8 
t A N D eS: WATER 
June 15, 1916 
Buczacz upon the Lower Stry*pa, and exactly the same 
kind of action by him north-west of Tarnopol. 
The New Line 
Putting all this together in order to draw our con- 
chisions from it. the- first thing we niu>t ostabUsh is the new 
Russian hne as it stood on tlie evening of Sunday .last 
(-since which no official news has reached us at the moment 
of writing this), that is after exactly eight days of lighting. 
We have that line now nmning as follows : 
It nins just west of the Styr instead of just east of it 
from Rafalovka down to Kolki. At Kolki tliere is a point 
where it recrosses the Styr to its old position on the western 
bank, but inunediately above Kolki it passes to the 
western bank again and well in front of it. thoroughly 
holding the important bridge-head at Rojichtche. thence 
it proceeds west of Lutsk to Demidovka. South of this 
last point it was evidently still in rapid movement at the 
moment the despatch was sent and we have no clear trace 
of it. but we find it again in the hilly country about 12 
miles north of Tarnopol, not far from the station of 
je/.ierna on the railway from Tarnopol tf) Leiiiberg. 
South of this it f(jllows the Strypa, but upon the west 
side of the river, and covers Huczacz. As it approaches 
the' point where the Strypa falls into the Dniester it bends 
sharply round, keeping ever\-\vliere on , the wrong or 
northern side of that stream, which here runs in a fairly 
deep valley between sandstone slopes and is a formidable 
obstacle. That obstacle is not crossed until the neigh- 
bourhood of Okna, but thence the Russians have sent 
bodies along the southern bank of the Dniester until they 
.threatened the Austrians holding the bridge of Zalescyzyki. 
Significance of these Movements and of the 
Numbers and Dates 
The reader has now before him the measure of the actual 
territorial ad\ance made b\' our Ally in this great week 
of effort. We see how much more pronounced it is in 
the neighbourhood of I.utsk than elsewhere, how it is 
held for the moment upon the two main railways A and 
B converging on Lemberg from Dubno and Tarnopol 
respectively and how it is pressing on the extreme left 
in front of Czernowitz, while hardly advancing at all as 
yet on the extreme right just south of the marshes. 
But we all know by this time that the measurement 
of territorial advance or retirement is the least significant 
of all indices in the present great war. All that we are 
! really concerned with is how far the Russian advance, 
its form, its rapidity, thedamage is has inflicted, brings 
the Allies towards a decision. 
The official story, given in , the - communiques (I 
purposely neglect all nnoflicial-accounts, tempting though 
i they are) shows us in the first place that permanent des- 
|triiction by actual capture at the hands of the Russians 
I i.s between a fifth and a sixth of the total force opposed 
•to them. These figures are certainly accurate. The 
; policy of the Allies, like that of the Central Powers, in 
the matter of prisoners is perfectly well known. The 
Allies either say nothing of the prisoners they capture 
or in the case of great offensives mention an exact tale. 
The Central Powers have preferred-^and it is well within 
their rights — to begin with exaggerations within the 
limits which their opponents may for the moment be 
• led to believe ; for instance the number of British pris- 
oners which the (iermans have claimed at various times 
is very nearly double the number now discovered to be 
in (ierman hands. Each party reaps the fruit of its 
policy. 
But while the Russian figures are true we must re- 
member that they almost certainly include wounded 
and unwoimded, and some proportion, though probably 
a small proportion of men who have died since thev wen- 
captured. Only those on the spot can make even a 
rough estimate of the probable proportion between the 
numbers thus actually fallen into I^ussian hands and the 
total Austrian losses, temporary and permanent, in this 
drive. It is not extravagant, however, to suppose the 
total losses somewhat more than double the captured, 
wounded and unwoundid. and to set them at least at a 
quarter of a million. They may be less if (a matter we 
cannot determine from the news to hand) there has been 
rapid and orderly retirement upon large sections of the 
line : though even in that case one would imagine large 
numbers of the wounded to be evacuated and saved. 
