12 
LAND & W'A T E R 
June 15, 1916 
torpcdu buats. It was perhaps pardonable that he sliould 
claim to have sunk many more British ships than actually 
went down. It was as easy for him to be mistaken in 
such a matter as for us. Ihick weatiier, bad li{,'ht, the 
fact of a night action, all these things would make the 
losses of one side uncertain to the other. But the attempt 
to conceal liis own losses must from every point of view, 
e.xcept the German, appear a fatal mistake. A very 
different list has since been admitted. The Lutzow 
and the Rostok, the loss of which till June 8th was denied 
" for military reasons," ha\ e now to be added. \\'liv, 
one may ask, are these losses admitted now. The in- 
ference is obvious. The liernums lied about their losses 
in the tirst instance, for without the lie the legend of the 
fruitless victory could hardly have got currency even in 
(iermany. They have admitted a small part of the truth 
now in the hope of concealing the larger part kept back. 
The point is not of \er\' great interest, for in this 
matter our opponents are only following in naval matters 
the course they have pursued from the tirst with regard 
to their losses on land. It is a courses that deceives no 
one outside (Iermany, but is, one must suppose, justified 
if it deceives and consoles the (iermans. At this stage 
of the war it is very doubtful if neutral o])inion is of 
much importance, but if it is the incident of the Lntzow 
has this value, that all (icrman olilicial statements about 
their successes, their failures, their losses, their prisoners 
and their booty will be treated not merely as suspect, 
but as deliberate and calculated untruths. 
While we have no fresh information to alter our general 
\\c\\ as to the course or the result of the Battle of Jutland, 
careful reconsideration of the evidence already in our 
j)Ossession prompts me to no material alteration in the 
opinions that have already been expressed. There were 
one or two palpable errors in the accoiuit which I pub- 
lished last week, and I have to thank se\eral corre- 
spondents for pointing them out to me. It is also clear 
from letters I have received that the preliminary dis- 
position of the forces and certain features of the action 
present considerable difiiculties, and not only to lay 
readers. I cannot this week deal with more than one 
or two of these. 
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Disposition of the Fleet 
First let us make it quite clear what their relative jx)si- 
iions were. And here I have to make a correction. In the 
first of the seven diagrams I gave last week, I gave Sir 
John Jellicoe's, Beatty's, von Hipper's and von Schecr's 
positions at approximatch- 2.20. This was an oversight. 
The tinii should have been approximately j. 45, when fire 
was opened. I reprint the diagram this week. And to 
get the position of the two battle-fleets at 2.20 the reader 
must imagine Sir John Jcllicoe to be about in the top of 
the left-hand corner and Admiral Scheer to be somewhere 
just off the Horn Reefs, and both Sir David Beatty and 
Vice-Admiral Hii)per further to the west. By 3.45, 
when the action began, they would have closed to the 
position in the diagram. 
The plan of the action followed by the British Fleut 
was undoubtedly tljat formulated by the Commander-in- 
Chief. He had not on this occasion to consider any new 
or unrehearsed problem. The fleet was embarking on a 
manoeuvre which it had performed on innumerable 
previous occasions. The task allotted to each section 
of the fleet was the result of past experience and a careful 
consideration of all the probabilities. The objective 
was to bring the enemy's fleet as a whole to action. The 
plan, therefore, had to take into consideration a thousand 
contingencies and obviously could not be the best possible 
plan for dealing with any particular one of them. The 
(|uestion is in point of fart one that can only be discussed 
intelligiblv wliiii all the experience and iiiformation 
available to the Conunander-in-Chief are known, and 
conclusions, as misleading as they may be unjust, will 
be put forward if the disposition of the fleet is discussed, 
as if tiie position and plans of the enemy were known 
before the British Fleets left their ports. 
British Prisoners in German Hands 
A fact which has puzzled a great many people is this. 
Indcjati^ablc was, as we saw last week, sunk within ten 
minutes of the battle cruisers opening fire on von Hipper's 
squadron. The action continued in a south-easterly and 
southerly direction for an hour after this, and then our fast 
division led the (icrmans northwards for another hour 
and twentj' minutes, when, after the entry of Hood and 
Arbuthnot into the field, the way was clear for the (irand 
Fleet, and the action ended with the disorderly flight 
of the enemy. How then did it happen that the (iermans, 
if driven off the field, should be found after the battle 
with prisoners from Indcjati'^able ? The explanation is 
really qiute simple. Von Hipper, we must remember, 
when the first contact was made at 2.20 until .J.45, when 
the action commenced, was always to the north and 
eastward of Admiral Beatty. He had no doubt distri- 
buted his destroyers well ahead of him when cruising 
northward, so that when Beatty made him turn and fall 
back on the High Seas Fleet, he would be follourd by 
the destroyers that had jMeviously been his advance 
guard. These destroyers would, in the ordinary course 
of things, pass over the scene of the engagement a quarter 
of an hour or half an hour after it had taken place. Our 
own destroyers, in the meantime, which had been ahead 
of Sir Da\id Beatty, would probably ha\c remained 
ahead of the squadron. Consequently our destroyers 
would not pass over the field of the action. There is 
nothing surprising then, in the (iermans having found a 
few survivors, and it is gratifying to know that they had 
the humanity to save them. 
I have to make two other corrections in the account 
of the action which I gave last week and in the diagrams. 
First, it seems clear that Rear-Admiral Evan Thomas's 
battleships got into action before 4.45 ; they seem to 
have fallen into line behind Sir David's battle cruisers 
The City of London Rose Society holds its annual show at 
the Cannon Street Hotel on Tuesday, the 27th inst. Last 
year the Society was able to liand over /()5 to the British 
Red Cross Society as the result of this show, and this year 
it hopes to do better. 
The oak-trees at Aslistcad arc being devastated by cater- 
pillars. Mr. Comptun Merryweatlicr writes suggesting that 
the trees be sprayed with cluomate of lead. This was done 
successfully in Richmond Park three years ago under similar 
circumstances on the advice of Mr. Maxwell Lefroy, Mr. 
Merrywcather lending the necessary pumping apparatus. 
The Women's National I^and Service Corps is, we are in- 
formed, in urgent need of recruits, more especially among 
educated women. This Corps, whose president is the Duke 
of Marlborough, is recognised by the (iovernment as th(^ cen- 
tral voluntary bodj' for enrolling girls and Women of the pro- 
fessional and leisured classes for work upon farms. Short 
trainings from four to six weeks can be arranged. It is 
found that the presence of educated women acts as an incen- 
tive to local female labour. Of course not every woman, be 
she educated or not. is suitable for farm work, InU many of 
them ha\e shown extraordinary aptitude^ 
