June 22, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
would put them upon the other flank. Were their victories 
to the north and the south sufficiently rapid and the 
retirement of the Austro-Gerraans in the centre suffi- 
ciently tardy, the result would be a great decision. The 
Austro-German forces of the centre would be destroyed. 
The chances of obtaining such a great decision in this 
region and at this moment, are odds against. And that 
for this reason : That whereas the Austro-German armies 
of the centre have a mass of excellent roads and three 
railway lines whereby to retire towards the region of 
Lemberg and reduce their salient, the Russians, though 
well provided with communications upon their southern 
(lank have upon tlieir northern flank in the Lutsk region 
poor communications. 
But it may be asked why in any case are the Austro- 
Germans thus fighting so hard in the central section and 
holding in the hill country near Jezierna, north-west of 
Tarnopol ; in the hill country just west of the Strypa and 
so south to the Dniester ? Why, especially, are they 
putting so great an 'effort forward in the region of 
Jezierna towards Tarnopol, if this standing out eastward 
in the centre, while the Russians advance westward 
above and behind them, puts them in peril ? 
The answer to that question is the old answer. When 
you are pressed upon your flanks, you have, if j'^ou are in 
sufficient force, a chance of breaking the enemy's centre. 
If we regard the Austro-German effort in front of Tarnopol 
as a " holding up " of the Russian advance, we have got 
the situation absolutely topsj'^-turv}-. It is the Austro- 
(lermans who are here attacking and the Russians, 
deliberately less strong here than on the two wings, that 
are holding tip the attack. 
The situation of this central portion at the moment of 
writing would seem to be as follows : 
Beginning at Radzivilov on the frontier and upon the 
main road and railway between Lemberg and Dubno 
(which was occupied by the Russians some days ago) , this 
front crosses the frontier somewhere near Popovce, 
covers, I think (but I am not certain) Zalosce — and then 
cuts the main Tarnopol-Lemberg road and railway in the 
hill country just east of Jezierna. It crosses the 
secondary railway from Tarnopol to Lemberg due south 
of the point where it crosses the main railway ; then 
runs along the Upper Strypa Valley upon its eastern side, 
I think (at the moment of writing), crossing the stream 
rather less than half-way down its length. The line 
runs up the west side of the Strypa along the watershed 
to the east of Podhajce and so down to the Dniester, 
which stream it strikes somewhere quite close to the 
Strypa mouth. 
From this description two points will be apparent. 
First, that the Austro-German central advance sector, 
the front of the big salient which the Russians have forced 
upon them, is very straight, running almost exactly along 
the 23rd degree of eastern longitude from Greenwich. 
Secondly, that there has been no conspicuous Russian 
advance here south of the Jezierna region. There has 
been a certain advance, especially in the effort of Buczacz, 
but elsewhere, as for instance in the neighbourhood of 
Tarnopol, there has been hardly any movement at all. 
But, as I have said, the right way to look at the thing 
is to conceive of it as an enemy thrust against the 
Russian centre which the Russians are holding up while 
they try to get round the flanks. So long as it is held up 
we need not bother about the strength of Bothmer who 
commands here. The longer he stays so far forward 
the better for the Allied plan. But, unfortunatel3% 
whenever he chooses to fall back he has ample oppor- 
tunities, no less than three railway lines and a whole 
network of good roads upon a front of only sixty miles. 
THE TRENTINO FRONT 
There is nothing to ?.dd this week so far as the news 
reaching London upon Tuesday afternoon advances us 
with regard to the position upon the Trentino front. 
The rim of the Asiago plateau is held thoroughly by the 
Italians and our Allies have begun local counter-offensives 
as well. Austria has not attained to the possession of 
any one of the main roads essential to ? further develop- 
men-t of their plan. They are thoroughly held upon the 
Brenta and the Adige, which valleys would give them, 
could they force them, a continuous railway each as well 
as a road. They ha\-c not e\Tn been able to peach the 
*^;?^ 
*^^^i^^ 
IX 
XRadzivlloff 
'^Zalosce 
I 
CZERNOWI': 
I 
secondary avenue of communications which is afforded 
by the road from Rovereto to Schio. 
The Italians have now thoroughly identified the whole 
of the Austrian effectives acting between Arsiero and 
the Brenta : that is, the units now used in the most active 
fighting, excluding those that are held up in the Brenta 
and Adige valley, and those massed against the Posina 
Ridge and in the" Vallarsa. These units total 15 brigades, 
of which six, if I am not mistaken, are mountain troops. 
■ The Italian local counter-offensi\es obtained their first 
successes on the evening of the 5th of June, a fortnight 
ago, during the storm which marked that night. These 
successes took the form of pushing the Austrians down 
the northern slope of the rim bounding the upland plateau 
-,in that portion of the rim lying west of the Astico. East 
of the Astico the Austrians had the day before mastered 
the Cengio mountain, and occupied all the Pass leading 
down to Cogollo, as we have said. There must, therefore, 
ha\e been a very critical moment upon that Sunday and 
for a few days following, but at the end of the week an 
Italian counter-offensive recovered the ravine and all the 
south-eastern slopes of the Cengio. In other words, the 
issue from the plateau down to the plain .and the railway 
was blocked by the Italian counter-offensives a week ago. 
Going further eastward the Austrians in the neighbour- 
hood of Asiago claimed, on the 7th of June, the foothill 
Lamerle which overlooks the Plain of Asiago by about 
700 feet. This claim was part of the general policy of the 
enemy dictated from Berlin, whereby, for some reason best 
known to themselves, the enemy announces the occupa- 
tion of a position which he either has not yet reached, or 
will never reach. At anv rate, the Lamerle hill was not 
carried upon that Wednesday the 7th of June. They were 
still fighting for it three days later upon the lotli, and 
upon that da^' the Italian brigade of Forli, which is com- 
posed of the 43rd and 44th regiments of the line, counter- 
attacked and drove the Austrians with the bayonet down 
such part of the hill as they had already occupied. 
Further to the east again the effort of the Austrians to 
obtain the Brenta at Valstanga, the most important 
effort of all, was also heavily pushed upon that same day, 
Wednesday, the 7th of June. A brigade of Southern 
Sla\'s was thrown into the action ; the 2nd regiment from 
Bosnia and the 22nd from Gratz. They carried the 
Meletta and the next day the mountain called Castel- 
gomberto, but there the advance stopped. There has 
been, if anything, a slight Italian readvance in this 
neighbourhood and particularly at the top of the Val 
Frenzela. " H. Belloc, 
