10 
LAND & WATER 
June 22, 191G 
" Your Splendid Work" 
By Arthur Pollen 
IT must be some time before Sir John Jellicoe's Jut- 
land dispatih reaches the AdmiraUy. For the oper- 
ations involved a fleet five times as numerous as that 
which Nelson commanded at Trafalgar, and the 
lighting extended over an area more than a hundred 
limes greater. As contact was made with von Hipper 
at 2.20 and the chase was not abandoned till between three 
and four on the following morning, the mmiber and length 
of narratives to be written, examined and collated, 
imix)ses a long and difficult task both on the Admirals 
and Captains engaged, and finally on the Commander-in- 
C hief and his staff. And pending the receipt of the dis- 
patch, it is natural enough that there should have been 
no official statement made by the Admiralty, nor any 
further information published other than flat denials 
of certain German inventions. The section of the public, 
therefore, that is anxious to form right conclusions about 
naval events has had to look to contributions and corres- 
pondence of specialists for further light upon the many 
problems this great battle has set for solution. An ex- 
tremely interesting correspondence has been running in 
the columns of the Times, and many professional judg- 
ments have reached us from seamen in foreign countries. 
What is perhaps their most noticeable feature is the 
contrast between the unhesitating verdict of the foreign 
experts and the somewhat diffident criticisms of 
native controversialists. Is it a becoming modesty that 
explains the difference in the British attitude ? There 
are, of course, exceptions. Sir Cyprian Bridge, for ex- 
ample, does not hesitate to describe the tactics of the 
battle-cruiser fleet as perhaps the most brilliant re- 
corded in naval liistory. He perceives that these tactics 
were exactly designed to make possible that which actu- 
allv occurred, namely, the intervention of the (irand Fleet 
in a fashion that was as masterly as it was decisive. 
There is no closer student of naval history or naval science 
than Admiral Bridge, and he would not speak as positi\'ely 
as this if he were not e.xceedingly sure of his ground. It 
is a real pleasure to record his concurrence in the \icw 
expressed in these columns a fortnight ago. 
The more doubtful attitude taken by other writers 
seems to me to arise from two things. First, the original 
impression made by the Admiralty communique was that 
the action had been indecisive. And in spite of the clearer 
\ision that should have come with time, some writers, 
more bv accident than by intention I think, have said 
things that tend to perpetuate this illusion. Admiral 
Henderson, for instance, in calling attention to what I 
believe to be the second reason for confused judgment — 
namely, the fact that the main forces on both sides were 
widely separated — has likened the engagement to that of 
Mathews off Toulon in 1744. Apart from the bare fact 
that the British forces were divided on both occasions, 
there is manifestly no parallel at all. But it has misled 
others, notably Mr. Leyland, who reminds us that the 
majority of naval actions have been indecisive, as if 
the Battle of Jutland were a case in point. Surely 
nothing more decisive than the recent battle can well be 
imagined. One of the most distinguished of German 
admirals, the President of the German Naval League, von 
Koester, is clearly under no illu.sions whatever on this 
point. For speaking at a meeting of that extremely 
combatant body on Sunday last in Berlin, he explained 
that the ta.sk before the German Fleet was to protect 
Germany against enemy attacks, to keep open the ocean 
thoroughfares, to destroy the enemy's trade, and in the 
highest degree damage the enemy in revenge for his 
efforts to starve Germany. What more damning com- 
ment on the Kaiser's claim to a sea victory could be 
uttered ? His audience must have been rudely disil- 
lusioned. For protecting Germany against hostile attack 
has only one meaning. It is to forbid the use of the sea 
to the enemy as a line of communication for his invading 
forces, and it is immaterial whether the attack comes 
tlurough France, or directly through a point seized on the 
German coast. But since the second week in August, KJ14, 
the British Army has been transported over the sea for the 
attack of Germany without, so far as is known, the loss 
of a single transport, though their numbers have been 
incalculable. This part, then, of the German Fleet's task 
has never been attempted. And the ocean thoroughfares 
were closed before the first transport was sent ! Not 
since the 6th August has a German ship from overseas 
entered a German port. The third division of its duties 
has, it is true, been essayed. I'ifty-six British ships were 
captured or sunk by surface craft in the short five months 
before the last of the fugitive German cruisers was run 
down and sunk off Juan Fernandez. The talc of sub- 
marine success was longer — but so discreditable that it 
had to be abandoned in the face of the protests from the 
civilised world. The last of von Koester 's catagories 
is really the most interesting^ — to do the " utmost damage 
to the enemy." Apart from the submarine campaign, 
how has the Germany Navv sought to discharge this 
duty ? 
And first, we must realise that our Battle Cruiser 
Fleet stands in a relation to the Grand Fleet that has no 
parallel on the German side. The Grand Fleet without 
Sir David Beatty was undoubtedly superior in strength 
to the united German Fleet. We then could afford the 
luxury of division ships faster than the rest, because their 
fitness to "lie in the line" was sacrificed to speed. 
But the enemy was in a different case. It should 
long since have been recognised that as navies only 
exist to win or dispute the command of the sea, and 
that as command follows the victory of the main 
force of one side over the main force of the other, 
Germany in setting up a navy .should have concentrated 
her effort on producing the greatest amount of lighting 
force that her financial and other sacrifices would give 
her. Up to the completion of the Lutzow and the last 
of the Koenigs the big ship navy that Germany had 
actually built for herself consisted of six battle cruisers 
and 17 battleships. Why did she build battle-cruisers ? 
Battleships v. Battle-cruisers 
Writing immediately after Sir David Bcatty's pursuit 
of von Hipper in 1915, I pointed out that the most 
serious of Germany's naval mistakes was her failure to 
realise that no naval forces except those capable of dis- 
puting command with our main forces could be of the 
slightest use to her. The armoured cniiser Blucchcr 
and her six battle cruisers can hardly have cost her less 
than ^^14,000,000 sterling. This is a sum that would have 
produced at least seven battleships, of which five could 
have been ready at the outbreak of war. Had they been 
ready, Germany might have had 21 or 22 Dreadnoughts 
in commission in August, 1914, at a time when we had 
only 20 in the Grand Fleet I She seems to have built 
these battle cruisers for the curious reason given by von 
Koester, namely as instruments of revenge — engines of 
f rightfulness, like Zeppelins and submarines, that could 
wound the British even if useless for conquering them. 
Their whole employment from the beginning of the war 
has been consistent with tliis theory, and it was an em- 
ployment that on every occasion risked their existence. 
No doubt the extreme care with which the several raids 
on Yarmouth, Scarborough and then Lowestoft were 
arranged, reduced those risks to a minimum. But the 
risk was there and had it materialised should have been 
fatal. But for an accident to Lion the adventure of 
January 24th must certainly have been fatal. 
The German disposition at Jutland risked them once 
more, and this time quite fatally. They were risked 
because it was the essence of the German plan to fight a 
partial action^ — useless if it succeeded, ruinous if 
it failed. If three are destroyed, von Hipper's squadron, 
as a squadron, ceases to exist, even if the Hindenbcrg 
is finally commissioned and got ready for action. 
But. the point to bear in mind is this, was there 
something in the type that made this riskHng of the 
