June 8, 1 916 
LAND 5: WATER 
Germany's Mistakes 
1,— Strategical 
By Colonel Feyler 
17 
[Colonel Fcxlcr. Su'ikci'laiid'x distinguished military 
critic tchose itritings arc follo'iccd carefully by students 
of the li'or throughout Europe, contributes to Land & 
Water three articles on " Germany's Mistakes." The 
first, which appears below, deals unth her strategical 
blunders. Next xveek Colonel h'eyler ivill write on her 
political and ajterwards on her moral mistakes.] 
IT is only when the full consequences become mani- 
fest that one can obtain a clear insight into the errors 
committed by a staff or by an army at the beginning 
of an action. In the future, when Germany has been 
vanquished, it will be of absorbing interest to examine the 
mistakes which will have led to the downfall of so power- 
ful and so formidably prepared an Empire. From a 
military point of view, such mistakes can be classified 
imder four heads, to wit, tactical, strategical, political and 
moral, each succeeding variety more grave than the 
other. 
Tactical mistakes are those committed on the actual 
battlefield by subordinate commanders, or even by 
private soldiers ; strategical mistakes are those of a 
General Staff in the preparation of military operations 
and in the orders issued for the purpose of ranging the 
armies in order of battle ; political mistakes may be 
made by a belligerent Government in its resolutions re- 
garding the declaration and the conduct of war, and 
may have effect on mutual relations with other States, 
and lastly, moral mistakes are such as, whether com- 
mitted by Government, General Staff, commander or 
soldier, outrage individual or national consciences. 
All these mistakes may be repaired, but under very 
unequal conditions, for the reparation needs time in pro- 
portion to the gravity of the mistake. 
Tactical Blunders 
Tactical mistakes can usually be corrected immediately 
or at no long interval after their commission. On many 
occasions a failure at one point of the held is balanced 
by a success at another. Such mistakes are so common that 
the victor of an action is not he who fails to commit any, 
but he who succee'ds in committing the least. Strategical 
mistakes are of deeper import, for a single one may spoil 
a whole battle or even a whole campaign. Woltke wrote 
that a strategical error at the beginning of a war might 
compromise the whole course thereof. 
Still more serious are political mistakes, for they may 
put in danger the very existence of the State. For in- 
stance, Napoleon III. foresaw a struggle with Prussia ; 
nevertheless he allowed her to crush Austria alone at 
Sadowa, thus imperilling the interests of France and 
necessitating a new war, at much greater risk, in an effort 
to counterbalance the effects of the first. Unfortunately, 
this new war merely aggravated conditions, and forty- 
four years were to elapse before another attempt was made 
to settle the same question. And lastly again, moral 
mistakes may have to be paid for by the shame and 
humiliation of countless generations. 
Which of these faults can be laid at Germany's door ? 
If appearances do not mislead, all ! This is why Ger- 
many's position in the war seems very grave to all who 
can see further, so to speak, than the mouth of a 420mm. 
liowitzer. There is nothing to prevent the Germans 
winning yet more victories, for the last word is not spoken 
until the last gun has ceased fire. Napoleon saved 
himself in infinitely more critical situations ; but then 
he was Napoleon — and even he eventually succumbed. 
It is too early to discuss the tactical mistakes ; these 
are rarely decisive, and the Allies ha\-e probably com- 
mitted just as many as the Germans. Such errors can 
only be of general interest if their nature and frequency 
betray a mistaken general method. Such a study would 
need an exhaustive examination of numerous actions. 
Strategical errors make themselves more immediately 
manifest. We can already ask ourselves whether the Ger- 
mans did not commit a first mistake in 1914 in passing 
to the left bank of the Belgian ^Meuse, and a second, even 
more apparent, in sweeping blindly forward between 
Paris and Verdun. ,We may further ask whether the 
first mistake was not due to too blind an adherence to 
Moltke's strategy, nor the second to ton literal an applica- 
tion of the tactical theory of a pursuit which is to make 
the victory doubly complete. Lastly we may ask whether 
these two errors do not reveal a state of o\'er-confidence 
reinforced by under-estimation of the enemy. These can, 
however, be but passing questions, for, in strategy as in 
tactics, it is the subsequent facts -which lead to a definite 
conclusion, and we may not simply say " It was a mistake 
to act thus " without seeking to laj' down the correct, 
or at least a less objectionable, course of action. 
With this reservation then (for a detailed examination 
is impossible until the end of the wa*) we can safely state 
that the two mo\'ements above quoted have c\;ery appear- 
ance of being strategical mistakes. 
Crossing the Meuse 
The disadvantages consequent upon the crossing to the 
left bank of the Meuse have shown themselves to be the 
following : A great loss of time, whi'ch postponed the 
moment of the general attack just when one of the essen- 
tial conditions was that this attack should be immediate 
and overwhelming. To keep in alignment with the left 
wing in Alsace, the right wing had to march for several 
days which would have been better employed had it 
kept to the right bank of the river. This loss of time was 
aggravated by a resistance superior to the expectations 
of the German Staff, who had imder-estimated the 
value of the obstacles to be overcome, thus leading to a 
further delay in the general attack and the loss of the 
strategic element of surprise which was the fundamental 
point of the operation. A second disadvantage of this 
movement between Meuse and Scheldt, was the extension 
of front thereby involved, necessitating a large increase 
in the forces engaged, whereas the plan. of a campaign 
against France and Russia simultaneously advised strict 
economy. Proportionate reserves, too, had to be con- 
•stituted. A third disadvantage was in the extension of 
lines of communication in an enemy country, which 
immobilised considerable forces. 
The consequences of the second strategical mistake, 
namely the blind rush between Paris and Verdun, were 
even more immediately conspicuous, and the German 
armies were forced to beat a hasty retreat out of the trap 
into which they had rushed. Quite truthfully, this was 
described as a " concentration to the rear " and quite 
inaccurately as a " voluntary retirement." No one will 
easily believe that the German Staff led their advancing 
columns forward till their heads almost reached the 
Seine with the intention of withdrawing them bC3'ond 
the Marne only forty-eight hours later. They retired 
because they were taken in flank, and they were taken ill 
flank because their higher command, precisely as in Bel- 
gium, failed to appreciate the true value of the obstacles 
to be overcome. 
Since that moment the second strategical mistake has 
not ceased to manifest its consequences. The weaker 
the German forces grow, the more hampering is the effect 
of the great extension of their lines. Moltke's saying, 
that such a mistake may compromise the whole course 
of a war, threatens to find confirmation. 
Camp Craft, by Warren H. Miller, editor of the American 
journal, Field and Stream (B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 7s. 6d. net.) 
is a practical work devoted to camp lore, with an introduction 
by Ernest Tliompson Seton. Cooking, shooting, tents, camp 
comforts and organisation, are'a few of the subjects treated, 
and, though camping is considered from the American point 
of view, lovers of the open air in this country will find the 
work a mine of information on the practical side of cnmping 
out, and the nearest way to comfort and the perfect health 
that comes of life in the open. 
