T| 
L A N 1) 
\\' A T K R 
June 8, jqiG 
tlio moment the attack approaches : a modifuation of 
thus kind does not ap])Iy, ol cours«\ to what iV f,'oin^' on 
before Wrdun where tlio defence is skilful and stubborn. 
It will be clear from the above that a verv considerable 
element in the deciding of what extra losses the attack 
snlTers is the ])ro|Mirtion of successful to nnsuccessfn! 
assaults. We can tabulate pretty accurately this pnv 
portion in front of Wnlnn. Coimtinf,' only the main 
attacks deli\ered by iarne bodies of, say, at least a brigade. 
i: soems to work out rouj,'hly at about hve to one. To 
one occasion in which ymi ha^'e the successful rushing of 
the advanced elements, such a>< was accon>plished by a 
couple of (iennan Divisions between the Mort Honuue 
and Cumieres the other day, you have, I think, about 
live exactly similar ixcasions in which a main a>sault rs 
broken. And the exjK'nso of these is further added to 
by the fact that the attempt is usually made up of several 
successive failures in the same day. 
If the fighting round Wrdun consisted simpl\- in re- 
jn-ated German attacks usually failing but siicceeding 
once in, siay. about five times," and therefore f^radually 
eating into the French lines without reactions against 
such an advance, the tierman losses would be immensely 
higher than the French. They might be fourfold. 
Bui there is another category of fighting here as wc 
all know. The defenders launch counter-attacks, some- 
times recapturing, sometimes faihng to recapture certain 
sections of their line which they think critical. 
Whenever action of this kind is uiideti;ikrii tiie roles 
arc reversed. 
The force whicii i> upon the whole im im defensive 
is for the moment attacking and loses proportionately. 
If these counter-attacks were as numerous, and carried 
out with as large forces as the main attacks of the offensive 
we might expect the losses on both sides (o be equal, 
but we know as a matter of fact, that these counter- 
attacks are nothing of the kind. They are always 
hx-al, delivered over a comparatively small front, arid, 
what is very important, <chai a point taken in a counlcr- 
ttltack is abandoned it is abandoned as a rule b.-fore the 
heaviest pressure of the reltirninii enemy, has been jell. In 
such cases the territory yieldecl is innnediately subjected 
to the fen d'ccrascment, wliicii can always be delivered 
upon an enemy mass, the position of which is exactly 
known. It is a tactic which cannot be employed of course 
when territory is lost in tlie confusion of ari assault, but 
it can be employed, and is employed, when the retirement 
is delibcTate. "It wa^ emj^loyed, for instance, at 
Donaumont fort on the 23th or 26th of May, and it was 
employed two days ago \ipon the north fosse of Vaux. 
It is a tactic possible only to a defensive which intends 
to remain a defensive, fot it is a tactic only open to a 
force which is willing to yield ground on condition of 
making an enemy pay the price for that ground. 
1 have no more certain information on the matter than 
any reader of this. I receive private -letters dealing with 
\'erdun now and then and have heard information second- 
lumd,. I read the accounts in the foreign press- often 
by eye-witnesses — and I have followed, of coursi-, tlie judg- 
mt'Uts of the chief writers upon the Continent. I do not 
juetend, therefore, to anything but an estimate or a guess, 
but 1 will suggest that even in the present stage of the 
struggle, with the French nearly stationary and the great 
attacks following each other at considerable intervals, 
there is a disproportion between the two sets of losses of 
more than two to one. 
The Southern Russian Offensive 
Tt is unfortunate for the ]nnposes of this article that 
the offensive which the K\issiajis have undertaken against 
the .\ustrian lines south of the Priiiet, or rather the news 
of it, .should only be learned in London just as these 
lines are written. No details enabling us to analyse the 
great movement or to conjecture its probable dexelop- 
ment, or even its main objective are jet available. 
