ig 
L A iN D c1' W A T E R 
June 15, 1916 
be suicidal to place the conduct of such operations in the 
hands of a separate Service. It would be still more suici- 
dal to relegate to a separate Air Service the still more 
intimate duties of aircraft, as concerned in military 
reconnaissance, " spotting " for artillery, etc. : it would 
be as foolish as placing the artillery or the cavalry under 
the control of a separate Minister. On the naval side 
again many e.xamples might be cited of the employment 
of aircraft which are essentially so related to otlicr naval 
operations as clearly to be inseparable. 
Direct Military Value 
In all such military and naval air work, that is to saj', 
in operations of Jitect military value, the precision and 
exactitude of co-ordination or co-operation with the other 
arms of the Service, or with our Naval Forces, is so im- 
portant that it is unthinkable that any such operations 
should be placed under a separate Ministry or any 
organisation other than that of the appropriate Service. 
An air operation, such as a bombardment from the air 
(at least as we know it at present) is as compared to the 
operations of the other arms of tlie Service in itself but 
of moderate effect, but by accurate co-ordination such 
air operations may prove (and have proved) of signal 
value and utility. It is of little use bombing a railway, 
for instance, a day too soon because experience has shown 
that repairs can usually be effected in a few hours. It 
is useless conducting the same operations a day too late, 
it is essential that it should be done lo lime, at tlic psycho- 
logical moment, in fact, when the enemy is relying upon 
the use of his railway or comuumication. and when its 
failure will be of the greatest detriment to him ; thus an air 
raid, such as is under discussion, requires to be accelerated 
or held back, or repeated, according to the progress of . 
other operations, and the more intimately the command 
of the air force is identified with that of the Army on the 
one hand or the Navy on the other, the more efficient 
it will become. 
A typical operation of indirect military value was 
the raid on Friedrichshafen in the autumn of i()i4. That 
raid was not connected with the movements of any of the 
armies on the western or other battle front ; it was not 
connected with any naval operation in particular. It was 
an attempt to weaken the enemy's industrial power and 
in particular his power of building airships. ■ There was 
no special reason why that should have been undertaken 
at any particular instant of time, there was in fact no 
clear reason why the raid should have been organised 
at all, so far as the Admiralty is concerned ; it was, we 
may take it, initiated by certain adventurous spirits, 
and perhaps we may say justified by results. That it 
has not been regarded as a cla.ss of operation of great 
utility is well evidenced by the fact that no serious 
attempt has been made at its repetition. 
Building Up a Flying Corps 
The truth is that with the limited numbers of aero- 
planes which have been hitherto at the disposal of our 
authorities, and the tax on our manufacturing resources 
by the rapid growth of our armies, there are more im- 
portant duties always at hand. It must be borne in mind 
that, with an army Avhich has grown in less than two 
years to the extent of three or four millions of men, it 
has been a problem of no mean magnitude to build up a 
Flying Corps, the ".cavalry of the air," commensurate 
with the strength of the other arms of the Service. The 
problem is still the continuous increase required, more 
and more pilots, more and more squadrons, more and 
luore mechanics, depots, etc. 
In suggesting that a raid such as that on l-'riedrich- 
shafen is not an example of the best possible employment 
of our air squadrons, it is neces.sary to say under existing 
conditiotis ; it may be fairly inferred that" in due course, 
when adequate provision of materiel and personnel is 
available, such operations will be fully justified and will 
have to be carefully considered and organised in ad\ance. 
.-\ny operation such as the Friedrichshafen raid is rightly 
to be regarded as one of indirect military value, since, 
as pointed out, it has no intimate relation to other 
operations either in the Army or the Navy, and, further, 
there is no definite indication from the character of the 
operation whether it is part of the responsibility of the 
Army or the Navy. It may be argued on the one hand 
that since the value of the Zeppelin airship is mainly 
naval reconnaissance, the destruction of its headquarters 
would fall naturally to the Navy. On the other hand it 
might equally be argued that since the object of attack 
and the only available base are both far inland the duty 
is clearly one for the Army. In biief the incentive to 
attack is naval, and the undertaking itself is within the 
military zone. 
The raid on Friedrichshafen is merely an example. 
There are scores of industrial centres in an enemy country 
where munitions are manufactured of different kinds, any 
and all of which would be appropriate subjects of attack 
were the appro])riate air forces, i.e., machines, trained 
personnel, etc., available, and all these duties, so far as 
not inunediately connected with the military or naval 
strategic plan, may be classified as operations of indirect 
military value. It is these operations which it will be 
one of the great concerns of the Air Board to study and 
provide for. In the first place (and under pre.sent con- 
ditions) it is desirable that a clear decision should be 
reached at the earliest })ossible date, as to what these 
duties (-omprise and which operations are to be regarded 
as coming within the re>ponsibility of the military authori- 
ties, and which (if any) the Navy will be exjjected to 
undertake. Clearly the Services can neither of them 
legitimately be called upon to carry out work which does 
not come within their own strategic scheme or plans, 
and for which they have had no opportunity to provide 
either maleriel or personnel. Later, if and when opera- 
tions of indirect military value have been undertaken, 
it will be a matter of serious consideration whether these 
shall be allowed to remain as collateral responsibility of 
the Army and Navy, or whether their importance will 
justify an Independent Air Service under an Air Minister. 
Test of Experience 
Obviously this latter <iuestion nuist be one of degree — 
in brief it will depend upon the relative magnitude and 
the importance which will ultimately attach to the 
operations in question. Should it transpire or experience 
demonstrate that these operations have not great or real 
importance then we may rest assured that an Independent 
Air Service will not be justified. If on the other hand, as 
is generally believed, attack on enemy centres of produc- 
tion, etc., should prove a valuable method of breaking his 
power, and capable of fast and effective development, 
then we may rest assured that the Independent Air 
Service will be found the ap})ropriate solution. 
There is fortunately no need to jump at any conclusion, 
the future will take care of itself. Thus the present Air 
Board is fully capable of considering the possibilities of 
large scale air raids and of taking the necessary initiative 
when our resources permit. The War Office or the 
Navy will be advised that certain operations are con- 
sidered desirable from a national point of view, and be- 
lie\ed to be feasible, and either one Service or the other 
will be informed that the work of carrying out such and 
such operations has been assigned to them. 
The production of the necessary materiel and personnel 
will then be undertaken with perhaps a special supple- 
mentary grant based on the decision of the Air Board ; 
in due course the utility or otherwise of the measures 
taken will be proved. It is on the test of experience that 
the future situation will require to be judged. On the one 
hand we do not want a separate Air Service to conduct 
half a dozen long distance raids per annum ; on the other 
hand if such raids could be shown of sufficient value tc 
become a matter of daily occurrence it is more than 
probable that it may be "found advisable ultimately to 
relieve the existing Services of these duties, and con- 
centrate all air work of indirect military value under an 
orgaiiisation with its own Minister, Chief, and Staff. 
It is of interest in this regard to review the history of 
our i)iesent day systems of two Services ; in other words 
to examine the manner and conditions in and under 
which the British Navy emerged as a separate Service 
from Its origin as a mere adjunct to the military system 
of feudal times. It is from the reading of history that we 
may expect some real guidance from the past, and not 
from the setting up of false or unproven analogies such 
as are imijlicitly embodied in the current slogan " One 
Element, one Service." 
