June 15, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
being thus achieved, the factors would seem to be as 
follows : 
1. As an initial blow the Russian success is miich 
greater than the corresponding Austro-German success 
of last year. It shows a very much larger number of 
prisoners and a very much larger number of guns. 
2. But, on the other hand, the Austro-German blow of 
last year took all the Russian Carpathian positions in 
flank, because the Russian lines were bent round in the 
shape of the letter L and the blow fell upon the corner, 
or foot of the L, rolling up the stem. The Austrian line 
■ in this case is not so menaced. It presented no refused 
flank for the Russians to strike at, therefore it has a 
much better chance of reforming and making a stand. 
3. The Russian retirement then provoked stood for 
some time upon the line of the San. But it could not 
maintain itself long on one line, though it stood time and 
again after its first stand upon the San. It was unable to 
stand permanently on any line because it lacked munition- 
ment. This will not be the case with the Austrians. 
They will be amply munitioned as they fall back upon 
their main depots. And such a line as that of the Bug 
in front of Lemberg or any other they may have pre- 
pared further west would, if they could rally upon it, 
find them at least not short of missiles, which was the 
true cause of the Russian retirement last year. 
4. On the other hand, the great Russian retirement 
last year gave the enemy no true decision on account of 
these two things in favour of Russia : An indefinite space 
on which to retire and indefinitely large numbers from 
which ultimately to recruit. The enemy has no such 
adxantage in the present state of the war. He is ap- 
proaching the exhaustion of his reserves in numbers, and 
any retirement continued for say a month uninterruptedly 
would be disastrous for him in the way of space. 
Upon the whole the chances are much more in favour 
of the Austro-Germans reforming their line than of the 
great decision being arrived at in this field immediately. 
But only the future can show whether the event will 
follow those chances or no. 
Pressure upon the Trentino Front 
It would be a great error to imagine that .the Russian 
offensive will immediately relieve the pressure upon the 
Trentino front. 
E.xtraordinary ideas of that sort get about at this 
stage of the war, based on the assumption that the enemy 
have been able to whisk vast masses of men from place 
to place in a few days by rail. 
As a matter of fact, the enemy's handling of railways 
had not been superior to that of the Western Allies. He 
has never done anything equal in rapidity or exactitude 
to the moving of all the I3ritish divisions right round 
from the Aisne to Ypres. Still less anything that can 
compare to the swinging of the 4th corps 120 miles from 
the extreme right to the extreme left of the Allied line vuhile 
the battle of the Manic was actually in progress and just 
behind the line of that battle. 
The truth is here, as in almost every other matter, that 
the great modern industrialised nations are much of a 
muchness in the handling of machinery, with slight differ- 
ences in favour of the one or the other belligerent in 
particular categories. 
Now with all the good will in the world and with all 
the exactitude of organisation conceivable it would be 
impossible for the Austrian Empire to despatch adequate 
reinforcements from the Trentino to the Galician front 
in a less time than several weeks. A single division 
occupies 80 trains at least. The special" concentration 
upon the Trentino front, over and above the original 
•garnishing of that line, is not less than 10 divisions, pro- 
bably more. And it was the winter's work — a thing 
long and carefully prepared against the spring oppor- 
tunity for advance in the mountains. But more of a 
factor in time (in proportion to the amount of material 
to be moved) even than the transmission of men and 
field artillery, is the movement of the big guns and their 
munitionment. These have been painfully established 
in the mountains of the Upper Adige and Brenta basins 
after what was certainly months of preparation. Not less 
painfully a large head of munitionment was piled up 
behind the emplacements. You cannot suddenly transfer 
an organisation of that kind for a distance by rail equi- 
valent to the distance between Rome and London, and 
that with no advantage of parallel lines at your service 
such as exist in the northern part of the enemy territory. 
By at least three great arteries parallel to each other the 
enemy in the north can bring troops from west to east and 
east to west, yet he has only been able to handle a com- 
paratively small proportion of troops in this fashion, 
and that at great expense in time. For the swinging of 
troops from the Trentino to the Galician fronts you have 
at the very most two such arteries, one through Vienna 
and the other along the Drave valley and so through 
Buda Pesth, and until the mouth of the Brenner Pass 
you have one double line of railway only along which to 
move the whole of that enormous business. It would be 
simply impossible to get back any large number of guns 
to the Russian front; still more impossible to accumulate 
a large mass of munitionment for them during the pro- 
gress of thi^ great offensive, the checking of which or the 
gaining of a decision through which will be known in the 
next few days. It is indeed probable that the effect, of 
the Russian offensive in relieving the pressure on the 
Trentino will be apparent in the course of the month, 
for it is probable that men will be transferred. But they 
will not be transferred in such numbers and they cannot 
be transferred in such time as to cause an immediate 
relief upon the Trentino front in the next few days. In- 
deed, the pressure upon the Trentino has been continued 
during the whole week which saw the unexpected Russian 
advance, 900 miles away. And we shall do well to notice 
the fortunes of this continued Austrian offensive against 
the Italians because, as has been apparent ever since 
the first blow was struck, now nearly five weeks ago, 
success in this quarter on the part of the enemy would 
give a decision. It is the only place in Europe 
where the Allied communications are in peril from- a 
flank attack. Let us see, therefore, how things have 
stood in the past week. 
My readers will remember the general position as it 
was expressed in last week's sketch map, which I repro- 
duce here 
VICENZA, 
JUcbe deAztded B B B 
iylCaHanf. 
Miles 
The Austrians for their advance must ultimately control 
the Brenta and the Adige valleys, one of them at least 
and better both. Otherwise they can never possibly 
munition and feed and do everything else necessary for 
a large army. 
Pending their possession of these two avenues there is a 
second best, which would suffice for temporary needs if the 
advance could be rapid, and this second best is the road 
from Rovereto to Schio over the Fugazze pass. The 
Austrians after a month of fighting have failed to get a 
grasp even of this second best line of communications. 
They have got their line into a big salient which occupies 
the .\siago plateau, the plateau of the " Seven Villages," 
and from that place, withUheir heavy guns placed just 
behind the northern crest of the plateau, they are 
making alternate efforts to the right and to the left. 