We are told (by the Austrians) that the heaviest fighting 
has taken place a little south of the centre of the line- 
but there is nothing sufficiently definite to guide us to 
even the most general statement at the moment of writ- 
ing. We can only await further developments. The 
facts as contained in the two communiques, Austrian 
and Russian, are as follows : 
After a preliminary bombardment, undertaken ap- 
parently upon all sections of the southern eastern front 
from the I'ripct to the frontiers of Roumania, the Russian 
infantry attacked last Sunday upon sectors covering the 
whole line and had before reening made 13,000 prisoners, 
and had also captured a certain (unnamed) number of 
The inteiisixc bombardment was proceeding as the 
infantry advanced. The main weight of the pressiire 
was u\yim the watershed between the Styr river and the 
Pruth, with especiallx' -"^ '"•■ li'-htiiig in the neighbour- 
hood of Okna. 
Till- I'lUssian local au\aui c wa.- most j)ronounced im- 
mediately to the north-west of Tarnopol, and appears 
to have o\erla|)|)ed upon cither side the specially- 
strengthened position of I\uzpow, to the west of the 
latter. Strong attacks were also delivered in the region 
north-west of Dubno. The whole affair is apparently 
onl\' beginning, and at the moment of writing ( fuesday 
evening) no details arc available upon which to pass any- 
considered judgment. 
The German Glass '17 
Onr of tlie principal objects of speculation with tlie 
Allied command at this moment is the exact time when 
tiie (icrman class iqij (the last of the contingents called 
up) will be compellerl to appear in the field. 
I have recci\ed not a few accounts from private sources, 
some of them detailed accounts, of the presence of the 1917 
class already in the field. But I have seen no evidence 
that give these isolated instances the value of a general 
polic\-. I have seen no evidence, official or even private, 
of any considerable numbers of the 1917 class yet present 
in the fighting units. 
The date generally given as the latest upon which tli. 
Kji; class will appear in considerable force — that is, the 
latest date to which the Germans can ]>ostpone calling 
upon these lads for the maintenance of their effectives- 
would seem to be the end of the present month. That, at 
least is the general opinion upon the Continent, both 
among the Allied students of the war and neutral students. 
I presume that the fixing of this date as the last moment 
of entry for the class is based upon intelligence from 
within Gerniany. Common sense would lead one to 
belie\e that it could not be postponed \ ery nuich later. 
.Aluch of Class I()i7 has already been kept back later than 
the other young German contingents. It was first called 
up a little before the corresponding French class, because 
the German effectives arc .somewhat more exhausted in 
proportion than are the French. The French began 
calling up their 1917 elass in January. The Germans 
began calling their 1(117 ^'l^^s in Deceniber. The incor- 
poration went on through January, and the tail end of 
It lasted through February. But "even though the Ger 
mans c(mtinued their incorporation of the i()i7 class uj) 
to the \ery end of February that would still give a full 
four months between the date of the incorporation of the 
last of these and the end of the present month, and six 
months since the first were called. Four months is the 
average length of time after which the (iermans think it 
safe to put newly trained men into the lield. 
There is, by the way, interesting evidence also to hand 
of the use of iqi6 before this class was put into the 
furnace of \'erdun. Some prisoners taken from tlii> 
class were found to have already seen service in Serbia. 
Presumably onl>- after the occupation of Serbia was com- 
pleted, and used only for policing and garrison duties. 
H. BKii.Oi 
Aulcs on Slnvl l-i-li!u!!^. a sixpennv manual issued by 
Messrs. horsier (.room and Co.. is tlic first book of anv kind 
that has appeared devoted to tliis subject, and, in viewof tli-.- 
pn.bable diange that will come over the Flanders front with 
the end of the trench warfare, it is one that recommend^ 
Itself for study by militarv men. Ilinls for Flioht Sub- 
J.ieulcnanis (is. net), publislud bv the same firm, is a booklet 
of common-sense advice for the" Roval Naval Air Service. 
written by a ftiglit lieutenant, and containing many useful 
tips. Other recent publications b\' this firni are Gunnery 
iormiihe Simplified lis. net), by Lieut. L. N. Rawes, K.A., 
and Musltetrv (M. net), the latter a verv -handv little intro- 
cfucton- study of the mechanism of the rifle, care of arms, 
and the meanmg of " musketry " as the term is at present 
applied to the use of tl.e ,in<- :M,d irainin" iturein 
