June 15, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
Capture of Fort Vaux 
11 
The events of the present week, in particular the develop- 
ment of the great Russian offensive, forbid me space to 
deal at any length with the Verdun sector. I propose to 
analyse the position more thoroughly next week, but it 
may be worth while pointing out briefly what is meant 
by the entry of the enemy into the ruins of \'aux Fort. 
As every one knows the word " fort " in this con- 
nection has no relation to the old purposes of the forts 
surrounding \^erdun. Permanent restricted works shelter- 
ing heavy artillery disappeared in the first days of the 
war. But these dismantled works are ready-made 
obstacles and ready-made shelters. A comparatively 
small number of men holding them can do a great deal (if 
execution against an attack attempting to carry them, 
even when that attempt is brief as in the counter-attack 
of the French 20th army corps in the ruins of Douaumont 
on the 26th of February — which, it will be remembered, 
failed to carry the ruins — or the very brief and successful 
recapture of the fort of some weeks ago, or the equally 
brief counter-stroke whereby it fell again into German 
hands two days later. But if the attempt to recapture 
such a place is prolonged, the disproportion between the 
losses of the assailants and those of the defenders becomes 
prodigious. A determination therefore upon the part 
of the enemy to acquire such a piece of ground at no 
matter what cost gives the very fullest opportunity for 
the practice of the French tactics upon the Verdun sector, 
Avhich is, not to preserve particular areas of ground, but 
to inflict a maximum loss upon the enemy with the mini- 
mum loss to themselves. On the other hand, the pos- 
session of the fort of Vaux was a very valuable one for 
the Germans and the effect of its loss to the French must 
not be minimised, for it was the last good observation 
post over the Woevre plain possessed by the French to the 
east and north-east of Verdun. The fort of Souville is 
higher. It stands on the top of the down lying behind 
the fort of Vaux, which latter is built upon the shoulder 
of the down just before the bank plunges steeply down into 
the plain of the Woevre below. But you have no good 
observation of the Woevre from the distant back summit, 
although it is higher. From the fort of Vaux you had one 
of the best observation posts in the whole district. I 
believe at the present moment there is no French observa- 
tion post left which directly commands the plain of 
the Woevre in this district. Further, the possession of 
this spur upon the shoulder of the down gives the enemy 
an entry upon the Vaux ravine. 
But when we have weighed the loss and the gain it 
still remains true — and would that every writer upon the 
war would steadily keep it in mind — that the main under- 
lying ideas before Verdun are, upon the German side to 
occupy the French by a continual offensive, to wear down 
their moral by losses which, if inferior to the Germans' 
own losses, may yet, they hope, have an ultimate effect ; 
impress opinion at home and abroad by an approach 
to the geographical point of Verdun, and possibly after the 
exhaustion of their useful striking force to enter the ruins 
of the town itself. While, on the other hand, the French 
conception of the fighting is the compelling of the enemy 
(since he is determined, after his loss of the original battle, 
to continue an offensive of usury), to lose the very largest 
number of men possible in proportion to the numbers that 
must be lost by the French in order to inflict that damage. 
In general, the Germans believe that by wearing them- 
selves out they are also wearing out the French, and that 
with the wearing out of the French the whole allianct: 
will lose its moral. The French believe that the Germans 
are wrong in this calculation, and th"at their error will 
cause them to exhaust their forces at such a rate as to 
make the counter-offensive, when it does come, innnediate 
and crushing. The future will show which of these two 
theses is right, but the gradual advance of the enemy 
over this sector at an average rate of about 300 yards a 
month since the first main line was reached upon the 26th 
of February, is not the approach to a fortress and has 
nothing to do with the " taking " of Verdun. The more 
we use that meaningless phrase the better the enemy will 
be pleased. H. Blllog 
The Battle of Jutland 
By Arthur Pollen 
SINCE writing the general sketch of the battle of 
Jutland which appeared in last week's Land 
& Water, I have seen no additional infomia- 
tion published that seems to be of material 
\aluc. In his speech in the City, Mr. Balfour dealt with 
the position created by our victory in terms that were 
just, statesmanlike and moderate, but he gave no further 
details to assist us in forming any clearer picture of the 
event itself. The Commander-in-Chief has paid a splendid 
tribute to the brilliant assistance given to him by Vice- 
Admiral Beatty. " No Admiral," he says, " could wish 
to be better served." And he has thanked the Flag 
Officers, officers and men of his fleet who are upholding 
the glorious traditions of the Navy. But in speaking of 
the victory he, like Mr. Balfour, speaks with perfect 
modesty of the British performance. Sir David Beatty, 
in addressing his men, maintained that the enemy's 
losses must be heavier than ours. Sir John Jellicoe 
contents himself with saying that they are at least equal. 
There is no attempt anywhere to pretend that the losses 
are crushing or to give official sanction to the convictions 
held by many reliable officers as to the actual damage 
the Germans have suffered. And no doubt a moderation 
in these claims is right and proper. 
The whole world has paid its respect to the candour 
with which we have admitted our own losses and 
our under-statement of those which we believe we 
have inflicted. This candour was strikingly exemplified 
by the fact that in the first communique, not only was 
every known loss published, but all ships not actually 
heard from by the afternoon of June ist were included 
amongst those that might be lost. \\'hen it came, 
therefore, to giving a corrected list, the actual losses 
turned out to be smaller than might have been anticipated. 
Similarly too, little if anything was made of the damage 
we had inflicted. At the beginning of last week the 
Admiralty put the probable losses of the Germans at four 
capital ships, four cruisers, nine destroyers and one 
submarine. Yet in his message to the fleet. Sir John 
Jellicoe, as I have stated, speaks of them only as at "least 
as heavy as ours. But this message seems, though only 
published on Tuesday, June 13th, to have been written 
at least ten days earlier. After a careful sifting of the 
evidence available to me, I have formed the opinion 
that the Admiralty statements of a week ago must 
be considerably below the truth. It is highly probable 
that two more capital ships arc sunk, that the loss 
of cruisers is 7 and not 4, of destroyers 15 and not 
9, and instead of one submarine at least three were 
sunk by the British and probably one by the fler- 
mans themselves. But I admit without any hesitation 
that no estimate can be reliable until all the evidence is 
thoroughly sifted and impartially compared, and I have 
only suggested these figures, not as definitely established 
German losses, but as indicating that there is- evidence 
of much higher losses than we have claimed. 
The Enemy Losses 
The course that the enemy has followed in this 
respect has been strikingly unhke our own. He began 
by putting foi-warda claim to victory that — in the face of 
his retreat and his total inability to seize the fruits of 
victory — was patently fatuous. The only losses he 
admitted were the small cruiser Wiesbaden, the 
pre-Dreadnought Pommerii, the Fraucnlob. and some 