The total losses are quite certainly not less than 200,000. 
The next thing to note is the comparative regularity 
of the daily returns. The large number given for Sun- 
day, the small number given for Saturday afe probably 
due to the imperfection of the returns upon the former 
day which swelled the return uj)on the latter day. At 
any rate the daily steps run thus in thousands — 13, 
nearly 15, over 15, 11, very nearly 14, and in the last 
two days between 18 and 19 each. 
Note further the comparative losses in officers and men. 
Tt remains nonnal throughout in about one officer to 
60 men. In a rajiid retirement such a proportion is 
conmion. If units are captured whole it is, of course, 
higher : more like one officer to 35 men. 
As to the guns, we notice a capture of 77 guns, nearly 
all field guns, in the first three days. Not quite double 
that niunber in the first eight, so there has been a fairly 
regularly progressive rate in this item also. On the other 
other hand, the comparatively small number of machine 
guns taken and the still smaller number of trench mortars 
would seem to mean that on- those sectors where the 
enemy retired, the retirement was continuous without 
any attempt to dig in and resist from line to line. In a 
word, the figures of prisoners and guns taken point in 
general at once to surprise and to the rapid regular 
hillowing up of retirement where retirement has taken 
place, but not to a completely broken line. 
But the most important point of all has yet to be 
decided. What is the form of the Russian advance and 
of the enemy's retirement, and how do they seem to affect 
the immediate future ? 
It is clear from a glance at the foregoing Sketch Map II 
that only in one region has there been any considerable 
retirement of the enemv's line. That region is the region 
where the main blow fell, delivered from Olyka towards 
Lutsk. Now supposing such a push to be continued 
what does it mean ? 
A drive of this sort can only be sujiplied bv the railways 
and the main roads which in this undeveloped and flat 
country follow the general lines of the railways. 
To this fact add another fact. Any turning movement 
to cut off the mass of the Austrian troops must aim at 
Lemberg. Lemberg once occupied you have the centre of 
all the Galician railways in your hands. You utterly 
paralyse everything to the south. 
But for an advance on Lemberg you have only the 
two converging lines, apparently, the one from Dubno 
the other from Tarnopol, which I ha\'e marked A and 
B upon the map. The one from Tarnopol (B) is being 
fiercely contested by the enemy, who has here held up 
the Russian forces in the hilly country about 12 miles 
north of Tarnopol for the whole week. It is by the 
nothern railway (A) that the best chance of an advance 
turning the Austrian positions to the sovlth lies, for 
this railway can be got hold of by striking south from 
the extreme point of the advance beyond Lutsk. Already 
a Russian body has passed through Mlyno\-, occupiecl 
DemidoN-ka and so turned to Dubno and compelled 
the Austrians here to fall bark upon the railway hne (A). 
A continued advance westward from Lutsk permits of 
this process being continued indefinitely. 
It is possible also that the Russians have anothei 
avenue of supply. It is said, I do not know with what 
truth, but it is obviously probable, that the enemy in the 
course of his occupation of the country has constructed 
a railway to continue the old railway (C) through the 
intervening stage (D) and thus directly connecting 
Lutsk to Lemberg. If this is the case the meaning and 
value of the great stroke at Lutsk are at once apparent 
in a new light. For if tliere is a new railway from Lutsk 
to Lemberg direct it enormously increases the turning 
value of the Russian forces now in the Lutsk region. 
Meanwhile, as I have already said, a failure to turn 
the Austrians round by Lutsk "and a mere shepherding 
of the Russian advance up northward towards Kovel 
would effect nothing linal. It would compel a retirement 
of the enemy's front in the central marshy district ; it 
would rearrange the line to Russia's advantage and would 
gain territory. It would not advance the war. 
As to the general chances of the ultimate Russian 
object : the permanent division of the Austrian line, 
the cutting off of the southern portion and a true decision 
