June 15, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
has been upon a comparatively narrow Iront, a thing made 
possible by the fact that the ItaHan flanks in, moun- 
tainous country could not rapidly .support the centre.. 
Similarly, the attack on the Verdun sector was made 
over the narrow front of less than eight miles, the flooded 
Meuse preventing the French left flank from supporting 
its centre easily, and the French line turning a sharp 
corner on its right — so that if the short front between the 
flooded Meuse and this corner were broken, the whole 
sector would go. 
Another set of differences lay in the different con- 
ceptions of various belligerent commands with regard to 
the best way of holding the advance portion of the 
defensive line. In general the Germans have believed 
in holding this densely. True, they have put very few 
men in the very first trenches, but their first line as a 
whole they have always held strongly, with the result 
that if the offensive got in, the enemy lost a comparatively 
large number of prisoners in the very first phase of the 
attack. The Allies, on the other hand have, upon the 
whole, and especially the French, pieferred to put forward 
bodies as small as they thought safe for what may be 
called " covering lines." Thus, the losses in prisoners 
during the first shock of Verdun were only one-third of 
the corresponding losses in the same period of time during 
the first shock in Champagne. Finally, the following 
development has occurred differentiating the later 
offensives from the earlier. 
The first great offensive on the Dunajetz broke through 
the Russian front completeh^ and provoked an immediate 
retreat. The Allies in the West considering this lesson, 
made a similar attack with one blow in the September 
following. They failed to get through, and their failure 
was a subject of an elaborate memorandum upon the part 
of the German observers of the action, which may be 
seen quoted in America. It was to the effect that 
these offensives in the future had better be conducted 
by progressive moves : That there should not be one 
attempt with all one's forces to break through since 
the second line would almost certainly hold one , up, 
at least against equally prepared opponents. There 
should be a mastering of one advance belt, then the bring- 
ing up of the guns and further ammunition for the master- 
ing of a second belt, and so forth. It was upon this 
method that the enemy acted in the Verdun sector, and 
it is upon this method that he is acting in the Trentino. 
When we compare the various measures of success of 
each of these offensives, we find the following table : 
(i) The first of these great offensives, that of the 
Austro-Germans against the Dunajetz in the last days of 
April and the first days of May 1915, completely broke 
the front opposed to it and provoked an immediate 
retreat of the Russians. This retreat was precipitate 
until the line of the San was reached. There the Russians 
rallied about twelve days after the opening of the great 
action and from that moment, from just before the 
middle of May 1915, to the exhaustion of the enemy's 
effort at the end of September, effort after effort to en- 
velop any considerable portion of the Russian Army 
failed. There were half a dozen such efforts, the last 
and greatest being that round the saUent of Vilna. We 
may say, therefore, of this first of the great offensives, 
that it was successful in its immediate object of breaking 
the defensive front opposed to it, but failed in its ultimate 
object of enveloping a portion of the broken line and thus 
achieving a decision. 
(2) The second of the great offensives, that of the Allies 
in the West was less successful. As it was rapidly halted 
by its commanders, as it " cut its losses," to use the verna- 
cular phrase, the losses inflicted upon the enemy were 
very high in proportion to the expenditure of effort by the 
Allies, but it did no more than occupy the first line of the 
sector attacked. It failed to carry the second line and 
to break through. The immediate object, therefore, was 
not reached and the ultimate object was not even 
approached. 
(3) The third great example, the offensive against the 
sector of Verdun, was even less successful because the 
first line which the Germans carried, just as the Allies 
had carried the (ierman first line five months before, was 
hinly held, so that the losses of the defence were not 
heavy in proportion to the expense of the attack, while 
the determination of the Germans to continue the attempt 
right on to the qth of April, by which date the defensive 
had finally won the Battle of Verdun, made of this third 
offensive a really disastrous failure. By that date the 
losses of the offensive were quite out of proportion to 
the' results originally obtained and were already far more 
than double the Allied losses in the offensive of tive months 
before. What has gone on in front of the sector of Verdun 
since that date, the repeated assaults against the French 
lines, has no longer been any idea on the part of the Ger- 
mans of breaking the French line (a thing they now know 
to be impossible in this particular case), but only of an 
effect partly moral, partly political and partly of usury 
in men and munitions, by a combination of all of which 
they hope to render the Allies more willing to discuss 
peace. 
(4) The fourth of the great offensives, that on the 
Trentino, is still in progress, but so far it would seem to 
move upon a model not unlike that of Verdun, and">so far 
it has quite failed in the first or immediate object of break- 
ing a front and has therefore not approached the ultimate 
object of enveloping a portion of the enemy's forces and 
thus attaining a decision. 
What of the fifth ? \\'hat of this last great offensive, 
the attack of the Russians upon the Austrian defensive 
line in Volhynia and Galicia ? That experiment is also 
in progress. With regard to it also we cannot yet affirm 
that it has attained its immediate object^hough it 
seems probable ; still less can we affirm that it is approaich- 
ing its ultimate object. We cannot say at the moment; 
of writing that the defensive line is broken so as to bes 
compelled to a general, immediate and precipitate re- 
treat ; still less can we say the line will be incapable of; 
re-forming as it retreats, that a permanent gap will opea 
in it through which the Russians can advance, and thu=i 
envelop the southern portion of the Austrian line. If tho 
Russians can do this they will have obtained a decision. 
But such a result has not yet been obtained, and we have 
not the elements before us to judge as-yet the probability 
of its attainment. 
What we can do is to examine in the light of what has 
just been described with regard to the general character 
of these great offensives, the extent and the nature of the 
Russian success at the moment of writing. 
The line with which we are concerned should, if we are 
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