June 22, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
is as yet only ronjcctural, their pressure towards Kovcl 
is already well developed. On that account, it has 
attracted most attention in Europe 
It is rumoured with regard to the Russian attempt to 
strike down in flank towards Lemherg and cut off the 
Austro-German central armies that it will be met, not upon 
the line of the Hug, which is the chief natural obstacle of 
the district, but upon a prepared line of trenches which 
start from Vladimir, pass tlnough Sokal and so run at 
an angle to Sojanow. Whetlier this will be so or no we 
cannot tell until the shock of the rapidly proceedmg 
advance in this direction comes upon the main line of 
defence, which the enemy shall establish u])on this 
northern flank of this central sector. 
But a much more obvious line is that of the Luga. 
If the enemy were to stand behind the Luga, small 
as the stream is, he would cover all his railheads Vladi- 
mir itself, Sokal, and Sojanov, and at the same time he 
would have a continuous straight front in this region, 
and he would have in front of him to protect him an 
obstacle not very serious as the old wars went but valu- 
able for the increased jKnver of the modern defensive. 
At any rate he must try and stand somewhere between 
Vladimir and Sojanov unless he wants his northern flank 
broken in and his central armies enveloped. 
This movement, I say, the most important of all, is 
as yet only sketched out. But the direct Russian ad- 
vance upon Kovel is already very highly developed. 
Now the value of Kovel is clearly apparent from the 
simplest railway i)lan of the eastern front. Take that 
front down from Dvinsk to Czernowitz and you iind it 
interrupted by the bad country of the Pripet Marshes. 
Roughly speaking, the ape.K of these marshes at the end 
of the good land and the beginning of the bad land is 
marked by the fortress of I-5rest. Across the marshes runs 
a railway that would link up the whole front, and the 
Austrians and Germans fought very hard to get this 
railway ; after they had failed in their attempt to destroy 
the Russian armies last summer, their last object was to 
reach this lateral communication (marked on the accom- 
panying Sketch II with a thick black line and the letters 
(a) (a) ) and hold it. They failed. They got the northern 
])art of it as far as Vilna and tliey got the southern 
jiart of it from Dubno, but they could not seize the 
, middle part of it. The consequence was, as Sketch 
Map II plainly shows, that they could not communicate 
between the northern and the southern sections of their 
front save by the railway communication marked with a 
double line and vitally dependant on the junction of 
Kovel. Their few forces in the Pinsk Marshes they 
could supply by the railway from Brest to Pinsk, but 
for general communication from north to south they had 
to pass through Kovel. 
If Kovel wen; to fall into Russian hands the enemy 
would be compelled to abandon all that he holds east o^ 
Kovel and south of the marshes. The whole southern Iind 
would have to be modified. 1 
Note, such a modification of the southern enemy front] 
such a retirement, would not be a decision in any sense or 
the word. It would leave the enemy intact. No true 
decision can be got on this front save by envelopmentj 
* I »■' < I t I I I ♦ 
.Lokatcfit 
