June 15, T916 
LAND & WATER 
The Air Board 
By F. W. Lanchester 
17 
THE creation of the Air Board, under the presi- 
dency of Lord Curzon, may be regarded as in- 
augurating a new phase in the development of 
military and naval aeronautics. Apart from 
the multitude of minor problems of greater or less magni- 
tude with which the Air Board is, and will be, faced, the 
whole fate and future development of the air branches of 
our Services may be said to rest in its hands. It is true 
that the Board has no executive power, but it possesses 
that which will probably prove as effective — the President 
has the power, in order to avoid a deadlock, of going to the 
War Committee of the Cabinet for authority to decide 
any point that may arise, or on which disagreement may 
exist. 
There are some (with whom I am myself inclined to 
agree) who regard the Air Board, or at least an Air Board, 
forming a link between the Services, as the right and 
appropriate solution to the control of our air forces. 
P'rom this point of view the air branches of the Services, 
just as the artillery of the Services, will remain under 
separate control ; the War Office and Admiralty being, 
as at present, respectively responsible for the air efficiency 
of the Army and of the Navj^ There are others who (I 
think without sufficient consideration) assume that an 
ultimate solution must be sought in some kind of amalga- 
mation of the two branches into an Air Service under 
an Air Minister. I have previously discussed this 
cpiestion to some extent in these columns.* I now 
return to the subject to consider the alternatives with 
greater analytical exactness. 
Permanent or Temporary 
The point of importance at the present juncture is 
broadly whether we are to regard the present Air Board 
as a good and — humanly speaking — permanent solution 
to the problem ; or whether, as strongly urged by Lord 
Montagu, and as actually foreshadowed by Lord Curzon, 
we look to an Air Ministry and single Air Service as the 
probable outcome. Lord Curzon's actual words -f are : 
Having said so much, I should like to add for myself 
that I think such an Air Department is destined to come. 
I see before myself, before many years have passed — it 
may be even sooner — I paint to myself a dream of a 
single Service under a single head, under a single roof, 
with a single organisation. Such a unification I cannot 
believe to be beyond the administrative genius of our race. 
But if I am right in that, I would sooner see it come — 
as in the past few months I have seen military compulsion 
come — as the result of a concordat between all those who 
are interested in the matter, as the result of a cordial 
acceptance of the principle by both services and both 
Departments, and with the avowed support of the Secre- 
tary of State for War and the I'lrst Lord of the Admiralty. 
The Board which has been appointed will undoubtedly 
hold this consummation in view. It is one of our duties 
to explore the ground and to examine the possibilities 
of such a solution. One day it will be our business to 
report to His Majesty's Government upon the matter. 
But in the meantime 1 tJirnk I can show the House that 
we have more immediate and more pressing duties to 
perform. l'"or the reasons I liave stated I cannot accept 
the Motion of my noble friend Lord Montagu. His Motion 
is really one, rather cleverly disguised, for the immediate 
creation of an Air Department or an Air Ministry. 
This actually goes further than Lord Montagu desires, 
if we take his remarks in the House of Lords Debate as 
a criterion. Thus (following the above) he says, " I 
particularly disclaimed any idea of an Air Ministry at 
present." (The italics are my own.) 
Whatever the future may" have in store, it is I think 
generally agreed by those "with whom the decision lies 
that no immediate action is possible beyond that already 
taken by the (iovernment, namely the appointment of an 
Air Board, and through that luedium the more close 
correlation of the existing departments and the inde- 
pendent study of the problems of air warfare, with a view 
• Land & \V.\tf.r, Apiil aotli, 27tli, and May 4tli. 
■f Oft'ici.-il Rop. House of Lords. Vol. 22, Xo. 3S, p. 157 
to tendering advice to the Services, and making provision 
in advance to meet such extensions in the duties of air- 
craft as may seem feasible and desirable. 
I will now take the matter up from the point at which 
it was left in my article of May 4th under the title " Air 
Problems and Fallacies." 
Direct and Indirect Military Value 
It is at the outset necessary to insist on the funda- 
mental distinction between operations of direct and of 
indirect military value ; it is precisely on this point, and 
it is definitely on the future of potential value of opera- 
tions of indirect military value that the case for an Air 
Ministry will stand or fall. If no such operations were 
feasible or, from a strategic point of view, desirable, then 
there is no case for an Air Ministry. If on the other hand 
it can be shown that operations of indirect value are 
destined to become of importance, then there is a case 
for an Air Ministry and for an independent Air Service, 
and the more important the operations of indirect military 
value become, the stronger the case. Whether or no, the 
Air Ministry and independent Air Service will ultimately 
prove necessary will depend finally upon the strength of 
the case as above defined ; thus if such operations are 
found to be in practice rare there is no reason 
why the whole new apparatus in the sense of an Air 
Ministry with its corollary Service should be created 
for its execution, when there are other means available. If 
on -the contrary these operations of indirect military 
value become, or are shown by experience to be, of great 
national importance, and require to be initiated and 
carried out on a large scale, then we may take it that an 
Air Ministry and an Independent Air Service is the 
inevitable solution. So far, experience is lacking. 
It may be urged that the preceding paragraph is too 
dogmatic ; it is not propounded as dogma, it is a state- 
ment of the case which it is the object of the present 
articles to -make good. 
It is doubtful whether the experience of this War will 
be final on the question of the utility or otherwise of 
operations of indirect military value. It has been 
pointed out in the previous article (to which reference 
has been made) that in almost every case, whatever may 
be the value of operations of indirect value, they are, 
more often than not, weak in comparison with direct 
operations, therefore so long as we are building up con- 
tinually increasing armies with their necessary comple- 
ment of aircraft, materiel and personnel, it is certain that, 
whatever the future may be, the present will not leave 
much scope for experimental development outside im- 
mediate military and naval requirements. The present 
situation so far as the Board is concerned is clearly that 
any operation of indirect military value, which, one may 
say, by definition, does not come naturally into the 
purview either of the supreme Admiral of the Navy, or 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, must be considered and 
worked out and defined by the Air Board, who will also 
decide which of the present Services will be expected to 
undertake any particular kind of duty. Let the matter 
be exemplified by a few illustrations. 
If it were thought necessary to conduct bombing raids 
in the rear of the enemy's lines, to destroy his magazines 
or interrupt his communications (as has been done 
repeatedly in the course of the western campaign) we 
have to deal with a class of operation which is decisivclv 
of direct military value, for example the bombing of the 
railway station and junction at Lille, or the raid on the 
enemy communications behind Verdun.; such work is 
definitely related to military operations with which, both 
as to time and place, it requires to be co-ordinated. 
It would be useless for example, and might even be 
prejudicial, if such work bearing directly on other military 
operations were to be carried out at the wrong instant, 
as might easily happen were it conducted independently 
of the military command ; the more closely such air opera- 
tions are co-ordinated with other work in the field the 
more effectively will aircraft be employed, hence it would 
