only for the remaining advanced rifle and 
machine gun fire of the defensive Hne, but for the field guns 
of the defence, which have, of course, studied every yard 
of the ground over which the attack must pass. 
It h in this phase that the heavy casualties occur. And 
during this phase one of two things must happen. Either 
the great main effort of the attack, even if it be repeated 
over and over again, fails to get home or, at last, some of 
its elements do get into the battered trenches of the 
defence and occupy them. If there is great momentum in 
the attack they even push on well beyond towards the 
second line. In the first case, the losses of the attack are 
overwhelmingly greater than those of the defence. They 
may be ten, twelye or twenty times greater. There is 
no comparison between them. 
In the second case, the attack must also normally lose 
much more than the defensive, but not so enormously 
more. For there will be a considerable amount of hand- 
to-hand fighting in which many of the defenders will be 
killed and wounded, and all those over whom the attack 
passes and who survive will fall into the hands of the 
attackers as prisoners, and will be permanently lost to 
their own side. 
So far we have the mathematical certainty that the 
offensive will lose more than the defensive. It will lose 
rather less during the preliminary phase, but during 
the second phase, which is the only critical one in the way 
of losses, it will lose enormously more if the attack fails, 
and considerably more even when it succeeds. The only 
exception to such an obvious truth is to be found wheia 
the quality of the defence is so poor that it has to be 
densely packed to meet attack at all, and breaks down 
Sovtes Sbakespeaviattae 
By SIR SIDNEY LEE 
To the British Navy. 
T/ie grace of Heaven 
Before, behind ihec, and on every hand 
Emvheel thee round ! 
Otbcllo n., i.. 8S-7. 
The Braggart Enemy . 
The man thai once did sell the lions skin 
While the beast lived, was killed iviih 
hunting him. 
Henry V., IV., iii., 93-4. 
The German Fleet off Jutland. 
They that of late wc^-e daring with 
their scoff's 
Areglad and fain by flight to save themselves. 
1 Henry VI., III., ii., 113 4. 
